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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Exploring Barriers To Effective Risk Management Through A Proposed Risk Governance 
Framework 
 
BY 
 
Edward Cho 
 
November 17, 2015 
 
 
Committee Chair: Danny N. Bellenger 
 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
 
 As harmful as the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was, some organizations professed some 
benefits as a result; “we know our risks better,” “we can better manage risks.”  Many of the 
organizations that hailed such positives undoubtedly had what would generally be considered 
sound risk management systems/practices (RMS).  So, what happened?  What prevented 
organizations RMS from perhaps better mitigating risk during the recent financial crisis than was 
the case?  Said another way, “what are barriers to effective risk management?”  This study 
proposes a risk governance framework (RGF) that helps distinguish phases of RMS, and is 
grounded in Risk principles versus a controls based foundation that many view as part of the 
current problem with RMS.  Based on our survey of 41 Risk Managers (RM) and 96 Regulators 
(REG), we obtained perspectives on barriers to effective risk management including barriers to 
effective risk management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the importance of Risk 
principles, and suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS.  We also obtained RM and 
REG perspectives of the impacts to RMS from our banking environment providing a type of 
“insurance,” impacts to RMS due to perceptions of the state of the financial/economic 
environment, how complete must phases of RMS be, compensation practices and its impacts to 
RMS, and the notion of quantitative/qualitative methods in current RMS.  Leading up to the 
xiv 
 
financial crisis of 2007-2009, identified barriers to effective risk management include a lack of 
risk culture and under estimating risks.  Some suggestions to improve RMS include improving 
the risk function and developing more dynamic, forwarding looking and preemptive risk 
management tools and techniques that blend quantitative and qualitative methods.  The proposed 
RGF and the rich context on barriers to effective risk management obtained from our study may 
help practitioners and academia alike in considering ways to analyze and improve RMS. 
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I CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
  
Risk management has existed as a technical discipline in financial institutions for many 
years and Regulators have assessed institutions on their ability to manage risk appropriately 
(McCormally, B. C., Allen, C. L., and Mayer, H. E., 2012; Hall, M., Mikes, A., and Millo, Y., 
2013).  Regulators and market participants alike have held the positives to “good management” 
that the discipline of risk management practices apparently brings (Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 
2011; COSO, 2004; ISO, 2009).  Although evidence that risk management prominence and 
stature continues to increase in organizations as policy initiatives expand enterprise controls to 
include risk management, the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, and continuing risk 
management failures, call for an examination of risk management practices (Bhimani, 2009; Hall 
et al., 2013).  With the number of years of risk managements’ existence, available 
procedures/processes, and its importance to organizations, we have to question why does risk 
management fail?  In this paper, we seek to explore perspectives on barriers to effective risk 
management.    
As the financial industry has had a history of crisis, including the most recent Great 
Recession, we seek to continue on those institutions subject to resolution plans (Cho, Mier, Jones 
and Bellenger, 2014) to explore what are barriers to effective risk management.  From a 
historical perspective, Martinez-Ruiz, E., and Pons, M.A.’s (2014) paper summarizes studies of 
past financial crisis.  While this historical analysis of past financial crisis revealed vulnerabilities 
in financial markets resulting from the globalization of financial systems and processes initiated 
in 1971, the analysis relied on the historical evidence from the first globalization (1870-1913) to 
draw similarities and differences (Martinez-Ruiz et al., 2014).  One of the studies is Marichal’s 
(2014) analysis of hearings published following what many economic historians view as the first 
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truly global financial crisis in modern capitalism called the “Great Depression of 1873-1896.”   
This analysis identified that pressure from the public who were troubled by the magnitude and 
effects of financial misconduct was the genesis of the resultant commissions established to 
investigate the crisis. These commission reports identified that key causes of the crisis included 
poor management and fraud (Martinez-Ruiz et al., 2014).  Marichal’s (2014) study indicates a 
period of calm in world finance until the financial crisis of 1907 that marked the beginning of a 
deep depression in the United States.  Some view the most important decision taken by the U.S. 
Congress was to establish the National Monetary Commission (NMC).  The NMC reassessed the 
role of banking systems culminating in the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank in 1913, which 
shaped the regulatory and institutional banking and financial architecture in the United States 
(Marichal, 2014). 
Another study by Minsky (1992) suggest that financial instability does not come as a 
consequence of external shocks but is rather an inherent phenomenon in the financial realm. 
Minsky’s (1992) Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) challenged the classic principles that the 
economy is constantly an equilibrium-seeking and sustaining system.  The FIH suggests that 
over periods of prolonged prosperity, capitalist economies, i.e., an economy with pricey capital 
assets and a sophisticated financial system tend to move from a financial structure dominated by 
stability to one of instability (Minsky, 1992).  As we can see from the most recent crisis of 2007-
2009, learning more about previous experiences does not prevent us from suffering new crises. 
All major financial crises over the last two centuries have incited disbelief because of their 
rapidity and the large costs that resulted (Marichal, 2014). This seems evident in the case of the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009.   
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The 2007-2009 global financial and economic crisis emerged as the most significant 
economic recession experienced by the United States since the Great Depression (Gökay, 2009). 
The financial crisis that emerged indicated a need for change as it revealed a unique financial 
system with a special ability to socialize losses while also privatizing profits (Guynn, 2012; 
Andersen, L. B., Häger, D., Maberg, S., Næss, M. B., and Tungland, M., 2012).  Indeed, the 
economic crisis raised questions on how institution leadership, including the boards and senior 
executives, were managing their institutions risks which resulted in calls to improve risk 
management in financial institutions (Beasley, M. S., Branson, B. C., and Hancock, B., 2010; 
Andersen et al., 2012).  Many have questioned the role and profile of risk management in 
financial institutions contending that challenges institutions faced were due in part to a lack of 
focus on identifying, assessing and managing their existing and emerging risks.  Some attribute 
this inability to the existence of a risk management system or framework that was incapable of 
identifying, assessing, mitigating and monitoring risks, and because institution leaders were 
overconfident about their informal approaches to risk management (Aebi, V., Sabato, G.,  and 
Schmid, M., 2012; Beasley et al., 2010; Harner, 2010).  
In the wake of this Great Recession, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA), to “promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end “too big to 
fail”, to protect the U.S. taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes” (Govtrack, 2010). The DFA increased the resolution 
powers of regulators and Section 165(d) established requirements of resolution plans (RPs), or 
“living wills” for the more than 130 systemically important financial institutions that own more 
than $50 billion in total consolidated assets (US Government Printing Office, 2012).  Section 165 
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also calls for risk management requirements for certain financial institutions to create 
independent board-level risk committees and establish or enhance its risk management, to one 
that operates on an enterprise-wide basis (Bugalla, J., Kallman, J., and Narvaez, K., 2014; 
McDonald, 2004; Martin, D., and Power, M., 2007; McCormally et al., 2012;). 
As suggested in Cho et al.’s (2014) recent study, the perspectives of the RPs resulting 
from Section 165(d) of the DFA resulted in mixed views of their effectiveness by the experts 
most closely involved with their creation and regulation, namely, employees of the affected 
banks (BANs) and federal regulators (REGs) with RP oversight responsibilities.  Cho et al.’s 
(2014) qualitative data provides rich perspectives from BANs and REGs, including strengths of 
RPs.  The main strength the respondents identified was RPs created greater understanding among 
BANs of their own organizations, including their complexity, dependencies, and risks. 
According to one BAN, the RPs “have forced institutions to reconsider their corporate structures, 
and have started them down the path to simplification.” Another BAN detailed that “they have 
exposed gaps in operational processes, strategic plans, and organizational structures that have 
been fixed as a result.” The responses to the study’s open ended questions fell into the primary 
category of “Greater Understanding” with the coded responses being, 1) Enhanced transparency 
on the operations and size of the organization; 2) Improved risk monitoring and reporting by 
BANs; and 3) Improved understanding of the institution and operational risks by BANs (Cho et 
al., 2014). 
As important that risk management is to the banking industry, and recognizing the 
aforementioned strengths as shared by the BANs and REGs indicating that RPs “enhanced 
transparency to operations,” “improved risk monitoring and reporting by bankers,” and 
“improved understanding of the institution and operational risks by bankers” (Cho et al, 2014), 
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why did it take a massive regulation such as DFA and its requirement for RPs to illicit such 
responses relative to “risk management?” Should this “improved understanding of risks” have 
been byproducts of the institutions risk management practices versus a regulatory requirement in 
the form of RPs?  The basic views on risk management is that its risk mitigation processes 
should be explicitly related to organizational and sub-organizational objectives and processes, 
yet many view that despite the growing complexities of risks faced by organizations, the level of 
risk management remains fairly immature (Power, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2013; 
COSO, 2004).  Many question whether risk management is evolving in the right direction and 
this appears questionable as extensive research in the discipline of risk management indicates as 
much.  Furthermore, our review of literature identified additional concerns relative to risk 
management.   
Current literature is varied and inconsistent on what challenges or barriers may exist to 
effective risk management.  A great deal of literature questions the most highly referenced of risk 
management concepts, enterprise-wide risk management (ERM), questioning its ability to enable 
institutions to manage risk effectively (Power, 2004; Power, 2004b; Schiller, F., and Prpich, G., 
2014; Mikes, 2009; Mikes, A., and Kaplan, R. S., 2014; Huber, C., and Scheytt, T., 2013). 
Criticism includes ERMs’ lacking in its ability due to its high ambiguity and to some that it is 
internal controls based and not empirically grounded (Paape, L., and Speklè, R. F., 2012; Schiller 
et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2007; Power, 2009; Huber et al., 2013).  Further, Schiller et al. (2014) 
suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and 
risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks, noting a failure to recognize the value 
of internal communication as it can result in poor integration of risk knowledge bases and risk 
management systems. 
6 
 
This paper aims to make several contributions to theory and practice. First, based on 
survey data from 130 institutions subject to the RP requirements of DFA, and perspectives of 
certain regulatory agencies examiners and analyst and bankers with risk management 
responsibilities, we explore barriers to effective risk management.  As noted, the study by Cho et 
al. (2014) identified that going through the process of creating RPs a benefit was improved risk 
management and knowing the organization better, yet, most of these institutions subject to RP 
undoubtedly had some level of risk management practices prior to DFA (McCormally et al., 
2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; Harner, 2010).  We seek to explore what are barriers to 
effective risk management.  This part of our study connects to previous work of Kleffner, A. E., 
Lee, R. B., and McGannon, B. (2003), and Beasley, M. S., Clune, R., and Hermanson, D. R., 
(2005), which calls for additional research including barriers to effective risk management.  Our 
study adds perspectives from those institutions risk management practices recently required to 
create RPs and certain agency’s regulators, thus providing insights, and practical perspectives to 
risk management professionals and academia.  
Our study to understand barriers to effective risk management requires a lens with which 
to explore these barriers (Arena, M., Arnaboldi, M., and Azzone, G., 2010).  To this end, which 
also represents our second contribution, we draw from Yaraghi, N., and Langhe, R. G., (2011) 
risk management systems/practices (RMS) study, which identified critical success factors to 
RMS.  We adapted as three phases of RMS, “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration” 
and some of the noted success factors, to explore these barriers.  This connects with his call for 
leveraging these factors and phases of RMS in different empirical ways relative to risk 
management.  Third, we refined the factors and phases of our RMS by drawing from Mikes et 
al.’s (2014) study which suggests three ERM design parameters and three contingency variables 
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classifying different types of risk events.  The three design parameters are, (1) Processes for 
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; (2) Frequency of risk meetings; and (3) Risk tools.  
The three contingency variables classify different types of risk events as, (1) Preventable risks; 
(2) Strategic execution risks; and (3) External risks.  As Mikes et al. (2014) indicates that 
organizations risks are contingent on context and circumstances, she offers these as ideas about 
what risk management may depend on.   
Lundqvist’s (2014) research explored what an ERM firm “looks like” and suggests four 
pillars as integral to the implementation of an ERM as, (1) General internal environment and 
objective setting; (2) General control activities and information and communication; (3) Holistic 
organization of risk management; and (4) Specific risk identification and risk assessment 
activities.  A primary motivator of her study was the use of inconsistent indicators and measures 
of ERM implementation.  Given the nature of these pillars, we refined our RMS by aligning 
these pillars as underlying concepts that we view as important considerations for the phases of 
our RMS.   Relative to Mikes et al.’s (2014) and Lundqvist’s (2014) studies and resultant 
contributions, while we find these to be compelling and providing substantive detail, we thought 
of these as exactly that; key “details,” which we likened to having savory sausage meat without 
the casing.  Hence, we adapted this detail to the RMS to provide it some model structure which 
may ease the ability of practitioners to draw from as they consider this valuable detail for their 
risk management efforts and practices. This connects with their calls for leveraging these design 
parameters and contingency variables, and furthering analysis of the four pillars.   
As noted, Schiller et al. (2014) suggests that organizations risk management is limited 
due to a lack of the concept of risk and risk knowledge generation with current ERM 
frameworks, noting a failure to recognize the value of internal communication as it can result in 
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poor integration of risk knowledge bases and risk management systems.  As such, our fourth 
contribution is our proposed new “risk governance framework” (RGF).  We draw from van 
Asselt et al.’s (2011) risk governance study which explicates the idea that risk management is to 
help risk professionals to familiarize themselves with a broader concept of risk. We view that 
what may be missing from these normative ERM frameworks are underlying guidelines that can 
inform thinking about how to deal with uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous risks in various 
contexts.  These three risk principles are, (1) Communication and Inclusion; (2) Integration; and 
(3) Reflection.  We connect with her efforts to synthesize risk governance and incorporate these 
principles to serve as the underlying guiding risk principles of our proposed RGF.   In summary, 
our research on barriers to effective risk management through the lens of the proposed RGF, 
which incorporates the RMS enhanced as noted above, provides a risk governance framework 
with an RMS empirically grounded in success factors and corresponding phases, and risk theory 
based principles serving as underlying guidance, will provide a sound lens with which to explore 
perspectives on barriers to effective risk management.  Tables 26, 27, 28, and 29 reflect the 
critical success factor variables and three phases adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011) and 
enhanced with the parameters and variables from Mikes et al. (2014).  Table 30 reflects the RMS 
design parameters and contingent variables adapted from Mikes et al. (2014).  Table 31 reflects 
the four pillars of RMS implementation adapted from Lundqvist (2014).  Table 32 reflects the 
three guiding risk principles adapted from van Asselt et al. (2011).  Table 33 reflects the 
proposed RGF which draws from Yaraghi et al. (2011), Mikes et al. (2014), Lundqvist (2014), 
and van Asselt et al. (2011).  See Appendix A for these Tables. 
In the next sections we provide a perspective of risk and risk management, followed by a 
discussion on the evolution of risk management and the rise of enterprise-wide risk management.  
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This is followed by perspectives on various challenges of risk management including views on 
challenges with implementing an enterprise-wide risk management framework.  Sections three 
and four present the methodology and discussion of our results.  The final section five reflects 
our conclusions, implications, limitations, and future research suggestions. 
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II CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
II.1 Overview of Risk and Risk Management 
Risk and risk management began to receive regular exposure only from about the mid-
1990's onwards (Power, 2004b; Hall et al., 2013; Power, 2009; Kleffner et al., 2003; Arena et al., 
2010; Martin et al., 2007).  Extensive research on risk has still not produced a widely accepted 
definition of the term which should not be surprising as risk is studied in a broad range of fields, 
ranging from sciences to finance and medicine to engineering and over varied disciplines and 
perspectives (Doorn, 2013; Bhimani, 2009).  The very concept of "risk" itself, implies the ex-
ante possibility that things can go wrong including the possibility of damage, loss or injury 
whether in health, environmental or other terms (Power, 2004b; Harner, 2010; van Asselt et al., 
2011; Corbett, 2013).  The ambiguity surrounding the term risk provides various actors with a 
broad concept upon which they can pursue their interests; hence, it is a fundamental element that 
drives financial behavior (Talwar, 2011; Huber et al., 2013; Bhimani, 2009).  In the business 
context, the concept of risk includes not only the probability of loss but also the consequences of 
that loss or risk event (Power, 2004b; Harner, 2010; Talwar, 2011).  Historic perspective reveals 
that within organizations and organizations in varying industries have taken more of a silo 
approach thus managing risk differently and separately (Bromiley, P., McShane, M., Nair, A., 
and Rustambekov, E., 2014).  This can be seen, for example, by a finance department addressing 
interest rate risks or risk associated with currency, and operations focusing on safety and quality 
control risks (Bromiley et al., 2014).   
Relative to risk management, it is an intuitive concept and is as much art as it is science 
(Doorn, 2013; McCormally et al., 2012; Mikes, 2011). Risk management may be defined as a 
process directed towards identifying, evaluating, and determining the risks an organization is 
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exposed to and developing policies, processes, and procedures to monitor and manage the risks 
identified (Talwar, 2011; Hall et al., 2013).  Some view risk management as the key to the 
banking industries continued survival and growth as they are in the business of managing risk, 
not avoiding it (Talwar, 2011). Organizations seek to define the most favorable levels of adverse 
outcomes based on an assessment of probability and impact, and then focus on those risks 
considered unacceptable (Power, 2004b; Huber et al., 2013a; Power, 2009).  Risk management 
practices are viewed as an efficient and reasonable means to test institution policies, procedures, 
processes, practices, and products to reduce the harmful impacts of risk taking without stifling it; 
in many ways, risk management is a central corporate governance task as it sustains value 
creation (Huber et al., 2013; Mikes, 2008; Andersen et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2007; Pirson, M., 
and Turnbull, S., 2011).  This expression of an organization’s risk attitude at the level of the 
organization as a whole is referred to as its “risk appetite” and the Committee of the Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) defines it as “the amount of risk, on a 
broad level, an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of value” (COSO, 2004; Paape et al., 2012). 
The goal of risk management is not viewed as the elimination of all risk, but the pursuit 
of sensible and informed risk profiling and decision making toward increased returns (Harner, 
2010; Talwar, 2011).  Thus some consider that risk management issues demand greater 
democracy in the decision process as risk management touches many areas, and that risk 
knowledge itself is so uncertain, risk management may not be able to claim any unique authority 
(Power, 2004b).  Therefore, risk management finds they are presented as risk experts, but 
admitting that many areas of relevant knowledge are essentially conjectural (Power, 2004b).  
Indeed, in financial institutions, risk management has often been described as a highly abstract 
yet analytical activity (Mikes, 2011).  McCormally et al. (2012) suggests that financial 
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institutions face unique challenges in risk management as they are exposed to traditional 
business risks, and also to those inherent in the business of banking—for example, credit risks, 
and interest rate risks. Financial institutions operate in a heavily regulated environment that 
creates compliance risks of its own, and failure to manage these risks to the satisfaction of 
regulators may result in enforcement actions and significant reputational harm (McCormally et 
al., 2012).   
Empirical work has highlighted the proliferation of risk management into different 
domains such as higher education, banking, and agriculture (Huber et al., 2013; Termeer, 2009). 
Risk management has been gaining ground in banking, fuelled by regulators and market 
participants calls for “good management” that the discipline of risk management practices brings 
as a corporate governance and management control practice applicable across all industries 
(Mikes, 2009; Power, 2009; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; Paape et al., 2012; COSO, 2004; 
ISO, 2009).  Further, their expectations regarding risk management have been rising rapidly, 
especially since the recent financial crisis.  In that crisis, weaknesses in risk management 
practices that included governance side and financial risk modelling issues became visible, and it 
seems that the importance of risk management elevates in times of failures or crisis (Mikes, 
2011; Harner, 2010).  The financial crisis of 2007–2009 led regulators to call for firms to focus 
on enterprise-wide risk oversight and institutions faced significant pressure to strengthen their 
risk management systems and control practices, and to take appropriate actions to improve 
stakeholder value protection (Paape et al., 2012; Bhimani, 2009).   Significant public policy 
debates and propagated new risk management rules by regulators and standard setters evidenced 
these pressures (Paape et al., 2012; Mikes, 2011; Bhimani, 2009).  The importance of making 
risk management “count” in high-level strategic decisions is perhaps the most agreed upon 
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lesson that industry actors are taking from the recent financial crisis (Mikes, 2009).  As Mikes’ 
(2009) noted from a Wall Street quote, “After an era of go–go growth that led firms into 
profitable but chancy areas like mortgage securities, the industry is moving toward the kind of 
leader who gets down into the nitty-gritty of risk management.” 
II.2 Evolution of Risk Management 
In light of the recent financial crisis, Power’s (2004) study resonates today in that the risk 
management of everything turned out to be the risk management of nothing (Power, 2009; 
Mikes, 2011). No other term has received such a significant echo in the media during the global 
financial crisis of 2007-2009 than that of risk management (Huber et al., 2013; Power, 2009). In 
the approximate 20 years prior to this event, the interest in risk management has steadily 
increased (Bhimani, 2009; Huber et al., 2013).  Risk management has emerged as a means for 
managing potential adverse organizational outcomes by using “probability x impact” frameworks 
to define parameters to assess and differentiate acceptable levels of unfavorable outcomes 
(Huber et al., 2013a; Jordan, S., Jørgensen, L., and Mitterhofer, H., 2013; Kaplan, R. S., and 
Mikes, A., 2012; McCormally et al. 2012). Risk management has shifted from a back-office, 
defensive role into a fundamental part of the business model and has emerged as a means of 
providing ex-ante rationalizations of the limits of prospective organizational action to optimize 
the outcomes of those actions (Huber et al., 2013a; Power, 2004b).  This redefines the lens 
through which undesirable events can be assessed, tolerated, and managed by organizations 
(Huber et al., 2013a). 
Some view the rise of risk management is a self-protective reply to a more demanding 
organizational environment of consumers and stakeholders (Power, 2004).  Power (2004) 
indicates that risk management has been characterized by an increasing focus on risk 
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management of secondary risk such as reputation risks, which he views as a serious concern to 
the concept of risk management and to society.  Risk related regulatory reforms, including the 
Turnbull report, the listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the U.S. 
Department of Justice Sentencing Guidelines, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, significantly 
expanded societies’ perspectives and public policies related to effective risk management, and 
the rise of this regulatory conception of risk management, finds its roots in internal controls 
(Beasley et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2007; Arena et al., 2010; Harner, 2010; ICAEW, 1999; Gates, 
2006). Risk management has been high on the agenda of finance practitioners and scholars as its 
focus has broadened to include more questions of internal control, and new risk categories 
including operational and reputational risks (Mikes, 2009; Huber et al., 2013a).  When applied to 
areas outside finance departments, traditional statistical-driven techniques gave way to broader 
and nebulous methodologies (Huber et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011).   
The growth of risk management out of internal controls has evolved risk management 
into an intensified focus on auditability of processes, and corresponding trails of documentation 
to evidence organizational adherence to interested stakeholders (Power, 2004b; Tekathen, M., 
and Dechow, N., 2013; Bhimani, 2009; Jordan et al., 2013).  Power’s (2009) disheartening view 
on the growth of risk management - the risk management of nearly everything - was less about 
managing risk as it is formally understood and more about organizations creating evidence of 
due process. Instead of managing risk, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 found extreme risk-
taking to have played a pivotal role (Dobbin, 2010), and that risk management may have helped 
disguise poor risk practices (Huber et al., 2013).  
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II.2.1 Enterprise-wide Risk Management 
Yet, risk management continues to be viewed as relevant and important in many 
industries and types of organizations and this is especially so when risk management takes on 
what many view as its most popular paradigm called enterprise-wide risk management (ERM).  
In September 2004, the COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework, to 
provide a model framework for ERM. The framework defines ERM as:  
A process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, 
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events 
that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives (COSO, 2004; 
Beasley et al., 2005; Harner, 2010; Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2009; Beasley et al., 2010). 
COSO is a coalition of the main accounting and finance trade associations in the United States 
and was formed due to the fraudulent financial reporting issues in the mid-1980s (Power, 2009; 
COSO, 2004; Power, 2007). 
As we discussed, and considering the influence of the internal controls foundation over 
risk management, it is important to note COSO’s 1992 Internal Control – Integrated Framework 
which suggested that: by calling upon the risk awareness of employees, an internal risk culture 
can be created; risk attitudes are aligned with strategies and objectives; hazards and opportunities 
are identified in relation to an organization’s objectives; and risks are assessed by the potential 
likelihood and impact of their harm (Schiller et al., 2014; COSO, 1992). Schiller et al., (2014) 
suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and 
risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks, which may be indicative of why 
current risk management has lost sight of the value of integrating risk knowledge bases and risk 
management systems.  Instead, it seems that the COSO (1992) guidance provides the precursor 
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conceptual building blocks for the COSO 2004 ERM as a controls-based approach to risk 
management, thus a direct influence on ERM can be traced to an accounting conception of 
internal control (Power, 2009).   
Hence, the ERM model is strongly influenced by accounting and auditing standards of 
control, with an emphasis on detailed controls supported with robust documentation evidencing 
effectiveness of the controls (Power, 2009; Talwar, 2011; Jordan et al., 2013).  Our proposed risk 
governance framework seems warranted as it foundationally rest on risk governance principles 
versus emphasizing standards of internal controls which may enhance the understanding of risks 
and the ways in which actors and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by 
uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011) that appear to be lacking with 
current organizational risk management (Schiller et al., 2014). 
Nonetheless, while ERM has various sources feeding the same basic idea, the COSO 
(2004) version has become a global framework for best practice (Power, 2009; Paape et al., 
2012; Huber et al., 2013).  In a study by Viscelli (2013) 64% of interviewees indicated that they 
leveraged COSO as a reference or starting point but did not follow it in detail which is a telling 
sign and indicative of the inconsistency in ERMs noted in some research.  ERM was viewed as 
one response to growing expectations by various stakeholders as a possible effective response to 
risk management challenges (Beasley et al., 2005; Paape et al., 2012). Broadly described as a 
“process,” ERM requires a business entity to develop an organization-wide, top down approach 
to identifying, assessing, managing, and monitoring risks that would prevent the organization 
from meeting its objectives and managing risks throughout its operations (Beasley et al., 2005; 
Kleffner et al., 2003; Harner, 2010; Pirson et al., 2011; McCormally et al. 2012; Mikes et al., 
2014; Viscelli, 2013; Talwar, 2011; Arena et al., 2010; Jordan et al., 2013).  ERM is an 
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integrated risk-management framework intended to improve knowledge of and communication 
about possible risks throughout the firm, and was designed to increase the boards and senior 
management’s ability to oversee these risks (Beasley et al., 2005; Kleffner et al., 2003; Harner, 
2010; Pirson et al., 2011; McCormally et al. 2012; Mikes et al., 2014; Viscelli, 2013).  
ERM differs from earlier views of risk management with its enterprise focus, and holistic 
versus silo approach where strategic, operational, compliance risks, and financial risks, are 
addressed concurrently (Paape et al., 2012; Harner, 2010; Kleffner et al., 2003; Schiller et al., 
2014; Gates, 2006; Mikes, 2009). For operational risk, organizations were encouraged to 
consider the Basel II regulatory definition, “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events” (Basel, 2004).  Operational risk 
is broad and includes costs associated from human error, legal liabilities, natural disasters, and 
can include cyber security threats and regulatory fines, while strategic risks covers the hard-to-
quantify risks that threaten key strategic and business objectives (Basel, 2004; Mikes, 2008; 
Andersen et al., 2012; Heltman, 2015). In these secondary risks such as strategy and reputation 
risk, we saw efforts to quantify risks in an effort to formalize management’s judgement and 
knowledge (Burchell, S., Clubb, C., Hopwood, A., Hughes, J., and Nahapiet, J., 1980).  The 
COSO ERM concept defines risk management using a top-down approach that segments 
managerial responsibilities at all levels of decision making and planning (COSO, 2004). It 
considers, for example, that “each manager should be accountable to the next higher level for his 
or her portion of enterprise risk management, with the CEO ultimately accountable to the board” 
(Tekathen et al., 2013; Arena et al., 2010; COSO, 2004).  The intent of this integrated approach 
was to help companies deal with risks and opportunities more effectively, enhancing the 
organization’s ability to create and preserve value for its stakeholders, and to promote more 
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efficient use of capital in financial and non-financial institutions alike (Power, 2009; Kleffner et 
al., 2003; COSO, 2004).   
The COSO ERM is represented as a three-dimensional matrix of eight elements deemed 
essential for achieving strategic, operational, reporting and compliance goals (COSO, 2004) and 
an organizations risk appetite is a key concept in the COSO ERM framework. Risk appetite 
refers to “the amount of risk, on a broad level, an entity is willing to accept in pursuit of value” 
(COSO, 2004). This expresses the organization’s risk attitude at the level of the organization as a 
whole (Power, 2009; Paape et al., 2012). Risk appetite is the starting point of COSO type ERM, 
and according to COSO (2004), consideration and defining of the organizations risk appetite is 
essential for successful risk management. Risk appetite may be expressed in qualitative or 
quantitative terms, and at lower levels of an organization in the form of risk tolerances that are 
subsequently aggregated (COSO, 2004; Power, 2009; Paape et al., 2012; Harner, 2010). While 
the design and implementation of ERM is firm specific, it involves mapping the firm's business 
strategies and risks.  At its core, ERM revolves around efficient and effective communication 
and monitoring of the organization's risks against its risk portfolio.  In addition to the risk 
appetite, organizations are encouraged to develop key risk indicators that facilitate more 
effective monitoring of potential risk events (Harner, 2010; COSO, 2004). In 2009, COSO issued 
a thought paper, titled Strengthening Enterprise Risk Management for Strategic Advantage, to 
discuss the importance of the board's role in ERM and to provide some guidance in strengthening 
risk-management practices and complying with anticipated regulatory mandates on risk 
management to assist boards in fulfilling their role (Harner, 2010).   
Once a company achieves a certain level of ERM sophistication, risk oversight begins to 
take on an independent status, and ways this has been signified include the appointment of a 
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“chief risk officer” or the transfer of risk oversight to an area such as strategic planning to avoid 
possible conflicts of interest in responsibilities (Gates, 2006). The purpose of such independence 
was that many organizations used outside auditors to design and establish the ERM objectives 
and sought to avoid the conflict of interest inherent in having them then be responsible for 
evaluating those same ERM processes (Gates, 2006).  To this end, as a professional group, risk 
managements role included accommodating the demands of various stakeholder groups: 
regulators, corporate executives, shareholders, debt-holders and the general public (Mikes, 
2008). 
II.2.2 Role of Risk Management 
It is believed by some that ERM provides a source of competitive advantage for those 
who can demonstrate a strong ERM capability and discipline (Beasley et al., 2005; Lessard, D., 
and Lucea, R., 2009). In Mikes’ (2008) study, the interviewed senior risk officers emphasized 
that the risk function creates strategic value when risk professionals partner with the business 
lines and help them understand the cost of risk taking.  ERM factors from a governance and 
organization perspective are:  A clearly defined risk appetite articulated through limits and 
monitoring procedures; Involvement of the board; Centralized ERM organizational functions in 
place; A set of risk committees at both corporate and business unit levels that ensure proper 
communication and help to in-still risk awareness into the culture of the business (McDonald, 
2004; Schiller et al., 2014; Talwar, 2011).  An ERM framework should align the organization 
standards and policies, risk measurement methodologies, and systems and tools (McDonald, 
2004; Pirson et al., 2011; McCormally et al. 2012; Mikes et al., 2014; Viscelli, 2013).   
The role of risk management became more important as rating agencies introduced 
requirements and from continued promulgation of risk management by regulation.  In May 2008, 
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Standard & Poor’s announced its efforts in evaluating an issuer’s ERM processes as an 
additional component of their credit evaluation procedures (Standard & Poor’s, 2008). In March 
2010, the Securities & Exchange Commission amended required proxy disclosures by requiring 
publicly traded companies to begin describing the board’s role in risk management practices 
(Beasley et al., 2010; McCormally et al. 2012).  While many financial institutions were already 
subject to, or encouraged to act by, these requirements, it was not until 2010 that the DFA 
created statutory ERM requirements explicitly for financial institutions (McCormally et al. 2012; 
Bugalla, J., Kallman, J., and Narvaez, K., 2014; McDonald, 2004; Martin et al., 2007).  Changes 
in NYSE governance rules include requirements for NYSE registrant audit committees to assume 
responsibilities with respect to ‘‘risk assessment and risk management,’’ including risks beyond 
financial reporting (Beasley et al., 2005; NYSE, 2003). Basel Committee’s Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision, require regulators of banks to ensure that all banks in their 
country have in place a suitable risk management process to identify, measure, monitor and 
control risks (Talwar, 2011).  This, in part, pressed regulatory agencies to become more explicit 
about having a risk-based approach to regulation.  Regulators have repeatedly emphasized five 
areas: effective structural governance, robust and independent internal audit functions, consistent 
flow of risk-related information to the highest levels of the institution, instilling a strong 
corporate culture, and early identification of risks (McCormally et al., 2012). 
Some recent studies have provided perspectives on the roles that risk management plays 
in organizations and determined that it can depend on the type of “calculative culture” within the 
organization (Mikes, 2008).  Mikes’ (2011) study identified two types of risk management: one 
driven by a strong shareholder value imperative (risk management by the numbers), the other 
corresponding to the demands of the risk-based internal control imperative (holistic risk 
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management).  The differences in the two styles are attributed to the calculative culture of 
“quantitative enthusiasm” and “quantitative scepticism” (Mikes, 2009; Mikes, 2008).  This 
shapes management preferences towards risk management, hence impacting the role that risk 
management plays in an organization.  “Quantitative enthusiasts” aim to replace judgmental risk 
assessments with risk quantification whereas “quantitative sceptics” turn to risk modelling with 
caution, and are wary of managing risks by numbers and rely more on executive judgement 
(Mikes, 2009; Talwar, 2011).  In light of the new regulatory requirements in financial 
institutions, it is not surprising that risk managers are under pressure and are tasked by boards 
and senior leadership to be able to demonstrate how the organization is meeting its risk 
management responsibilities (Mikes, 2008).  Hence, the role of risk management also includes 
the production of risk reports, risk maps, stress test, and scenario analysis, and to also satisfy 
regulatory expectations (Mikes, 2009; Mikes et al., 2014; Jordan et al., 2013).  Risk maps are 
based on risk identification and assessment processes, stress tests are based on data collection 
and statistical analysis, and scenario analyses are based on possible risk events that the 
organization may find itself impacted by (Mikes, 2009; Mikes et al., 2014; Jordan et al., 2013).  
In particular, regulators will look to see whether the information reaches senior management and 
whether and under what circumstances information reaches the Audit Committee, Risk 
Committee, and board (McCormally et al., 2012). 
From a scholar’s perspective one might believe that, with such an abundance of 
principles, guidelines, and standards, risk management is a mature discipline with clear and 
proven concepts and tools used by organizations in practice (Mikes, 2014).  However, this does 
not appear to be the case as risk management systems are largely unproven and still emerging 
(Mikes, 2014).  Many organizations are not implementing ERM’s (Viscelli, 2013) and if they 
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are, they are creating their own hybrid systems to manage risk (Arena et al., 2010; Mikes, 2011; 
Jordan et al., 2013; Mikes, 2014).  This is impactful as it makes it difficult to ascertain whether 
or not risk management systems such as ERM are creating their supposed value (Huber et al., 
2013a; Mikes, 2008; Andersen et al., 2012; Martin et al., 2007; Pirson et al., 2011).  Also, while 
some of the studies discussed provide perspectives on the role that risk management plays in 
organizations, the wide variety in risk management systems makes it challenging to understand 
the dynamics and components impacting risk management practices which affects the research in 
this space.  Further, many practitioners have expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed 
normative and regulatory ERM frameworks (Mikes, 2014; Paape et al., 2012; Arena et al., 2010).  
Research into barriers to effective risk management is needed and our study seeks to provide a 
sound risk governance framework with which to explore what these barriers may be. 
II.3 Challenges of Risk Management 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has negatively impacted the reputation of risk 
management as a suitable response to uncertainty (Huber et al., 2013; Tekathen et al., 2013).  
Some literature indicates that organizational focus is on adhering to expectations and avoiding 
potential blame by evidencing their conformance to regulatory requirements and document trails.  
Indeed, Power (2009) suggest that ERM might be better termed the ‘risk management of 
nothing’ being nothing more than an emblematic response to a growing audit culture, with little 
and even dysfunctional, impacts on routine operations (Huber et al., 2013a). This focus on 
auditability by interested stakeholders may cause organizations to overlook perhaps weaker 
indicators that may actually point towards risks (Power, 2004; Huber et al., 2013; Tekathen et al., 
2013).  In turn, organizations address what is referred to as policy risks thus prompting 
organization focus on meeting and adhering to policy actions called for by regulators and 
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governments (Ghoshal, 1987).  Hence, we can see the evolved accounting or internal controls 
based risk management systems serving as organizational compliance mechanisms or 
“rationalization machines” which have been implicated as the reason for some company’s 
failure, as risk management was relegated to a compliance function (Ghoshal, 1987; Beasley et 
al., 2010; Mikes et al., 2014; Burchell et al., 1980; Kaplan et al., 2012). Organizations can then 
project an illusion of control to sustain external legitimacy while doing little in practice to 
actually manage problems (Huber et al., 2013a; Martin et al., 2007; Powers, 2004).  
The perception that risk management was part of a “tools culture” driven by concerns for 
audit and control undermined the extent to which organizations felt it could improve decision-
making (Huber et al., 2013a).  Hence, many people question the value in investing further in 
their organizations risk management system and practices (Beasley et al., 2010).  This effect may 
be compounded by the notion that as it enters the organization, risk management systems such as 
ERM inevitably encounter other legacy risk management systems or practices which introduces 
variations in risk management practices (Arena et al., 2010).  Most financial institutions have 
some kind of risk management system in place, but most of these systems are piecemeal 
approaches, which is further accentuated as many organization leaders believe their ad hoc and 
informal approaches are adequate and appropriate (Talwar, 2011; Beasley et al., 2010).  
ERM may be relevant for regulators and others in need of proof of good governance as 
existing top-down designs for ERM are valued by regulators seeking to make senior 
management accountable, but such approaches are not realistic as it has become progressively 
detached from the reality of modern financial organizations and are not grounded in the demand 
for management action, which is always somehow “outside” the framework (Martin et al., 2007).  
Indeed, the recurring instances of risk management system weaknesses have often been 
24 
 
implicated as a contributor to the widespread failure of managerial and regulatory intelligence 
suggesting that the approach to, or implementation of, risk management practices is deficient in 
some respect (Power, 2009; Harner, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010).  This indicates room for 
improving underlying processes and procedures to strengthen an organization’s identification, 
assessment, and reporting of key risk exposures arising across all aspects of the organization 
(Power, 2009; Harner, 2010; Beasley et al., 2010). To this end, identifying barriers to effective 
risk management may bridge the gap between literature and practice in the field of risk 
management thus providing practitioners the ability to draw from these factors to better focus 
their limited resource on those things which really make the difference between success and 
failure (Yaraghi et al., 2011).  Research into identifying barriers to effective risk management is 
needed to help provide such insights and perspectives to risk management professionals and 
academia alike. 
II.3.1 Barriers to Risk Management 
Current assessment still finds that empirical work on ERM is limited and can be 
classified along three main lines of research – describing the ERM practice, analyzing the 
determinants of ERM adoption, and assessing the valuation effect of ERM (Eckles, D. L., Hoyt, 
R. E., and Miller, S. M., 2014).  In most cases, our review of risk management literature has 
found that the focus of the articles was not explicitly to seek barriers to effective risk 
management, however, our analysis has identified certain salient themes relative to barriers to 
effective risk management which can be categorized as strategy, organization structure, 
organization culture, communication, bias, process design/tools, and a final theme of the barrier 
being the concept of risk management itself. These are not presented as an exhaustive list, but the 
perspectives provide views of possible barriers to effective risk management. 
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It does not appear that literature supports that organizations are linking ERM to strategy 
(Viscelli, 2013).  Poor level of board involvement and strategic oversight was found to be 
impactful towards ensuring the firms risk appetite was broadly understood in the organization 
(McCormally et al. 2012).  In one case study, it appeared that a banks inability to secure the faith 
of the board in strategic discussions affected its risk management capabilities (Mikes, 2009).   
Organization structure led to a great deal of variability in a study where the multiplicity of local 
risk management circles throughout the firm led to data inconsistencies (Tekathen et al., 2013). 
Organizations may recognize certain risks and potential events were important, but in practice, 
there was no overarching strategy or process design, hence it was not clear who in the 
organization owned responsibility for “information objects” (Tekathen et al., 2013).  One study 
found that a deterrent to risk management systems such as ERM was an organization structure 
that discouraged ERM (Kleffner et al., 2003).   
Organizational culture was found to be a major deterrent to risk management as risk 
management practices were discouraged and resistance to change was constant; some studies 
reflected a rebellious tone where risk management practices were treated by managers as 
unavoidable tasks imposed by the parent company that did not add value to their existing 
knowledge (Kleffner et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2010).   One study’s finding suggested that the 
observed poor risk management practices could be linked to an unhealthy organizational culture 
which played a significant role in the failure to implement sound risk management practices 
(Andersen et al., 2012).   “Mind-sets” can be impacted as a study showed that less attention was 
paid to those issues where responsibilities were shared, which suggested that rather than 
challenging organizational practices, it acted as a force toward organizational conservatism thus 
reinforcing existing understanding and practice (Huber et al., 2013a).  As noted in a recent Wall 
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Street article, Thomas Baxter, general counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated 
in a speech on culture, “I confess that proof is hard to come by, yet I am not alone in the 
fundamental belief that a strong organizational culture will lead to better behaviour” (Glazer, E., 
and Rexrode, C., 2015). Organizational culture has also been found to negatively impact the 
notion of accountability as a study noted that accountability became an object of desire rather 
than an effect of their practice (Tekathen et al., 2013).  Organization culture was identified in a 
study of Malaysian public companies of independent non-executive directors as impacting, or 
being barriers to, their effectiveness in performing their roles (Annuar, 2012).  Organizational 
culture has been widely held to be the major barrier to creating and leveraging knowledge assets 
and in one study of policy formulation contributed to the observed fear of undermining an 
existing policy (David, W., and Fahey, L., 2000; Termeer, 2009).  
Harner’s (2010) research noted apparent weaknesses in communication as risk managers 
rarely discussed or assessed the company's overall risk profile and instead confined their risk 
management to separate and individual silos.  Communication challenges can come in the form 
of pressure to conform due to positive feedback loops as Hindmoor and McConnell’s (2013) 
study found that where a policy is perceived as being generally successful, a positive feedback 
emerges where pressures to extend a policy form resulting in risk signals being discounted.  
Harm in the form of miscommunication may arise as a study by Huber et al. (2013a) suggested 
that while the language of risk created a common “currency” with which to communicate, it also 
created potential for serious miscommunication as risk assessments communicated the most 
likely impacts of policy options, and paid little attention to related uncertainties.  Communication 
through documentation can present challenges as the more parties touch the documents, the 
communicated character of specific issues can become opaque with each additional review 
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(Tekathen et al., 2013).  Timeliness in communication of risk information was realized in one 
study where the needs for timelier and firmer signals to decision makers were identified (Mikes, 
2009).  The lack of communication in the form of organizational silence is a paradox where most 
employees know the truth about certain issues and problems yet do not speak of it to their 
supervisors (Morrison, E. W., and Milliken, F. J., 2000).   
Relative to bias, organizations may be pressured to deliver upon immediate goals which 
results in bias toward the preservation of existing institution policies and procedures leading to 
minimizing the need to clarify and communicate risks (Hindmoor et al., 2013; Harner, 2010; 
Termeer, 2009).  Mikes (2014) indicates that organizational biases, such as “groupthink,” which 
is akin to organizational silence, also inhibit good thinking about risks. Groupthink arises when 
individuals, still in doubt about a course of action that the majority has approved, decide to keep 
quiet and go along (Mikes, 2014; Morrison et al., 2000).   
Process design/tools challenges can be seen in circumstances where risk management 
practices were not able to be supported by the risk applications and infrastructure (Martin et al., 
2007).  In Mikes’ (2009) study, process design may have proved impactful as the process of 
treating “red signals” were treated as learning opportunities which prompted revisions of limits 
versus the process being designed to risk manage and intervene.  Power’s (2009) study indicated 
potential process design issues where the need to embed “risk management and internal control 
systems within business processes” was an understood imperative, yet, there was little 
elaboration of what that might involve.  Termeer’s (2009) case study found that the framing of a 
situation as a crisis or a race to reach a deadline put additional pressure on the process, causing 
managers to fall back on methods and tactic’s they were familiar with.  Tools or risk models was 
a point of challenge for a bank in Mikes’ (2009) study in that risk personnel spent a great deal of 
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time on calculating how much risk they had and ignored the bigger picture.  Further, a risk 
controller in the study was not convinced that a risk tool was able to accurately reflect the 
underlying risk exposure and its dynamics (Mikes, 2009).   
Some studies question facets of risk management including the paradigm ERM and the 
notion of risk silos.  Tekathen et al. (2013) suggest that the implementation of ERM does not 
ensure organizational risk management but instead actualizes the ambiguity and heterogeneity of 
organizational risk practices. Paape et al. (2012) indicated that they found no evidence that 
application of the COSO framework improves risk management effectiveness to help 
organizations establish sound risk management (Schiller et al., 2014). One study identified an 
obstacle to risk management being the existence of the silo risk mentality (Kleffner et al., 2003).  
Hall et al.’s (2013) study expressed the negative of the organization having compartmentalized 
risk, i.e., operation risk, credit risk, market risk, and reputation risk, when they should be viewed 
as all interacting.  A top Federal Reserve official said the central bank is still grappling with how 
to quantify certain types of risk for which incidents are unpredictable such as operational risk at 
the largest banks much less identify reliable controls to manage them (Heltman, 2015).  
As can be seen above, while most of the studies did not explicitly seek to identify barriers 
to effective risk management, our analysis reveals the identification of several factors that may 
denote barriers to effective risk management. The study by Cho et al. (2014) identified that going 
through the process of creating RPs a benefit was improved risk management and knowing the 
organization better, yet, most of these institutions subject to RP undoubtedly had some level of 
risk management practices prior to DFA (McCormalley et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 
2011; Harner, 2010).  We seek to explore what are barriers to effective risk management.   
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II.3.2 Proposed Risk Governance Framework 
Yaraghi et al. (2011) developed critical success factors related to risk management and 
developed them in a way to show how these factors relate to each other, and how RMS strategies 
can be defined, monitored, and controlled to provide adequate treatment to these factors from the 
time a organization decides to implement RMS, during the project of design and implementation, 
and finally throughout the life of the RMS.  Our adapted three phases of RMS, readiness, 
execution, and administration is the first component of our proposed risk governance framework 
(RGF).  We view these phases as part of an on-going feedback loop that should not be viewed as 
strictly linear.  This is important as risk management and governance in institutions change over 
time, hence; for example, the organization may need to transition from administration back to 
readiness to consider new risk events and its impact to the organization and the RGF.  With the 
variety of organization’s risk management structures in existence, it would be very difficult to 
generalize a mapping or alignment of our three phases to an organization risk management 
systems/practices.  Part of the strength of our proposed RGF is to provide flexibility for 
practitioners and academia to leverage this framework at all levels of an organization’s risk 
management systems/practices and in a variety of industries.  Hence, one should readily be able 
to consider the correlation of the three phases to their respective organizations risk management 
systems/practices.  For example, from a responsibility perspective, one could consider that all 
three phases would be led by senior executives and committees with perhaps certain facets of the 
phases aligned with middle/lower level management and committees, e.g., while “strategy” 
approval during the readiness phase may require board approval, “process design” 
responsibilities during the execution phase may have more involvement of middle level 
management and committees. 
30 
 
We also draw from recent studies that provide opportunities to refine the success factors 
underlying the RMS and enhance the conceptualization of the three phases.  We refined the 
factors and phases by drawing from Mikes’ (2014) study which suggests three ERM design 
parameters and three contingency variables classifying different types of risk events.  The three 
design parameters (see Table 30 for more details) are, (1) Processes for identifying, assessing, 
and prioritizing risks; (2) Frequency of risk meetings; and (3) Risk tools.  Mikes (2014) 
identified these parameters as an “ERM mix,” and as fundamental components of risk 
management.  The three contingency variables classify different types of risk events (see Table 
30 for more details) as, (1) Preventable risks; (2) Strategic execution risks; and (3) External risks.  
Specifically, we enhanced the CSF Process design to reflect the three design parameters and the 
three types of risk events.  We also enhanced the CSF Environment to reflect External risks.  As 
Mikes’ (2014) study indicates that organizations risks are contingent on context and 
circumstances, she offers these as ideas about what risk management may depend on.   
In Lundqvist’s (2014) study, she identified four pillars that are integral to the 
implementation of an ERM (see Table 31 for more details) as, (1) General internal environment 
and objective setting; (2) General control activities and information and communication; (3) 
Holistic organization of risk management; and (4) Specific risk identification and risk assessment 
activities.  Interestingly, relative to pillars 1 and 2, she found these components are not directly 
associated with risk management; firms that demonstrate no risk management activities could 
still implement these two components in a robust way, for example, if they have strong 
governance in place.  Hence, conceptualizing dimensions or components by separating risk-
related dimensions or components from those that are not directly related to risk could be a way 
to improve RMS (Lundqvist, 2014).  Given our three phases, we refined our RMS by aligning 
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pillar 1 to readiness and pillar’s 2, 3, and 4 to readiness, execution and administration.  
Furthermore, Lundqvist (2014) suggests a more consolidated framework with “broader 
components” as existing frameworks may offer too many components.  This may provide better 
guidance with risk management frameworks as her study showed that organizations do not 
implement ERM based on existing component definitions and instead implement on broader 
terms.  Our RMS aligns with this suggestion with three broader phases aligned to the four pillars.  
This may provide a framework for practitioners to draw from as it separates risk and non-risk 
related phases, i.e., readiness, and conceptualizes components on a broader level, i.e., readiness, 
execution, and administration. 
The growth of risk management out of internal controls has in turn evolved risk 
management into an intensified focus on process, and on auditable trails of documentation thus 
supporting the need for external display of internal organizational coherence (Power, 2004b; 
Tekathen et al., 2013; Bhimani, 2009; Jordan et al., 2013).  Although COSO’s 1992 Internal - 
Integrated Framework suggested more of a risk awareness and internal risk culture, instead, it 
seems that the COSO (1992) guidance provided the conceptual building blocks for the COSO 
2004 ERM as a controls-based approach to risk management, thus a direct influence on ERM can 
be traced to an accounting conception of internal control (Power, 2004).  This drives 
organizations to create elaborate trails of detailed controls with corresponding documentation to 
prove the quality of processes (Power, 2009; Martin et al., 2007; Talwar, 2011; Jordan et al., 
2013).  Schiller et al. (2014) suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack 
of the concept of risk and risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks, which may 
be indicative of why current risk management has lost sight of the value of integrating risk 
knowledge bases and risk management systems.  
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The notion of “risk governance” has been coined only recently and is generally linked to 
efforts related to “TRUSTNET – concerted action on risk governance” (van Asselt et al., 2011).  
The concept of risk governance pertains to the various ways in which many actors, individuals, 
and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or 
ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011).  Risk governance provides a conceptual as well as normative 
basis for how to deal responsibly with uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks in particular 
(van Asselt et al., 2011). However, research suggests that COSO ERM does not address the 
management of uncertainties (Tekathen et al., 2013). Risk principles may serve as guidance for 
practitioners as they need to understand how different individuals and groups within 
organizations define risk, potential biases in risk assessment, and challenges in implementing 
risk management initiatives as many risks cannot be calculated on the basis of probability and 
effects alone (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011).  Risk governance highlights the 
importance of uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks; however, it is a consistent finding 
that in most of these cases, the risks are treated, assessed, and managed as if they were simple 
(van Asselt et al., 2011). Perhaps it is the uncertainty around what constitutes risk which lends it 
the capacity to alter, define, and reshape risk management activities in particular ways (Bhimani, 
2009). The lack of precise definitional characteristics enables the concept of risk to effect 
organizational risk management by conferring legitimacy on redefining boundaries of risk 
management (Bhimani, 2009).  The failures to deal adequately with risks such as the financial 
crisis demonstrate the need to develop alternative concepts and approaches to deal with 
uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks (van Asselt et al., 2011). 
We therefore draw from van Asselt et al.’s (2011) risk governance study.  While there 
may be other risk governance principles, van Asselt et al.’s (2011) study synthesized the body of 
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scholarly ideas and proposals on governance of systemic risks and explicates the idea that risk 
management is to help risk professionals to familiarize themselves with a broader concept of 
risk. We view that what may be missing from these normative RMS frameworks are underlying 
guidelines that can inform thinking about how to deal with uncertain, complex and/or ambiguous 
risks in various contexts.  We adapted van Asselt et al.’s (2011) set of three principles which are 
(see Table 32 for more details), (1) Communication and Inclusion; (2) Integration; and (3) 
Reflection.  These principles should be read as a synthesis of what needs to be seriously 
considered in organizing structures and processes to manage risks (van Asselt et al., 2011).  
Schiller et al., (2014) notes organizational failure to recognize the value of communication as it 
can result in poor integration of risk knowledge bases and risk management systems.   Bromiley 
et al. (2014) suggests that as underlying strategic choices strongly influence firm-level risk, then 
risk management efforts at lower levels may have limited value, hence it is important to consider 
communication and inclusion with risk management practices.  Risk management should be 
embedded and integrated in the company's cultural and organizational fabric that it is barely 
noticeable as a distinct management function at either the strategic or tactical level (Lessard et 
al., 2009). The integration principle may provide guidance as risk management requires 
coordination so that decisions made at one level in the organization do not result in the creation 
of new risks at other levels (Lessard et al., 2009).  Reflection is important as it is difficult for risk 
governance to be routinized (van Asselt et al., 2011); managers make decisions based on what 
they believe and often their beliefs differ greatly from objective measures of risk (Bromiley et 
al., 2014).  Also, individuals or organizations do not make consistent risk judgments or have 
consistent risk preferences, hence, the incorporation of the risk governance reflection principle, 
may enhance understanding managerial mental models of cause and effect for hard-to-measure 
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types of risk (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011). We refined and enhanced our RMS 
by utilizing these three risk principles to function as underlying guiding principles to managing 
risks, which completes our refinements and enhancement to the RMS thus resulting in the RGF 
(see Table 33 for more details). 
II.3.3 Summary 
Our research on barriers to effective risk management through the lens of the RGF, which 
as Table 33 shows, incorporates the RMS enhanced as noted above, provides an RGF with an 
RMS empirically grounded in success factors and corresponding phases, and risk theory based 
principles serving as underlying guiding principles to enhance risk management, will provide 
rich perspectives on barriers to effective risk management. We view the proposed RGF as a 
model that may provide practitioners a more practical framework to draw from to enhance their 
organizations ability to address "organizational realities" (Arena et al., 2010, Martin et al., 2007) 
versus providing a mere auditability of risk management practices (Power, 2004; Huber et al., 
2013; Tekathen et al., 2013).  By leveraging our proposed RGF, we can explore the various 
phases of RMS where barriers to effective risk management may arise thus creating 
unanticipated effects.  We provide practitioners a model to draw from that foundationally rest on 
risk governance principles versus internal control basis, which may enhance the understanding of 
risk governance and the various ways in which many actors, individuals, and institutions, public 
and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt 
et al., 2011) that appear to be lacking with current organizational risk management (Schiller et 
al., 2014).  Lastly, we do not necessarily portray the RGF as an enterprise-wide risk management 
system, but more so a model that may be drawn upon by practitioners in varying industries and at 
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all levels of an organization’s risk management practices (Talwar, 2011).  Figure 1 depicts the 
RGF.   
 
Figure 1 Risk Governance Framework 
 
II.3.4 Research Model 
The study by Cho et al. (2014) identified that going through the process of creating RPs 
benefits cited by respondents were improved risk management and knowing the organization 
better, yet, most of these institutions subject to RP undoubtedly had some level of risk 
management practices prior to DFA (McCormalley et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; 
Harner, 2010).  We seek to explore barriers to effective risk management for the 130 institutions 
subject to the RP requirements of DFA. We draw from Yaraghi et al.’s (2011) RMS study, which 
identified critical success factors to RMS to explore barriers to effective risk management.  We 
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adapted as three phases of RMS, readiness, execution, and administration, and some of the noted 
success factors, to explore these barriers.  Figure 2 is the conceptual framework leveraging the 
RGF.   
H1 (+)
H2 (+)
H3 (-)
H4 (+)
Figure 2 RGF conceptual framework
Type of Respondent:
Risk Managers (RM) & 
Regulators (REG)
RM ("+")
REG ("-")
Readiness barriers 
(positive, negative)
Execution barriers 
(positive, 
negative)
Administration 
barriers (positive,
negative)
R1 R2 R3 R4
E1 E2 E3
A1 A2 A3 A4
E4
Risk principles
(positive, negative)
RP1 RP 2 RP 3
Open Ended 
Questions
RP 4
 
Figure 2 RGF conceptual framework 
 
We will seek to obtain the perspectives of the respondents and based on our review of the 
survey results, we will test the following hypotheses: 
H1 - Both RMs and REGs will not view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk 
management.  
H2 - RMs will have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are barriers to 
effective risk management. 
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H3 - REGs will have a higher perception than RMs that Administration factors are 
barriers to effective risk management. 
Relative to the three risk governance principles, as van Asselt et al. (2011) expressed that 
her study does not provide a model in the strict sense of the word, there is no prior empirical 
research performed on the three risk principles as adapted to the RGF, therefore, our analysis is 
structured around a research question (i.e., survey question 5; see the questionnaire located in 
Appendix B) and focusing on analyzing those results rather than testing the theory. Hence, we 
will review the survey results and test the following hypothesis: 
H4 - Both RMs and REGs will view Risk principles as favorable towards effective risk 
management. 
Our survey data comes from institutions subject to RPs and many of these institutions 
most likely have risk management practices in place and/or underway and many may have 
enterprise-wide risk programs in place or underway.  As we seek to explore barriers to effective 
"risk management" and not just "enterprise -wide" practices, we control for this plausible factor 
by focusing on the three phases of readiness, execution, and administration and the variables to 
subscribe to the notion of "risk management" practices and not just "enterprise-wide" practices. 
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III CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
III.1 Research Approach 
The goal of this research is explore barriers to effective risk management.  Based on 
survey data from 130 institutions subject to the RP requirements of DFA, and certain regulatory 
agency’s examiners and analyst, we explored these barriers using our proposed RGF as the lens 
through which we performed the analysis.  Appendix B has the survey questionnaire we used in 
this study. The survey questions were adapted from Yaraghi et al.’s (2011) study which defined 
critical success factors and their properties for risk management systems and from Cho et al.’s 
(2014) study on perceptions of the effectiveness of RPs.  The questions asked were designed to 
reveal possible barriers to effective risk management in the phases of readiness, execution, and 
administration.  We also explored perspectives relative to the three risk principles (van Asselt et 
al., 2011) that serve as guiding principles for the RGF.  We complimented the results from our 
Likert-type scaled survey with several open ended questions and the feedback provided to those.  
Therefore, we chose a mixed methods approach as the qualitative results may provide richer 
insights into the quantitative analysis findings (Venkatesh, 2013).   
III.2 Data Collection 
Our sampling of experts had two criteria, such that respondents are (1) involved in or 
knowledgeable about risk management systems and practices and (2) currently employed in the 
financial industry or serve as a financial industry expert (REG) (Cho et al, 2014).  We identified 
the financial industry individual as risk management personnel (RM) at the 130 financial 
institutions subject to RP requirements.  We defined RMs as the members of financial 
institutions who are responsible for the firm’s risk management activities. REGs are employed 
by the Federal Reserve District Banks (Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
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(OCC), the Federal Reserve System (Board), or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), and involved in the oversight of one of the 130 RPs.  
To locate RMs and REGs with firsthand knowledge of risk management 
systems/practices, we contacted approximately 650 Fed, FDIC, and OCC regulators with job 
titles of “Examiner” or “Analyst,” including Board personnel responsible for the supervision and 
regulation of the financial institutions, as well as bankers with explicit titles or responsibilities 
relative to risk management. All 12 Fed’s were included. We also solicited information from 
approximately 130 LinkedIn members currently employed by the approximately 130 institutions 
whose public profiles suggested possible responsibilities for risk management oversight.  The 
questionnaire is comprised of 20 questions: 7 quantitative and 8 open-ended, qualitative items; 
there was also one question that served to identify the respondent as RM and REG; three 
questions captured demographic information; and one question captured whether or not the 
respondent would like to obtain a summary of the study.  We collected the data between June 15, 
2015 and August 8, 2015.  
First, we asked potential respondents to identify the type of organization that currently 
employed them. The options provided to respondents included, “Financial institution” and 
“Government regulatory agency.”  
Second, respondents selected their responses on a Likert-type, seven-point scale on their 
views of barriers to effective risk management systems/practices in the phases of readiness, 
execution, and administration. We also measured their perspectives on the three risk principles 
and the value they placed on these principles towards effective risk governance and risk 
management.  Eight open-ended questions helped us gain insight into what these expert 
respondents viewed as barriers to effective risk management, including factors shaping 
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perceptions of risk management, as well as what changes they would suggest to improve the 
effectiveness of risk management systems/practices. A weighted response question asked 
respondents to choose, from a list of nine possible barriers that we gathered from previous 
literature, which ones they believe are barriers to effective risk management. 
III.3 Data Analysis 
III.3.1 Quantitative Data 
Our statistical tests include Independent Samples T-Test to evaluate differences between 
RMs and REGs relative to the phases of RMS and perspectives as to the extent that barriers to 
effective risk management exist in the phases of readiness, execution, or administration.  We 
performed independent samples t-test to evaluate perspectives of the importance of the three risk 
principles towards effective risk management and to rank the respondents response to a weighted 
response question that asked respondents to choose, from a list of nine possible types of barriers 
that we gathered from previous literature, which ones they believe are barriers to effective risk 
management.  To examine differences between RMs and REGs, we summed for each variable 
the numerical values of each of our subscales including the three phases of readiness, execution, 
and administration and took the mean to produce the total score (Burns, 2008).       
III.3.2 Qualitative Data 
The responses to our eight open-ended questions were analyzed and coded in accordance 
with descriptive coding methods (Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., and Saldana, J., 2014).  First, 
one author reviewed the responses to the open-ended Question 8 (see in Appendix B) and 
applied a content analysis technique to develop phrase categories or coded responses based on 
each respondent’s response to the question (Myers, 2009).  The barriers listed in our Question 7 
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(see in Appendix B), were used to help shape the coded responses.  Still, the majority of our 
coded responses emerged through Inductive coding from our collected data (Miles et al., 2014).   
Second, the same author reviewed the responses in the remaining seven open-ended 
questions and used where possible the coded responses generated from Question 8.  Myers 
(2009) content analysis technique was employed to develop additional coded responses based on 
each respondent’s response to each of the seven remaining open-ended questions where 
necessary.  As a result, each of the eight open-ended questions reflected a set of coded responses 
and some of the coded responses were applicable to more than one open-ended question.   
Third, we invited two REGs who were participants in the survey, and hence familiar with 
the survey tool, to code the eight open-ended questions.  We did not seek to utilize a RM as one 
of the coders, as the nature of the topic and interaction by “banker” along with “regulator” 
generated angst and raised concerns of confidentiality.  Independently, each REG applied the 
content analysis technique (Myers, 2009), but utilized the coded responses that were previously 
identified for each of the eight open-ended questions by the one author.   
Fourth, the one author obtained the completed coded responses from both REGs and 
consolidated the three independent coded responses.  This was performed for each open-ended 
question.  This first cycle coding identified differences in the coded responses assigned.  This 
was attributed to the fact that some of the open-ended questions elicited broad responses for a 
single question from a respondent.   
Fifth, we collaborated on determining the common coded response and on determining 
common themes, for each respondent’s response in each of the eight open-ended questions, to 
summarize them. For intercoder reliability, the first cycle coding ranged in agreement from 58 
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percent to 92 percent and 98 percent to 100 percent after the second cycle (Miles et al., 2014). 
Table 1 reflects the cycle percentages by the eight open-ended questions. 
Table 1 Intercoder Reliability 
 
Question 
Number * 
First cycle 
% 
Second cycle 
% 
8 69 99 
9 89 100 
10/11 92 100 
12 72 99 
13 74 99 
14 70 98 
15 58 99 
16 68 99 
 
*There were approximately eight open-ended questions seeking various 
perspectives relative to RMS.  These questions are covered in more detail below. 
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IV CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
IV.1 Comparison of RMs and REGs 
Table 2 provides descriptive profiles of our respondent group of 41 RMs and 96 REGs 
who completed our survey.  Many of our respondents are overwhelmingly male, 78% and 77% 
for RMs and REGs respectively, and a large majority had four year college degrees (32% and 
33% for RM and REG respectively), some postgraduate (7% and 17% for RM and REG 
respectively), and postgraduate degrees (59% and 49% for RM and REG respectively).  The 
respondent group was represented by a broad age range but most were 35 years or older, with the 
largest percentage population in the age range of 45-54 at 44% and 38% for RMs and REGs 
respectively. 
Table 2 Descriptive Profiles 
Profile * RM and 
REG ** Descriptor n Percent 
Gender *** 
RM 
Male 31 78% 
Female 9 22% 
REG 
Male  72 77% 
Female 22 23% 
 RM Some college, no degree (includes community 
college) 
1 2% 
Education 
REG 1 1% 
RM Four year college or university degree/Bachelor’s 
degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB) 
13 32% 
REG 32 33% 
RM Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no 
postgraduate degree 
3 7% 
REG 16 17% 
RM Postgraduate or professional degree, including 
master’s, doctorate, medical or law degree (e.g., 
MA, MS, PhD, MD, JD) 
24 59% 
REG 47 49% 
Age 
RM 
Less than 25 years old 
0 0% 
REG 1 1% 
RM 
25-34 
1 2% 
REG 7 7% 
RM 
 35-44 
12 29% 
REG 25 26% 
RM 
45-54 
18 44% 
REG 36 38% 
RM 
55 or older 
10 24% 
REG 27 28% 
 
*We provide profile prospective of our respondent groups. 
** Respondent groups are RM (Risk Managers) and REG (Regulators). 
*** The total number of RMs is 41 and REGs is 96, however, 3 (1 RM and 2 REG) did not provide their Gender. 
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Our research provides rich perspectives on barriers to effective risk management.  This 
includes their views obtained from open-ended questions on compensation practices, the current 
unique banking environment with the concept of “too big to fail” providing perhaps a type of 
“insurance” in that some organizations would be “bailed out,” how complete risk management 
systems/practices should be to be “effective,” the impact of the state of the financial/economic 
environment in shaping perceptions of effective risk management, barriers to effective risk 
management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, whether current risk management 
practices are more “quantitatively” or “qualitatively” driven, and finally what changes they 
would suggest to improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices.   
We conducted Independent Samples T-Test to evaluate our four hypotheses and to 
facilitate analysis of mean scores for our one weighted response question to rank the respondents 
perspectives on the list of nine possible barriers.  For our H1, that both RMs and REGs will not 
view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk management revealed that RMs and REGs do 
not differ significantly in terms of Readiness factors (see Table 3), such that both groups 
expressed moderately strong views that weaknesses in these Readiness factors may manifest 
barriers to effective risk management.   
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Table 3 Summary of Readiness Independent Samples T-Test  
 
Readiness Factor Variables 
Mean t* Sig 
RM REG   
Readiness - Poorly defined strategy 
(Strategy is defined as the organizations 
vision, mission, and long-term 
objectives.) 
5.56 5.81 -.88 .38 
Readiness - Poor organization culture 
(Organization culture is defined to include 
staff morale and commitment, and 
flexibility to change.) 
5.80 6.34 -1.94 .06 
 
Readiness - Lack of appropriate resources 
(Resources is defined to include 
infrastructure including human resources, 
and technical resources (cost and time are 
included in this category.) 
6.05 5.96 .42 .68 
Readiness - External environment in 
which the organization is operating 
(Environment is defined to include the 
effects of market, suppliers, competitors, 
socio-political systems, and the 
organization’s partnership and joint 
venture strategies.) 
4.61 4.52 .30 .77 
 
*We tested hypothesis 1 - Both RMs and REGs will not view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk 
management.  
 
For our H2, that RMs will have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are 
barriers to effective risk management revealed that RMs and REGs do not differ significantly in 
terms of Execution factors (see Table 4), such that both groups expressed strong views that 
weaknesses in these Execution factors may manifest barriers to effective risk management.   
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Table 4 Summary of Execution Independent Samples T-Test 
 
 
Execution Factor Variables 
Mean t* Sig 
RM REG   
Execution - Poorly understood strategy 
(Strategy is defined as the organizations 
vision, mission, and long-term 
objectives.) 
5.46 5.73 -.89 .38 
Execution - Poor process design (Process 
design is defined to include processes for 
identifying, assessing, and prioritizing 
risks; frequency of risk meetings; and risk 
tools design; and availability of 
documented process ownerships for the 
organization’s internal processes.) 
5.95 6.08 -.57 .57 
Execution - Lack of accountability 
(Accountability is defined to include 
defined job roles/responsibilities, and the 
level of employee involvement in risk 
management systems/practices.) 
6.20 6.53 -1.53 .13 
Execution - Inadequate risk performance 
reporting (Performance reporting is 
defined to include risk measurement, 
monitoring, and feedback reporting.) 
5.85 6.07 -.93 .35 
 
 
*We tested hypothesis 2 - RMs will have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are barriers to 
effective risk management. 
 
For our H3, that REGs will have a higher perception than RMs that Administration 
factors are barriers to effective risk management revealed that the “Administration – Inadequate 
levels of top management support of risk management systems/practices” factor was statistically 
significantly different (RM M = 5.88, REG M = 6.48; t = -2.14, p = .04), such that REGs more 
strongly viewed this Administration factor as manifesting barriers to effective risk management 
systems/practices than RMs (see Table 5).  The difference in this factor reveals perhaps a level of 
skepticism that REGs may have as part of their supervisory oversight in dealing with top 
management that may not exist with RMs working under that management.  It could boil down 
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to a level of confidence issue.    However, similar to Readiness and Execution phases, both 
respondent groups expressed strong views that weaknesses in these Administration factors may 
manifest barriers to effective risk management.      
Table 5 Summary of Administration Independent Samples T-Test  
 
Administration Factor Variables 
Mean t* Sig 
RM REG   
Administration - Poorly communicated 
strategy hinders (Strategy is defined as the 
organizations vision, mission, and long-
term objectives.) 
5.34 5.55 -.75 .46 
Administration - Inadequate organization 
structure (Organization structure includes 
the design, allocation of authorities, and 
responsibilities.) 
5.68 5.81 -.48 .63 
Administration - Inadequate levels of top 
management support of risk management 
systems/practices (Support is defined to 
include driving accountability and 
ownership of risk management 
systems/practices.) 
5.88 6.48 -2.14 .04** 
Administration - Inadequate 
communication of risk issues 
(Communication is defined to include 
processes to identify, assess and prioritize 
risks, including software/data analysis 
tools used to facilitate the 
communication.) 
5.49 6.10 -1.94 .06 
 
 
* We tested hypothesis 3 - REGs will have a higher perception than RMs that Administration factors are 
barriers to effective risk management. 
** Significance at the .05 level.  Our testing revealed that the “Administration – Inadequate levels of top 
management support of risk management systems/practices” factor was statistically significantly different (RM M = 
5.88, REG M = 6.48; t = -2.14, p = .04), such that REGs more strongly viewed this Administration factor as 
manifesting barriers to effective risk management systems/practices than RMs 
 
For our H4, that both RMs and REGs will view Risk principles as favorable towards 
effective risk management revealed that RMs and REGs do not differ significantly in terms of 
the Risk principles (see Table 6), such that both groups expressed strong views that these Risk 
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principles are important to effective risk governance and risk management.  The strong beliefs of 
the importance of Risk principles is consistent with the perspective that Risk principles may 
serve as guidance for practitioners as they need to understand how different individuals and 
groups within organizations define risk, potential biases in risk assessment, and challenges in 
implementing risk management initiatives (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011). 
Table 6 Summary of Risk Principles Independent Samples T-Test 
 
Risk Principle Variables 
Mean t* Sig 
RM REG   
Communication is key to effective risk governance and 
risk management (I.e., communication exchanges 
between policy makers, stakeholders, and experts.) 
6.32 6.18 1.04 .30 
Inclusion is key to effective risk governance and risk 
management (E.g. involving people in risk-related 
decisions through which they gain ownership.) 
5.93 6.03 -.59 .56 
Integration is key to effective risk governance and risk 
management (I.e., synthesis of risk perceptions and 
values; risk management is not usually about a single 
risk, it requires risks-benefits evaluations and risk-risk 
trade-offs.) 
6.29 6.08 1.31 .19 
Reflection is key to effective risk governance and risk 
management (I.e., risk governance cannot be routinized. 
Actors must reflect on what they are doing to manage 
risk and continue to emphasize that the risks are 
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, as the temptation to 
treat them as simple and to apply familiar routines 
remains huge.) 
5.93 5.67 1.56 .12 
 
 
* We tested hypothesis 4 - Both RMs and REGs will view Risk principles as favorable towards effective risk 
management. 
 
Our hypotheses, with the exception of the one Administration factor that was statistically 
significantly different, while not supported, gave us more practical comfort relative to 
perspectives of RMs and REGs.  We tailored these hypotheses to baseline presumptions of 
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perspectives that we felt RMs and REGs would have.  For example, for H2, that RMs would 
have a higher perception than REGs that Execution factors are barriers to effective risk 
management was predicated on the possibility that as RMs live closer with RMS execution daily, 
that RMs would have stronger views than REGs that Execution factors may manifest barriers to 
effective risk management.  Similarly, for H3, that REGs would have a higher perception than 
RMs that Administration factors are barriers to effective risk management was predicated on the 
view that as supervisors, with focus and concerns more relative to governance and administration 
of RMS, REGs would have a higher perception than RMs that barriers to effective risk 
management may manifest in the Administration phase.  While one Administration factor 
(Inadequate levels of top management support of RMS) proved to be statistically significantly 
different, the other three Administration factors did not.  Further, for H1, that both RMs and 
REGs will not view Readiness factors as barriers to effective risk management was predicated on 
the view that perhaps a weakness with RMS relative to our respondent groups of RMs and REGs 
would stem from a greater focus by these groups on Execution and Administration phases due to 
our previous views noted.  With the challenges and scrutiny that RMS faces, one could take 
solace with these hypotheses not being proven, which would seem to evidence alignment in RMs 
and REGs perceptions that barriers to effective risk management may manifest in all the phases 
of Readiness, Execution, and Administration, including the balanced perspective that Readiness 
factors are not overshadowed by the latter two phases of Execution and Administration. 
The study by Cho et al. (2014) identified that going through the process of creating RPs a 
benefit was improved risk management and knowing the organization better, yet, most of these 
institutions subject to RPs undoubtedly had some level of risk management practices prior to 
DFA (McCormally et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 2011; Harner, 2010).  Our proposed 
50 
 
RGF lens enabled exploration of RMS and our respondents strongly viewed that barriers to 
effective risk management can manifest in the phases of Readiness, Execution and 
Administration.  The respondents also strongly viewed the importance of the three risk principles 
to effective risk governance and risk management.  To further augment our exploration of 
barriers to effective risk management, we turned to the qualitative data for additional 
perspectives.  
IV.2 Selected Barriers to Effective Risk Management 
 
Table 7 displays the responses to the Likert-type question that featured nine possible 
barriers to effective risk management.  We obtained the mean scores to each of the nine barriers 
by RM and REG and took the average of their mean scores and ranked the nine barriers.  
Tekathen et al.’s (2013) study suggests accountability became an object of desire in 
organizations.  In line with this, the most highly ranked item selected overall was Accountability, 
i.e., lack of accountability, poorly defined job roles/responsibilities, and the level of employee 
involvement in risk management systems/practices (Average mean score = 6.01). Personnel, i.e., 
lack of qualified personnel to execute risk management practices (Average mean score = 5.91), 
and Oversight, i.e., inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership (Average mean score 
= 5.65) ranked second and third overall respectively. The rankings of items differed by 
respondent category though. That is, REGs indicated that their second ranked concern was 
Oversight, (REG mean score = 6.01) versus Personnel.   Further, of the nine barriers, only 
Oversight’s Independent Samples T-Test indicated a significant difference in scores for RMs and 
REGs (RM M = 5.29, REG M = 6.01; t = -2.90, p = .004), such that REGs more strongly viewed 
inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership as a barrier to effective risk management 
systems/practices than RMs. 
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Table 7 Degree to which RMs and REGs felt the following is a barrier to Effective Risk 
Management 
 
Rank * Barrier to Effective Risk Management 
Mean Score 
Avg RM REG 
1 Accountability:  
Lack of accountability, poorly defined job roles/responsibilities, and 
the level of employee involvement in risk management 
systems/practices. 
6.01 5.93 6.09 
2 Personnel:  
Lack of qualified personnel to execute risk management practices. 
5.91 5.93 5.88 
3 ** Oversight:  
Inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership. 
5.65 5.29 6.01 
4 Strategy:  
Lack of a well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and 
long-term strategy toward risk management in the organization. 
5.54 5.51 5.56 
5 Disparate Risk Mgmt:  
Disparity of local risk management processes and enterprise level 
risk management processes. 
5.24 5.20 5.28 
6 Documentation:  
Inadequate level of documentation, i.e., lack of clearly documented 
risk issues or concerns. 
5.09 5.07 5.11 
7 Inclusion:  
Lack of lower levels of management involvement in risk 
assessments. 
5.02 4.85 5.19 
8 Environment:  
Organization challenges in accommodating socio-political 
factors/pressures. 
4.45 4.41 4.49 
9 Auditability:  
Risk management systems/practices are more focused on auditability 
and documentation evidence. 
4.24 4.41 4.07 
 
Question: For each of the following statements, please indicate the degree to which you feel each is a 
barrier to effective risk management. The scale is 1 to 7 where 1 means "Very Low Significance as a 
Barrier" and 7 means "Very High Significance as a Barrier." Possible 
* Rank is based on the average of the mean score for RM and REG. 
** Of the 9 barriers, only Oversight’s Independent Samples T-Test indicated a significant difference in scores for 
RMs and REGs (RM M = 5.29, REG M = 6.01; t = -2.90, p = .004), such that REGs more strongly viewed 
Inadequate oversight by the board and senior leadership as a barrier to effective risk management systems/practices 
than RMs.  
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IV.3 Compensation Practices 
Tables 8 and 9 summarizes the respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “Do 
you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective risk 
management?  If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” 
and “Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of 
these phase versus another?”  
Our count and phase analysis indicates that both RMs and REGs believe compensation 
practices may manifest barriers to effective risk management and generally in the Execution 
phase.  Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified five major categories of the types 
of barriers that may manifest: misalignment to strategy (e.g., compensation practices not tied to 
strategy), risk taking (e.g., compensation practices that encourages excessive risk taking), 
compensation controls (e.g., lack of compensation related controls), risk culture (e.g., culture that 
does not promote risk management), and risk management personnel (e.g., lack of experienced, 
sufficiently compensated risk management staff).  
 
Table 8 Compensation Practice Barriers to Effective Risk Management – Counts and 
Phases (Readiness (R), Execution (E), Administration (A)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: Do you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers 
to effective risk management?  If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” 
“Execution,” and “Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management 
more in one of these phase versus another?  Please be as specific as possible. 
  Do Compensation Practices 
Manifest Barriers to 
Effective Risk 
Management? 
Phases Barriers Manifest 
In 
Respondent 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents Yes No Unsure 
% 
Yes R E A 
Highest % 
/ Phase 
RM 32 29 3 0 91% 9 17 11 46% / E 
REG 79 70 8 1 89% 8 41 16 63% / E 
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Both RMs and REGs believe compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective 
risk management.  RMs and REGs responded “Yes” at 91 percent and 89 percent respectively.  
While both respondents indicated that compensation practices may manifest barriers in all three 
phases, the highest percent cited was for the Execution phase at 46 percent and 63 percent for 
RMs and REGs respectively.  
 
Table 9 Compensation Practice Barriers to Effective Risk Management – Categories 
 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / Percentage 
of Total 
RM REG Total 
 
Misalignment 
to Strategy 
Performance/Comp
ensation not 
aligned with 
organization risk 
tolerance, 
objectives. 
Effective risk management is all 
about Execution and the design and 
Administration of the systems is 
necessary but completely 
insufficient. Employees need to be 
hired and compensated for behaving 
consistently with the strategy.  
Currently, people do what is 
inspected not what is expected. 
(RM) 
11 / 46% 23 / 38% 34 / 40% 
Compensation 
practices not tied to 
strategy. 
Risk Taking 
Compensation 
practices 
encourages 
excessive risk 
taking. 
Yes, compensation practices can 
promote ineffective decision making 
which leads to taking excessive risks 
(just to earn a large bonus as an 
example).  The barrier to effective 
risk management this creates is in 
the Execution phase more so than in 
the Readiness or Administration 
phases. (REG) 
3 / 13% 19 / 31% 22 / 26% 
Compensation 
Controls 
  
Lack of 
compensation 
related controls, i.e. 
governance, 
safeguards, and 
escalation controls. 
 I believe that compensation 
practices in the Execution phase 
could manifest barriers to effective 
risk management if they do not have 
the proper controls. If there were 
not compensating Risk Appetite 
controls on growth of new accounts 
for example, you could grow the 
number of accounts by dropping the 
credit quality scores of the 
purchasers to increase the potential 
pool of clients. This would result in 
higher sales, but would also 
potentially increase your losses 
significantly. The controls along 
with the proper governance and 
escalation process is a key 
component of risk management of 
6 / 25% 11 / 18% 17 / 20% 
Performance/Comp
ensation not 
aligned with 
organization risk 
tolerance, 
objectives. 
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the process.  (RM) 
Risk Culture 
Culture that does 
not promote risk 
management. 
An organization’s compensation 
practices can become barriers, but 
likely on the outer edges of 
compensation practices (all 
variable based on revenue as an 
example).  Generally, this would 
lead to poor Readiness and 
Execution more than 
Administration, as the culture would 
not be one to establish strong risk 
management practices (vs. 
oversee/administration). (RM) 
2 / 8% 5 / 8% 7 / 8% 
Risk 
Management 
Personnel 
  
Lack of 
experienced, 
sufficiently 
compensated risk 
management staff. 
Yes. Effective Risk Mgrs have to be 
experienced with stature and vision.  
Banks must be willing to pay for 
both to attract the right people. 
(REG) 
2 / 8% 3 / 5% 5 / 6% 
 
Question: Do you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers to 
effective risk management?  If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” 
“Execution,” and “Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of 
these phase versus another?  Please be as specific as possible. 
 
Misalignment to strategy - based comments were the most common among both RMs and 
REGs of the types of barriers that may manifest. They indicated that misaligned organization risk 
tolerance and objectives to strategy are drivers of possible barriers to effective risk management. 
As one RM stated, “Effective risk management is all about Execution and the design and 
Administration of the systems is necessary but completely insufficient. Employees need to be 
hired and compensated for behaving consistently with the strategy.  Currently, people do what is 
inspected not what is expected.”  This theme was echoed in spirit in the following REG 
comment, noting “Whenever compensation is an incentive to a certain behavior, the behavior 
must align with risk management strategies or the compensation becomes a barrier to effective 
risk management.” It is not surprising that this theme emerged as the top theme for this question 
as this appears consistent, more broadly, with prior studies that suggest that organizations are not 
linking ERM to strategy (Viscelli, 2013).    
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Risk taking - themed comments were the next most common. A higher percentage of 
REGs indicated this, compared with RMs, but the overall themes were consistent, namely, that 
compensation practices encourages excessive risk taking.  One REG commenting on the 
excessive risk taking explained, “Yes, compensation practices can promote ineffective decision 
making which leads to taking excessive risks (just to earn a large bonus as an example).  The 
barrier to effective risk management this creates is in the Execution phase more so than in the 
Readiness or Administration phases.” A RM shared a similar view about risk taking, 
“Compensation practices which are not aligned to risk management practices manifest barriers 
during the execution phase.  The execution phase is when risk is actually taken and where risk 
should be managed.  Without alignment, organization may inadvertently foster a risk-taking 
philosophy.”  
The remaining themes reflected compensation control comments (e.g., lack of 
compensation related controls, i.e. governance, safeguards, and escalation controls), risk culture 
(e.g., culture that does not promote risk management), and risk management personnel (e.g., lack 
of experienced, sufficiently compensated risk management staff).  
IV.4 Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance” 
We asked respondents to share their views on the notion of “insurance” and if in banking 
it manifests barriers to effective risk management.  Tables 10 and 11 summarizes the 
respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “Do you believe that the current unique 
banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for some organizations with the concept 
that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed out?”  If so, relative to the 
previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” does this 
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notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these 
phases versus another?”  
Our count and phase analysis indicates some differences in perspectives between RMs 
and REGs that the notion of “insurance” may manifest barriers to effective risk management.  
However, both RMs and REGs believed if barriers did manifest, it would generally be in the 
Execution phase.  Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified six major categories of 
the types of barriers that may manifest: incentives (e.g., creates moral hazard or sense of safety 
net promoting higher or excessive risk taking), risk culture (e.g., culture that does not promote 
risk management), repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., civil, criminal 
penalties, global requirements), regulatory oversight (e.g., higher cost of "insurance," i.e., higher 
capital requirements result in more effective risk management),  complexity (e.g., the barrier is 
really "too big to manage," i.e., poor data management, reporting), and misalignment to strategy 
(e.g., performance/compensation not aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives).  
 
Table 10 Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance” Thus Creating Barriers to 
Effective Risk Management – Counts and Phases (Readiness (R), Execution (E), 
Administration (A), Not Specified (NS)) 
 
  Does the notion of “Insurance” 
Manifest Barriers to Effective 
Risk Management? 
Phases Barriers Manifest In 
Respondent 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents Yes No Unsure 
% / Yes 
or No * R E A NS** 
Highest % / 
Phase 
RM 31 9 21 1 68% / No 0 3** 0 6 100% / E 
REG 81 40 38 3 
49% / 
Yes*** 
6 10 6 21 45% / E 
 
Question: Do you believe that the current unique banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for 
some organizations with the concept that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed 
out?”  If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and 
“Administration,” does this notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in 
one of these phases versus another?  Please be as specific as possible.   
* Reflects the higher responses for Yes or No.  REGs indicated more Yes responses to the notion of 
“Insurance” manifesting barriers to effective risk management than RMs.   
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** Of the 9 Yes responses, only three indicated a phase and all were Execution where barriers to 
effective risk management may manifest.  Respondent did not specify a phase, hence, “Not Specified” 
or NS. 
*** While REGs responses indicated “Yes” their “No” responses were 47 percent.  This slight 
difference seems to indicate questions exist on the notion of “insurance” and the “moral hazard” it 
may present.  
 
RMs and REGs perspectives that the notion of “insurance” may manifest barriers to 
effective risk management differed.   RMs responded “No” at 68 percent while REGs responded 
“Yes” at 49 percent. Also, although REGs “Yes” responses were higher than REGs “No” 
responses at 49 percent and 47 percent respectively, this slight difference would seem to indicate 
questions exist for this respondent group on the notion of “insurance” and the “moral hazard” it 
may present relative to impacts to effective risk management.   However, while perspectives that 
the notion of “insurance” may manifest barriers to effective risk management differed for RMs 
and REGs, for those respondents who indicated phases where barriers may manifest, the highest 
percent cited for both RMs and REGs was for the Execution phase at 100 percent and 45 percent 
respectively.  
Table 11 Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance” Thus Creating Barriers to 
Effective Risk Management – Categories 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / 
Percentage of Total 
RM REG Total 
Incentives 
Creates moral 
hazard or sense of 
safety net 
promoting higher 
or excessive risk 
taking. 
I do believe that the concept of "too big 
to fail" is providing a safety net for 
large organizations.  "Readiness" 
again would be most likely affected 
because the inclination to take risk is 
higher when there is a safety net.  
Although SIFIs failing would cause 
ripples in the economy, just about any 
type of safety net has the opportunity to 
be misused.  In certain circumstances, I 
believe the safety net might actually 
incentivize misuse and risky behavior 
because the organization knows it will 
be "caught" by the net and protected 
from sustaining fatal damage.  (REG) 
2 / 29% 18 / 50% 20 / 47% 
Culture that does 
not promote risk 
management. 
Risk Culture 
Culture that does 
not promote risk 
management. 
Not for "Readiness or Administration."  
Actually those two are the most 
regulated.  For the key activity 
2 / 29% 5 / 15% 7 / 15% 
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"Execution" I think "too big to fail" 
might be a factor in enabling a poor 
risk culture. (RM) 
Repercussions 
Lack of 
appropriate 
repercussion, e.g., 
civil, criminal 
penalties, global 
requirements. 
 Clearly, large banks that were "bailed 
out" were indeed taking advantage of 
"insurance", however, I feel that the 
common perception is that "the banks 
were saved, in spite of their poor 
management"; really society was saved 
from the likely economic disaster that 
would have occurred.  That being said, 
I feel that the management of the banks 
and investment banks that were both 
directly and indirectly responsible did 
not experience appropriate 
repercussions in terms of civil and 
criminal penalties. (RM) 
2 / 29% 3 / 8% 5 / 12% 
Individuals are 
not held 
accountable. 
Regulatory 
Oversight *  
Higher cost of 
"insurance," i.e., 
higher capital 
requirements 
result in more 
effective risk 
management. 
I believe that in the current 
environment bank's that benefit from 
"too big to fail" are paying a high price 
for that "insurance" (i.e., through high 
capital requirements and regulatory 
demands).This has forced risk 
organizations to become more active in 
challenging all business decisions and 
the quality of the information those 
decisions are based on.  If anything, 
this has resulted in more effective risk 
management. (RM) 
1 / 13% 4 / 11% 5 / 12% 
Complexity 
The barrier is 
really "too big to 
manage," i.e., 
poor data 
management, 
reporting. 
It is NOT a matter of "too big to fail" - 
it is a matter of "too big to MANAGE"!  
The concept of "insurance" is less of a 
barrier than the fact that the largest 
banking organizations cannot manage 
the more local cultures that are 
ingrained, particularly when several 
disparate entities are acquired over a 
short period of time such that 
integration was not well executed.  
(REG) 
0 / 0% 3 / 8% 3 / 7% 
Misalignment to 
Strategy 
Performance/Com
pensation not 
aligned with 
organization risk 
tolerance, 
objectives. 
Generally yes, although the post-Dodd 
Frank environment, and the recent 
court decision in the AIG case, creates 
some uncertainty regarding the ability 
or willingness of the government to step 
in.  I believe the failure to tie 
compensation to bad risk 
decisions/results is a much bigger 
driver for bankers to take outsize risks. 
(REG) 
0 / 0% 3 / 8% 3 / 7% 
 
Question: Do you believe that the current unique banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for 
some organizations with the concept that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed 
out?”  If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” 
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does this notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these phases 
versus another?  Please be as specific as possible.   
* Interestingly, some respondents indicated the current environment benefits from "too big to fail" as organizations 
are paying a high price for that "insurance" and believe that this has resulted in more effective risk management.  
 
Incentives - based comments were the most common overall for RMs and REGs of the 
types of barriers that may manifest. They indicated that the sense of a “safety net” promoted 
higher or excessive risk taking. As one REG stated, “I do believe that the concept of "too big to 
fail" is providing a safety net for large organizations.  "Readiness" again would be most likely 
affected because the inclination to take risk is higher when there is a safety net.  Although SIFIs 
failing would cause ripples in the economy, just about any type of safety net has the opportunity 
to be misused.  In certain circumstances, I believe the safety net might actually incentivize 
misuse and risky behavior because the organization knows it will be "caught" by the net and 
protected from sustaining fatal damage.”  One RM stated, “Yes. Execution. The concept of "too 
big to fail" wasn't introduced until there was a need. Now the term is widely accepted and is no 
doubt being used to leverage risk taking in extremely large organizations, but this is an opinion 
as I have no supporting evidence to back it up. Should we end up in another bail out situation, 
expect applicability of the term and conditions to resurface.”    
Risk culture - themed comments were next most common.  They indicated “too big to 
fail" might be a factor in enabling a poor risk culture.  One RM stated, “Not for "Readiness or 
Administration."  Actually those two are the most regulated.  For the key activity "Execution" I 
think "too big to fail" might be a factor in enabling a poor risk culture.”  One REG stated, “I 
would think this would be a factor in the readiness phase.  Too big to fail is more problematic at 
the top of the house in developing sound strategic plans that adequately incorporate sound risk 
management - and setting the culture for risk management from the top.”  The risk culture theme 
is consistent with Andersen et al. (2012) who appeared to find that poor risk management 
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practices could be linked to an unhealthy organizational culture which played a significant role in 
the failure to implement sound risk management practices. 
For some RMs and REGs regulatory oversight themed comments were provided and 
interestingly, these themes indicated a perceived benefit to effective risk management arising 
from the notion of “insurance” and “too big to fail.”  Some respondents indicated the current 
environment benefits from "too big to fail" as organizations are paying a high price for that 
"insurance" and believe that this has resulted in more effective risk management.  As one RM 
stated, “I believe that in the current environment bank's that benefit from "too big to fail" are 
paying a high price for that "insurance" (i.e., through high capital requirements and regulatory 
demands).This has forced risk organizations to become more active in challenging all business 
decisions and the quality of the information those decisions are based on.  If anything, this has 
resulted in more effective risk management.”  One REG shared the essence of this perspective 
with the following, “Yes. The "Big Banks" had an advantage of too big to fail.  With what 
Federal Reserve Board has proposed, increased capital requirement for large banks will reduce 
the advantage.” 
The remaining themes reflected repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., 
civil, criminal penalties, global requirements), complexity (e.g., the barrier is really "too big to 
manage," i.e., poor data management, reporting), and misalignment to strategy (e.g., 
performance/compensation not aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives). 
IV.5 RMS Phases and Percent Complete 
We asked respondents through a two part question to share their views on the RMS phase 
factors of Readiness, Execution, and Administration and “how complete” must the phase factors 
be for risk management systems/practices to be effective.  The first part sought perspectives of 
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either “100 percent complete” or “<100 percent complete.”  The second was an open-ended 
question seeking any additional perspectives to the percentage complete portion of the question.  
Tables 12, 13, and 14 summarizes the respondents’ responses to the question: “Relative to the 
previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration” factors, for 
risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please select the answer that 
best reflects your personal views: 1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration 
factors must be complete and in place for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not 
have to be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” Please 
provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question above.”  
Our count analysis indicates both RMs and REGs share the perspective of “<100 percent 
complete;” RMs and REGs indicated 80 percent and 74 percent respectively with this view.  Our 
coding and subsequent content analysis for respondents who offered perspectives for “100 
percent complete” identified four categories of perspectives for their choice of the percentage 
complete portion of the question: dynamic risk management (e.g., risk systems/practices should 
be dynamic and evolve with environment), key risk controls (e.g., include yearly simulations and 
trials), interconnectivity, and risk culture (e.g., risk systems/practices specifications should be 
implemented completely).    
Our coding and subsequent content analysis for respondents who offered perspectives for 
“<100 percent complete” identified eight categories of perspectives for their choice of the 
percentage complete portion of the question: dynamic risk management (e.g., risk 
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), risk management maturity level (e.g., 
experienced risk managers can offset risk systems/practices that are not 100% complete), risk 
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culture (e.g., risk culture should enable risk systems/practices to be effective),  key risk controls 
(e.g., risk systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), qualitative challenges (e.g., risk 
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), level of investment (e.g., risk 
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), accountability (e.g., risk systems/practices 
should be complemented by accountability), and issue awareness (e.g., risk systems/practices 
should be dynamic and evolve with environment).    
 
Table 12 Must all phases of Readiness (R), Execution (E), Administration (A) factors be 
complete for Risk Management Systems/Practices (RMS) to be Effective or may the R,E,A 
factors be in place but be < 100% complete and still be Effective – Counts 
 
  For RMS to be 
Effective 
 
Respondent 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents 
100% 
Complete 
<100% 
Complete 
Highest % / 
100% or 
<100% 
RM 41 8 33 80% / <100% 
REG 96 25 71 74% / <100% 
 
Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and 
“Administration” factors, for risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please 
select the answer that best reflects your personal views: 
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for 
risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to 
be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question 
above. Please be as specific as possible.   
 
For RMS to be effective, both RMs and REGs indicated that all phases of Readiness, 
Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to be 100% complete, 
for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.”  RMs and REGs responded “<100 
percent complete” at 80 percent and 74 percent respectively.   
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Table 13  RMs and REGs who offered Perspectives with their choice of 100% Complete – 
Categories 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / 
Percentage of Total 
RMs REGs Total 
Dynamic Risk 
Management 
Risk systems/practices 
should be dynamic and 
evolve with 
environment. 
Target state goal should be 100 
percent with the bar constantly 
being raised in the future. (RM) 
2 / 100% 0 / 0% 2 / 33% 
Risk systems/practices 
specifications should 
be implemented 
completely. 
Key Risk Controls 
Include yearly 
simulations and trials. 
Must be 100% completed with 
yearly simulation and table top 
trials.(REG) 
0 / 0% 2 / 50% 2 / 33% 
Interconnectivity 
Risk systems/practices 
specifications should 
be implemented 
completely. 
 Weaknesses in certain aspects 
of risk management will hinder 
performance in other processes 
(REG) 
0 / 0% 1 / 25% 1 / 17% 
Risk Culture  
Risk systems/practices 
specifications should 
be implemented 
completely. 
An effective risk management 
framework must be complete in 
order to create and instill a 
positive culture.  Leaving a 
framework incomplete sends 
the message that risk 
management is not a priority. 
(REG) 
0 / 0% 1 / 25% 1 / 17% 
 
Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and 
“Administration” factors, for risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please 
select the answer that best reflects your personal views: 
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for 
risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to 
be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question 
above. Please be as specific as possible.   
 
Most respondents did not provide additional perspectives on their selection for the first 
part of this question regarding their choice of “100 percent complete.”  Further, while our coding 
and content analysis for respondents who offered perspectives did identify categories, there were 
no common categories between RMs and REGs.  For RMs, the most common category was 
dynamic risk management and for REGs, the most common category was key risk controls.  
Relative to dynamic risk management, one RM offered this perspective for their selection of 
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“100 percent complete,” “While there's degrees to each of the factors of risk management, all 
three need to be working in concert for risk management to be effective across categories of 
risk.”  For key risk controls, one REG stated, “In short, you don't know what you don't know.  In 
order to be confident that risk management systems are operating effectively, they need to be 
fully implemented, executed, and tested for effectiveness and sustainability.”  The two remaining 
categories of interconnectivity, and risk culture were common for REGs but not for RMs.  For 
interconnectivity, one REG offered this perspective for their selection of “100 percent complete,” 
“Weaknesses in certain aspects of risk management will hinder performance in other processes.”  
Relative to risk culture, one REG stated, “An effective risk management framework must be 
complete in order to create and instill a positive culture.  Leaving a framework incomplete sends 
the message that risk management is not a priority.” 
 
Table 14 RMs and REGs who offered Perspectives with their choice of <100% Complete – 
Categories 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / 
Percentage of Total 
RMs REGs Total 
Dynamic Risk 
Management 
Risk systems/practices 
should be dynamic and 
evolve with 
environment. 
Risk management is an 
evolving process.  What works 
today, may not work tomorrow.  
You can have systems that are 
effective but there is always 
room for improvement. (REG) 
6 / 43% 15 / 45% 21 / 45% 
Risk systems/practices 
can have gaps but still 
be effective. 
Risk 
Management 
Maturity Level 
Risk systems/practices 
should be dynamic and 
evolve with 
environment. 
Effective Risk management is 
about the ability to identify, 
quantify and report the risk, not 
all of which will be immediately 
possible when the risk is 
initially discovered.  All of the 
phases should be able to move 
to 100% complete, but 
"effective" management 
includes the ability to provide 
early warning signs of 
emerging themes and issues. 
(RM) 
3 / 21% 8 / 24% 11 / 23% Experienced risk 
managers can offset 
risk systems/practices 
that are not 100% 
complete. 
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Risk Culture 
Risk culture should 
enable risk 
systems/practices to be 
effective. 
 If Readiness and Execution 
have been met, the risk 
management culture should 
take hold and allow the 
processes to be effective.  Then 
Administration aspects may be 
completed over time to fully 
implement the system.  Risk 
management is more than the 
sum of the processes or the 
system used to manage risk; it 
must be socialized and 
operationalized.  The 
administration of the system 
should be just a formality at 
that point. (REG) 
4 / 29% 5 / 16% 9 / 19% 
Risk systems/practices 
can have gaps but still 
be effective. 
Key Risk 
Controls  
Risk systems/practices 
can have gaps but still 
be effective. 
It's more about balance and 
focus on the key governance 
control that all good firms have 
which is absolute clarity 
regarding "kill, feed, starve" 
decisioning relative to the 
operation. Well defined "kill 
power" user manifests in stable 
and steady operating results.  
(REG) 
0 / 0% 2 / 6% 2 / 5% 
Qualitative 
challenges 
Risk systems/practices 
can have gaps but still 
be effective. 
Given the dynamic economic 
environment, I think it will be a 
big challenge to ever hit 100%. 
I think the key themes - 
structure, staff and 
transparency must be in place, 
but 100% may not be 
achievable. The risk is 
everything becomes so focused 
on documentation that 
decisions can't be made in a 
timely manner. It becomes 
document management, not risk 
management. Granted there is 
a balance, but I think 100% is 
not realistic. Furthermore, it is 
a qualitative assessment 
making it hard to drive 
consistency, etc. of what 100% 
means. (RM) 
1 / 7% 0 / 0% 1 / 2% 
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Level of 
investment 
Risk systems/practices 
can have gaps but still 
be effective. 
The question does not focus on 
the concept of "most effective"; 
to reach that level of 
effectiveness (maximum level of 
effectiveness of the risk 
management processes does 
require that the three factors all 
be 100% complete or working 
within the firm.  Basically, less 
than 100% implementation of 
all three factors will lead to a 
level of effectiveness that is less 
than maximum effectiveness, 
but most likely is at a 
reasonably good level of 
effectiveness, all things 
considered.  I keep thinking 
that the answer is you get what 
you pay for -- meaning if the 
three factors are 100% 
implemented the likelihood that 
the level of risk management 
effectiveness is very high or at 
an upper level is good; on the 
reverse end, if the three factors 
are implemented at say a 23% 
level, the overall level of risk 
management effectiveness will 
be much lower, BUT STILL 
BETTER THAN IT WOULD BE 
IF THE THREE FACTORS 
WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED 
AT ALL.  So risk management 
is on a sliding scale, you get 
more out of it the more you put 
into it across the level of 
implementation of the three 
factors, Readiness, Execution, 
and Administration. (REG) 
0 / 0% 1 / 3% 1 / 2% 
Accountability 
Risk systems/practices 
should be 
complemented by 
accountability. 
Accountability for risk takers 
(call it 'culture' if you must) is 
the key to risk management.  
You can have all the systems 
and/or processes in the world, 
plus a highly experienced / 
motivated risk management 
team, but it matters not when 
the body creating risk is not 
held accountable. (REG) 
0 / 0% 1 / 3% 1 / 2% 
Issue 
Awareness 
Risk systems/practices 
should be dynamic and 
evolve with 
environment. 
Awareness of the issues and a 
well designed and progressing 
plan for improving RM 
practices is often enough to 
manage a firm well. (REG) 
0 / 0% 1 / 3% 1 / 2% 
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Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and 
“Administration” factors, for risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please 
select the answer that best reflects your personal views: 
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for 
risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to 
be 100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question 
above. Please be as specific as possible.   
 
More respondents provided additional perspectives on their selection for the first part of 
this question regarding their choice of “<100 percent complete.”  Dynamic risk management-
based comments were the most common among both RMs and REGs.  Unlike for “100 percent 
complete” where our coding and subsequent content analysis did not identify dynamic risk 
management as a category for REGs, this category was the most common among both RMs and 
REGs for “<100 percent complete.”  One REG stated, “Given that risk management practices are 
still evolving, waiting until all components are in place and functioning is worse than having a 
phased approach to risk management processes.”  As echoed by one RM, “My belief is that you 
have to do as much as you can, as soon as you can in regards to identifying and mitigating risks.  
You cannot wait until all phases are perfect and all systems are "Go", the process must be 
iterative and malleable.”   
Risk management maturity level - themed comments were the next most common.  They 
indicated that experienced risk managers may offset risk systems/practices that are not 100% 
complete.  One RM stated, “Effective Risk management is about the ability to identify, quantify 
and report the risk, not all of which will be immediately possible when the risk is initially 
discovered.  All of the phases should be able to move to 100% complete, but "effective" 
management includes the ability to provide early warning signs of emerging themes and issues.”  
Similarly, one REG stated, “In any organization, there may be gaps or identified weaknesses that 
exist, but may be offset by key strengths to maintain an effective risk management structure.  
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The key factor is the existence of an experienced and skilled management structure that knows 
its strategic objectives, establishes an effective governance structure, and effectively 
communicates to all levels of the organization that can be easily understood and followed.”   
Risk culture - themed comments were the third most common.  They indicated that risk 
systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective with a strong risk culture.  One REG 
offered, “If Readiness and Execution have been met, the risk management culture should take 
hold and allow the processes to be effective.  Then Administration aspects may be completed 
over time to fully implement the system.  Risk management is more than the sum of the 
processes or the system used to manage risk; it must be socialized and operationalized.  The 
administration of the system should be just a formality at that point.”  One RM shared a similar 
cultural perspective stating, “I believe you could still have some small gaps in the process but 
still have an effective system in place. Self ID audit issues should be encouraged to document the 
gaps and remediate the issues while the gaps are small.” For RMs, however, this themed 
comment ranked second and risk management maturity level ranked third. 
Similar to “100 percent complete,” our coding and content analysis for respondents who 
offered perspectives for their choice of “<100 percent complete,” identified some categories that 
were not common between RMs and REGs.  These remaining themes reflected key risk controls 
(e.g., risk systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), qualitative challenges (e.g., 
qualitatively challenges can make executing risk systems/practices difficult and inconsistent), 
level of investment (e.g., risk systems/practices can have gaps but still be effective), 
accountability (e.g., risk systems/practices should be complemented by accountability), and issue 
awareness (e.g., risk systems/practices should be dynamic and evolve with environment). 
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IV.6 State of the Financial/Economic Environment 
We asked respondents to share their views on the importance of the state of the 
financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk 
management and if it may manifest barriers to effective risk management.  Tables 15 and 16 
summarizes the respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “How important is the state 
of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk 
management?  (i.e., if we are coming out of a financial crisis then general perceptions of risk 
management may be different than if there is a long period of stability.) and Relative to the 
previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” do you believe 
that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest barriers to effective risk 
management?  (E.g., in periods of long stability, management may begin to focus less on 
Execution factors thus creating potential barriers to effective risk management.)”   
Our count and phase analysis indicates that both RMs and REGs believe the state of the 
financial/economic environment is important in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness 
of risk management and these perceptions may generate barriers to effective risk management 
generally in the Execution phase.    Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified six 
major categories of the types of barriers that may manifest: risk focus (e.g., periods of stability 
reduces the focus on or priority of risk management), risk taking & complacency (e.g., periods of 
stability promotes more risk taking and complacency), sustainability (e.g., it can cause risk 
management to be backward instead of forward looking), perceptions (e.g., strong risk culture 
and risk management is not sustained during perceived periods of stability),  regulatory oversight 
(e.g., it has increased the levels of regulatory oversight including risk management), and 
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complexity & interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and interconnectedness of financial/economic 
environment creates barriers to effective risk management).  
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Table 15 How Important is the State of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the Effectiveness 
of Risk Management and do you believe that these perceptions may manifest Barriers to Effective Risk Management – Counts 
and Phases (Readiness (R), Execution (E), Administration (A), Not Specified (NS)) 
 
  Level of Importance in State of financial/economic 
environment shaping perceptions of the Effectiveness 
of Risk Management. 
Phases Barriers Manifest In 
Respondent 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents High Moderate Low 
Not 
Important 
% / Level of 
Importance* R E A NS 
Highest % 
/ Phase 
RM 31 21 8 1 1 68% / H 4 24 15 3 56% / E 
REG 78 54 16 3 5 69% / H 9 60 38 5 56% / E 
 
Question: How important is the state of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk management?  
(i.e., if we are coming out of a financial crisis then general perceptions of risk management may be different than if there is a long period of stability.). 
Please be as specific as possible.   
* Reflects the percentage of the most frequent level of importance.  Both RMs and REGs viewed the state of the financial/economic as highly 
important to shaping general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk management.   
 
Both RMs and REGs believe the state of the financial/economic environment is important in shaping general perceptions of the 
effectiveness of risk management.  RMs and REGs indicated a high level of importance at 68 percent and 69 percent respectively.  
While both respondents indicated that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest barriers in all three phases, the 
highest percent cited was for the Execution phase with both RMs and REGs at 56 percent.  
72 
 
Table 16 State of the financial/economic environment shapes general perceptions of the 
Effectiveness of Risk Management may Manifest Barriers to Effective Risk Management – 
Categories 
 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / 
Percentage of Total 
RMs REGs Total 
Risk Focus 
Periods of stability 
reduces the focus on or 
priority of risk 
management. Higher capital levels are 
mitigating risk, but too much 
focus on new regulation and the 
prior problems continues to 
reduce the focus on the next set 
of problems.  Ill prepared to 
identify at this point.  (REG) 
12 / 40% 29 / 40% 41 / 39% 
Strong risk culture and 
risk management is not 
sustained during 
perceived periods of 
stability. 
It can cause risk 
management to be 
backward instead of 
forward looking. 
Risk Taking & 
Complacency 
Periods of stability 
reduces the focus on or 
priority of risk 
management. 
The longer the time since the last 
crisis, the higher the probability 
that resources will be shifted to 
other priorities.  The 
redeployment of resources will 
impact execution first, but will 
ultimately impact all phases. 
(RM) 
7 / 23% 21 / 28% 28 / 27% 
Periods of stability 
promotes more risk 
taking and 
complacency. 
Sustainability 
Strong risk culture and 
risk management is not 
sustained during 
perceived periods of 
stability. 
 Bank's fundamentals should not 
change as a result of economic 
environment.  During good times 
and bad times bank's approach 
to risk should not change.  Good 
times do not last.  It is an 
economic cycle.  Bank's risk 
appetite and how it carries out 
its risk tolerances determines its 
own fate. (REG) 
6 / 20% 12 / 16% 18 / 17% 
It can cause risk 
management to be 
backward instead of 
forward looking. 
Perceptions  
State of the economy 
can promote incorrect 
perceptions of the level 
of risk in the 
environment and the 
quality of risk 
management. 
I believe it could, but the 
implementation of compensating 
capital controls, risk appetites 
and management reporting and 
escalation that is an effective 
risk management system 
provides a more stable 
environment regardless of the 
state of the economy. (RM) 
2 / 7% 10 / 13% 12 / 12% 
Strong risk culture and 
risk management is not 
sustained during 
perceived periods of 
stability. 
Regulatory 
Oversight * 
It has increased the 
levels of regulatory 
oversight including risk 
management. 
Yes, due to the compression of 
bank's earnings they will only 
implement the risk management 
they are forced to by regulators.  
2 / 7% 2 / 3% 4 / 4% 
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(REG) 
Complexity & 
Interconnected
ness 
Complexity and 
interconnectedness of 
financial/economic 
environment creates 
barriers to effective risk 
management. 
The main features of the 
financial/economist environment 
that creates barrier to effective 
risk management are the 
complexity and interconnectivity 
of financial and economic 
institutions. (RM) 
1 / 3% 0 / 0% 1 / 1% 
 
Question: Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and 
“Administration,” do you believe that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest 
barriers to effective risk management?  (E.g., in periods of long stability, management may begin to focus 
less on Execution factors thus creating potential barriers to effective risk management.) Please be as 
specific as possible.   
* Interestingly, some respondents indicated the Regulatory Oversight can manifest barriers to effective risk 
management by “driving the focus of risk management” or that there is a “lag between financial entrepreneurialism 
and regulation.”  
 
Risk focus - based comments were the most common among both RMs and REGs of the 
types of barriers that may manifest. They indicated that periods of stability can reduce risk focus 
and that strong risk management should be maintained in up and down financial/economic 
cycles.  One REG stated, “Yes, in periods of long stability, management may begin focusing on 
revenue priorities and may cut funding to risk remediation activities thereby creating a barrier to 
effective risk management.”  This theme was echoed in spirit in the following RM comment, 
noting “Interest on the maintenance of effective risk management practices will continue to 
decline, now that a period of improvement and the beginnings of a more stable environment is on 
the horizon, so this will become a barrier to effective risk management.”    
Risk taking & complacency - themed comments were the next most common. A slightly 
higher percentage of REGs indicated this, compared with RMs, but the overall themes were 
consistent, namely, that periods of stability may promote more risk taking and complacency.  
One RM commented, “Yes, executives, business unit managers, and risk managers can become 
lax in their diligence and, I feel, can lose the focus on the independence of their role.  Risk 
inventories may not be reviewed as thoroughly, and relationships between business unit and risk 
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executives may become such that the required institutionalised friction between roles may be 
lessened.  "Times are good, do we really need to do a ground-up inventory of our business unit 
risks?””  A REG shared a similar view, “I do believe the financial/economic environment may 
manifest barriers.  All phases may be affected in long periods of stability, creating more 
incentive for risk, less emphasis on renewing and revising risk management practices over time, 
and lax implementation of existing risk management practices.”  The risk focus and risk taking & 
complacency themes are in line with Huber et al. (2013a) who suggest that conservatism can 
reinforce existing understanding and practices. 
Sustainability - themed comments were the third most common.  They indicated that 
strong risk systems/practices should be sustained regardless of the state of the financial/economic 
environment.  One REG offered, “Bank's fundamentals should not change as a result of 
economic environment.  During good times and bad times bank's approach to risk should not 
change.  Good times do not last.  It is an economic cycle.  Bank's risk appetite and how it carries 
out its risk tolerances determines its own fate.”  One RM shared a similar perspective stating, “If 
proper controls and documentation are in place, theoretically, the external environment would 
not hinder REA.  Separating risk reporting lines from finance to ensure independence is also 
important.” 
For some RMs and REGs regulatory oversight themed comments were provided and 
interestingly, indicated that they may manifest barriers to effective risk management.  This is due 
to regulatory oversight “driving the focus of risk management” or that there is a “lag between 
financial entrepreneurialism and needed regulation.”  One REG stated, “Yes, due to the 
compression of bank's earnings they will only implement the risk management they are forced to 
by regulators.”  One RM shared the essence of this perspective with the following, “It doesn't act 
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as a barrier necessarily, but can act as a catalyst when regulations and oversight are adjusted to 
promote sustained economic growth.”  
The remaining themes reflected perception comments (e.g., state of the economy can 
promote incorrect perceptions of the level of risk in the environment and the quality of risk 
management), and complexity & interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and interconnectedness of 
financial/economic environment creates barriers to effective risk management).  
IV.7 Categories of Barriers to Effective Risk Management By RMS Phase 
The hypotheses tests for the three phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration 
clearly indicate both RMs and REGs view that weaknesses in these phases’ factors may manifest 
barriers to effective risk management.  We augment the perspectives toward these phases by 
capturing the types of barriers to effective risk management that may result as identified from 
three of the open-ended questions presented earlier where we sought the respondent groups’ 
perspectives on phases that may manifest barriers.  Table 17 lists the previously discussed 
category of barriers by phase as determined by our content analysis for the questions pertaining 
to compensation practices, the banking environment providing a type of “insurance,” and the 
state of financial/economic environment. 
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 Table 17 Categories of Barriers to Effective Risk Management By Phase of Readiness, 
Execution, and Administration from the Three open-ended questions pertaining to 
Compensation Practices, Banking Environment Provides a Type of “Insurance,” and State 
of the Financial/Economic Environment 
 
Phase Compensation Practices* 
Banking Environment 
Provide a Type of 
“Insurance” * 
State of 
Financial/Economic 
Environment* 
Readiness 
 Misalignment to Strategy 
(RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Culture (RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Taking (RM, REG) 
 Incentives (REG) 
 
 Risk Culture (REG) 
 Perceptions (REG) 
 
 Risk Focus (RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Taking & 
Complacency  (REG) 
 
 Sustainability (REG) 
Execution 
 Compensation Controls 
(RM, REG) 
 
 Misalignment to Strategy 
(RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Culture (RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Management 
Personnel (REG) 
 
 Risk Taking (RM, REG) 
 Complexity (REG) 
 
 Incentives (RM, REG) 
 
 Misalignment to Strategy 
(REG) 
 
 Regulatory Oversight 
(REG) ** 
 
 Risk Culture (RM, REG)  
 Perceptions (RM, REG) 
 
 Regulatory Oversight (RM, 
REG) *** 
 
 Risk Focus (RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Taking & 
Complacency  (RM, REG) 
 
 Sustainability (RM, REG) 
Administration 
 Compensation Controls 
(RM, REG) 
 
 Misalignment to Strategy 
(RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Culture (REG) 
 
 Risk Management 
Personnel (REG) 
 
 Risk Taking (RM, REG) 
 Incentives (REG) 
 
 Risk Culture (REG) 
 
 Repercussions (REG) 
 Complexity & 
Interconnectedness (RM) 
 
 Regulatory Oversight 
(REG) *** 
 
 Risk Focus (RM, REG) 
 
 Risk Taking & 
Complacency  (RM, REG) 
 
 Sustainability (RM, REG) 
 
* We include in parenthesis beside each barrier category the respondent group who indicated this phase 
based upon our content analysis. 
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**  Some respondents indicated the current environment benefits from "too big to fail" as 
organizations are paying a high price for that "insurance" and believe that this has 
resulted in more effective risk management.   
*** Some respondents indicated the Regulatory Oversight can manifest barriers to 
effective risk management by “driving the focus of risk management” or that there is a 
“lag between financial entrepreneurialism and regulation.”  
 
Some categories overlap phases and this is because the nuances of categories appear to 
have aspects that may result in alignment with different phases depending on the lens through 
which it is being viewed.  As one RM states, “I believe that compensation practices in the 
execution phase could manifest barriers to effective risk management if they do not have the 
proper controls. If there were not compensating Risk Appetite controls on growth of new 
accounts for example, you could grow the number of accounts by dropping the credit quality 
scores of the purchasers to increase the potential pool of clients. This would result in higher 
sales, but would also potentially increase your losses significantly. The controls along with the 
proper governance and escalation process are a key component of risk management of the 
process.”  Whereas one REG stated, “An organization's compensation structure may be designed 
in a manner to introduce misconduct risk in an otherwise perceived effective risk management 
framework.  This would be evident in the Administration phase, where well-written policies and 
adequate reporting exists.”  
The table presents a more explicit view relative to phases and not surprisingly aligns with 
the earlier detailed analysis.  For the notion of “insurance,” RMs largely indicated “No” 
regarding its impact to manifesting barriers, hence, most of the categories noted are mainly cited 
by REGs.  Similarly, it is easier to see why regulatory oversight seemingly contradicts itself as a 
benefit to effective risk management for the notion of “insurance,” i.e., organizations paying a 
higher price for “too big to fail” and has forced organizations to scrutinize their business 
decisions, and as a barrier to effective risk management for the state of the financial/economic 
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environment, i.e., regulation my drive risk focus or may be the root cause of lags between 
financial entrepreneurialism and supervision.  
IV.8 Barriers to Effective Risk Management Leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2007-
2009 
We asked respondents to share their perspectives on barriers to effective risk 
management leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2009.  Table 18 summarizes the 
respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “Benefits cited by bankers and regulators 
that were preparing Resolution Plans included improved understanding of the bank and 
improved risk management.  However, risk management practices were in place prior to the 
requirement for Resolution Plans.  What do you believe were barriers to effective risk 
management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009?”   
Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified 13 major categories of the types of 
barriers to effective risk management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007– 2009: 
risk culture (e.g., lack of a risk culture and accountability), underestimating risk (e.g., under 
estimating risk, including the nature of it; type of risk; and its level of possible systemic impact ), 
siloed risk management (e.g., siloed risk management processes and inadequate resources ), 
corporate greed  (e.g., revenue incentives driving transaction decisions), risk focus (e.g., periods 
of stability/complacency reduces the focus on or priority of risk management), complexity & 
interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and interconnectedness of financial/economic environment 
creates barriers to effective risk management), overconfidence (e.g., overconfidence in existing 
risk management processes), regulatory oversight (e.g., weak regulatory oversight), 
misalignment to strategy (e.g., performance/compensation not aligned with organization risk 
tolerance, objectives), repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., civil, criminal 
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penalties, global requirements), standardized risk management (e.g., risk management practices 
that were too standardized and lacked adaptability), independent oversight (e.g., lack of 
independent risk assessments/oversight),  and qualitative challenges (e.g., firms lacked the 
qualitative perspective to properly and consistently execute risk management). 
 
Table 18 Barriers to Effective Risk Management leading up to the Financial Crisis of 2007 
through 2009 – Categories 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / 
Percentage of Total 
RMs REGs Total 
Risk Culture 
Lack of a risk 
culture and 
accountability. 
Lack of need for effective risk 
management - it is not embedded 
cultural in most organisations, 
and certainly not within 
organisations that have a strong 
focus on Investment banking, so 
are more prone to risk taking.  
Historically, I have not found 
effective risk management 
practices and culture to be 
embedded appropriately within 
these types of banks and financial 
services, so it is not surprising 
that ineffective practices were in 
place prior to the regulators 
mandates for RRP requirements. 
(RM) 
6 / 21% 15 / 21% 21 / 21% 
Risk Management 
practices that were 
too standardized 
and lacked 
adaptability. 
Underestimating 
Risk 
Under estimating 
risk, including the 
nature of it; type of 
risk; and its level 
of possible 
systemic impact. 
There was insufficient emphasis 
on risk management, as well as 
no clear definition.  Inconsistency 
was a large barrier.  And, outside 
of credit risk management, 
regulators were not emphasizing 
it or gauging it as a "system" or 
"culture" (although there were 
measurements and regulatory 
guidance in place).   / In addition, 
many risks inherent in the 
financial sector are not easily 
quantified, such as compliance 
and reputation risks.  . (REG) 
6 / 21% 8 / 11% 14 / 14% Firms lacked the 
qualitative 
perspective to 
properly and 
consistently 
execute risk 
management. 
Siloed Risk 
Management 
Siloed risk 
management 
processes and 
inadequate 
resources. 
 Lack of integration from an 
enterprise level down to a LOB 
unit level.  Lack of a 
multidisciplinary view of risks 
(credit vs. tech vs. operational vs. 
fraud vs. vendors vs. market vs. 
business continuity, etc.) caused 
each to managed within a silo.  
Focus on safety/soundness vs. 
3 / 11% 11 / 15% 14 / 13% 
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consumer protection. /  / There 
was also a lack of accountability.  
The gov't would fine or issue a 
MRA, but until they took control 
of capital reallocation it was less 
of an area of focus for 
CEO/Board level executives. 
(RM) 
Corporate Greed 
Corporate greed. 
I believe the barriers included 
complacency (e.g., prosperity, 
what bubble?), lack of 
accountability (e.g., "too big to 
fail" so called insurance policy) 
and too much greed (e.g., revenue 
based incentives primarily driving 
all financial transaction 
decisions, including those 
decisions made by Rating 
agencies. Risk management was 
not part of the compensation 
equation.)  (REG) 
0 / 0% 11 / 15% 11 / 11% 
Lack of a risk 
culture and 
accountability. 
Risk Focus 
Periods of 
stability/complacen
cy reduces the 
focus on or priority 
of risk 
management. 
Complacency. As long as the 
business was thriving and 
regulators weren't knocking on 
the door, management was more 
apt to assume risk exceeding its 
stated risk appetite. (RM) 
4 / 13% 5 / 7% 9 / 9% 
Complexity & 
Interconnectedness 
Complexity and 
interconnectedness 
of 
financial/economic 
environment 
creates barriers to 
effective risk 
management. 
Certainly the complicated legal 
structures of firms contributed to 
poor understanding of aggregate 
risk in the firm.  Poor/disjointed 
systems and poor data 
contributed to the ability to 
identify and quantify key risks, 
both at business line level and at 
the enterprise level.  Complex 
financial products (including 
legal/contractual obligations) 
were not well understood by 
decision maker.  But we need to 
keep in mind that the 
unprecedented national collapse 
of the housing market, the black 
swan/100 year event drove a lot 
of the crisis.  I doubt even the best 
risk managed shops could have 
prepared for something that was 
considered inconceivable by 
virtually all market participants 
in 2005.  (REG) 
3 / 11% 3 / 4% 6 / 6% 
Overconfidence 
Overconfidence in 
existing risk 
management 
processes. 
Prior to the financial crisis, I 
believe the management of many 
large institutions held a 
"misguided level of confidence" 
regarding the effectiveness of 
their risk management practices.  
2 / 7% 4 / 5% 6 / 6% 
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Since the crisis, many institutions 
experienced large losses and 
many lessons have been learned. 
There now exists a different 
mindset about risk management.  
Many large institutions have 
enhanced their risk management 
practices and have hired 
experienced professionals and 
staff for these functions. (RM) 
Regulatory 
Oversight 
Weak regulatory 
oversight. 
Lack of government oversight and 
policies were to relax in favor of 
financial institutions. (REG) 
1 / 3% 5 / 7% 6 / 6% 
Misalignment to 
Strategy  
Performance/Comp
ensation not 
aligned with 
organization risk 
tolerance, 
objectives. 
Shareholder demands for 
increased share value conflict 
with sound risk management 
practices, which tend to limit 
share value growth. (REG) 
0 / 0% 6 / 8% 6 / 6% 
Corporate greed. 
Repercussions 
Lack of appropriate 
repercussion, e.g., 
civil, criminal 
penalties, global 
requirements. 
I feel that incentives offers to 
processors, executives, and 
salespeople were greater than the 
perceived repercussions of their 
actions.  Plus, "everyone else was 
doing it".  (RM) 
2 / 7% 2 / 3% 4 / 4% 
Standardized Risk 
Management 
Risk Management 
practices that were 
too standardized 
and lacked 
adaptability. 
The major barriers were reliance 
on past paradigms and an 
inherent bias of the manner in 
which types of risks would 
manifest themselves. (REG) 
1 / 3% 2 / 3% 3 / 3% 
Independent 
Oversight 
Lack of 
independent risk 
assessments/oversi
ght. 
Execution and independent 
assessment (oversight) needs to 
be in place for each organization 
(RM) 
1 / 3% 0 / 0% 1 / 1% 
Qualitative 
Challenges 
Firms lacked the 
qualitative 
perspective to 
properly and 
consistently 
execute risk 
management. 
This assumption is incorrect. 
Firms did not have good risk 
management practices. If that was 
the case the key risk indicators 
would have driven management 
to make good decisions early and 
prevent the collapse of 
institutions (e.g. banks did not 
have adequate liquidity.) Firms 
had in place quantitative risk 
controls, but not qualitative 
actions plans to execute. 
Furthermore, they didn't even 
know what hit them. (REG) 
0 / 0% 1 / 1% 1 / 1% 
 
Question: Benefits cited by bankers and regulators that were preparing Resolution Plans included improved 
understanding of the bank and improved risk management.  However, risk management practices were in 
place prior to the requirement for Resolution Plans.  What do you believe were barriers to effective risk 
management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009? Please be as specific as possible. 
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Organizational culture was found to be a major deterrent to risk management as risk 
management practices were discouraged and resistance to change was constant (Kleffner et al., 
2003).  Consistent with this, risk culture - based comments were the most common overall 
among RMs and REGs of the types of barriers to effective risk management at firms leading up 
to the financial crisis of 2007– 2009. They indicated that risk culture and accountability were 
missing in most organizations.  One RM stated, “Lack of need for effective risk management - it 
is not embedded cultural in most organisations, and certainly not within organisations that have a 
strong focus on Investment banking, so are more prone to risk taking.  Historically, I have not 
found effective risk management practices and culture to be embedded appropriately within these 
types of banks and financial services, so it is not surprising that ineffective practices were in 
place prior to the regulators mandates for RRP requirements.”  One REG stated, “Herd mentality 
and the need to stay in the game.  If you are in the business of banking, as the competitive 
pressures move to weaker risk management principles, institutions need to decide where their 
breaking point is and get out.  The consequences of pulling back require the willingness to 
sacrifice returns and prepare to ride out the storm.”    
Underestimating risk and siloed risk management - themed comments tied for the next 
most common. A higher number of RMs responses aligned to underestimating risk whereas for 
REGs, it was siloed risk management, but the overall number of responses for both was equal.  
For underestimating risk, one RM commented, “The greatest barrier may have been a lack of 
imagination - I think the severity of the financial crisis game as a genuine shock and really 
challenged peoples assumptions about the soundness of their institutions. Also, risk management 
functions are much better resourced now than they were in 2007 so there were significant 
barriers arising from a lack of trained staff.” A REG shared a similar view, “Underestimation of 
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"worst case" scenarios.  People who quantified risk underestimated the downside. Management 
doesn't understand models and relied too heavily on models…The failure to understand that 
actions that benefit the individual firm in the short run could make the situation worse for the 
industry.”   
For siloed risk management, one RM stated, “Lack of integration from an enterprise level 
down to a LOB unit level.  Lack of a multidisciplinary view of risks (credit vs. tech vs. 
operational vs. fraud vs. vendors vs. market vs. business continuity, etc.) caused each to managed 
within a silo.  Focus on safety/soundness vs. consumer protection. There was also a lack of 
accountability.  The Gov’t would fine or issue a MRA, but until they took control of capital 
reallocation it was less of an area of focus for CEO/Board level executives.” Similar to this 
perspective, one REG offered, “Lack of a fully integrated, enterprise-wide approach to risk 
management (structural/governance defects), inadequate resources devoted to risk management 
functions (under skilled and under staffed), MIS insufficient to provide for risk data aggregation 
across the firm (fragmented IS and reporting structure), mis-aligned employee incentive 
compensation policies (emphasizing profits without appropriate consideration of associated 
risks), and cultural/tone-from-the-top environmental factors that allowed and sometimes 
encouraged excessive risk taking were several of the key barriers to effective risk management.” 
Corporate greed - themed comments were the fourth most common, however, only REGs 
comments reflected this theme. Interestingly, our coding and subsequent content analysis did not 
identify this theme with RMs, yet, the instances from REGs alone were enough that this theme 
ranked fourth overall.  One REG offered, “I believe the barriers included complacency (e.g., 
prosperity, what bubble?), lack of accountability (e.g., "too big to fail" so called insurance 
policy) and too much greed (e.g., revenue based incentives primarily driving all financial 
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transaction decisions, including those decisions made by Rating agencies. Risk management was 
not part of the compensation equation.)”  Another stated, “Focus on profitability over safety and 
soundness. Lack of concentration risk management practices. Short-term incentive compensation 
practices need to put capital to use.” 
Risk focus - based comments were the fifth most common overall among RMs and 
REGs. They indicated that the long stability leading up to the crisis reduced risk focus for many 
organizations.  One REG stated, “I think the sustained period of stability was a factor.  Also the 
stress scenarios used by management across the LOBs and risk categories did not expose the 
level of credit and liquidity risk within the institutions.”  A RM shared a similar perspective 
stating, “A long period of stability caused increased loosening until the system imploded.”    
The remaining themes reflected complexity & interconnectedness (e.g., complexity and 
interconnectedness of financial/economic environment creates barriers to effective risk 
management), overconfidence (e.g., overconfidence in existing risk management processes), 
regulatory oversight (e.g., weak regulatory oversight), misalignment to strategy (e.g., 
performance/Compensation not aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives), 
repercussions (e.g., lack of appropriate repercussion, e.g., civil, criminal penalties, global 
requirements), standardized risk management (e.g., risk management practices that were too 
standardized and lacked adaptability), independent oversight (e.g., lack of independent risk 
assessments/oversight),  and qualitative challenges (e.g., firms lacked the qualitative perspective 
to properly and consistently execute risk management). 
IV.9 Quantitative, Qualitative, or Mixture 
Respondents were asked to share their perspectives on current risk management 
systems/practices and whether they believe current RMS were more quantitatively, qualitatively 
85 
 
driven, or if it were a mixture of both.  Tables 19 and 20 summarizes the respondents’ responses 
to the open-ended question: “Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as 
more “quantitatively driven” (i.e., increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of 
risk modeling renders more and more risk types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively 
driven” (i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by numbers is turned to with caution; risk 
measurements are trend indicators which may complement or be overwritten by senior 
managerial discretion, experience and judgment)  and to provide any additional perspectives.”   
Our count analysis indicates that both RMs and REGs believe that current RMS are more 
quantitatively driven.  Our coding and subsequent content analysis for respondents who offered 
perspectives identified six major categories of perspectives: quantitative (e.g., risk management 
is becoming more driven from models/numbers), mixture (e.g., risk management needs to 
balance strengths of both), judgment (e.g., data does improve risk management, but judgment of 
management should be a factor), process & tools (e.g., quantitative practices, however, the 
related processes, e.g., complex governance, complex models, do not allow for effective risk 
management),  qualitative (e.g., qualitative as some risk are inherently difficult to quantify), and 
risk type (e.g., mixture as some risk are more quantifiable than others).  
 
Table 19 Are current Risk Management Systems/Practices (RMS) more “Quantitatively” 
Driven or “Qualitatively” Driven – Counts (QT = Quantitative; QL = Qualitative; M = 
Mixture; D = Depends on Firm) 
 
  Current Risk Management Systems more 
QT, QL, M, or D 
Respondent 
Type 
Number of 
Respondents QT QL M D 
Highest % 
/ View * 
RM 32 17 6 9 0 53% / QT 
REG 76 33 9 28 6 43% / QT 
Question: Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as more 
“quantitatively driven” (i.e., increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of risk 
modeling renders more and more risk types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively driven” 
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(i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by numbers is turned to with caution; risk measurements 
are trend indicators which may complement or be overwritten by senior managerial discretion, 
experience and judgment)?  Please be as specific as possible.   
* Reflects the percentage of the most frequent view.  Both RMs and REGs viewed current RMS as 
more Quantitatively driven.   
 
Both RMs and REGs indicated that current RMS are seemingly more quantitatively 
driven.   RMs and REGs indicated quantitative at 53 percent and 43 percent respectively. Many 
REGs however identified mixture (37 percent) and comments appear to be reflective of the 
current regulatory environment that calls for modeling techniques in determining capital levels 
that must be augmented by qualitative measures such as scenario analysis and strength of internal 
controls.  For the REGs who indicated it depends on the firm, comments were light with 
responses such as “depends on the institution,” or “it depends on size and complexity of the 
institution.” 
Table 20 RMs and REGs who offered Perspectives with their choice of QT, QL, M, or D – 
Categories 
 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / 
Percentage of Total 
RMs REGs Total 
Quantitative 
Risk management is 
becoming more driven 
from models/numbers. 
Quantitatively driven.  We must 
be able to set quantifiable limits 
and measure against them to 
consider the risk management 
program to be effective (RM) 
11 / 34% 24 / 32% 35 / 33% 
Modeling/tools should 
not replace management 
judgment. 
Mixture 
Risk management needs 
to balance strengths of 
both. 
It's a mix that I think the industry 
is still trying to get right now.  
There is a need to quantify risk, 
but it cannot stand by numbers 
alone.  It needs to be balanced 
with the knowledge and 
experience of management and 
independent risk managers.  
Finding that balance is 
something that I see banks 
struggle to get right. (REG) 
9 / 28% 23 / 31% 32 / 30% 
Mixture as some risk are 
more quantifiable than 
others. 
Judgment  
Modeling/tools should 
not replace management 
judgment. 
More qualitatively driven.  Some 
risks can be easily measured 
given the availability of data, but 
we tend to over engineer a risk 
management process by 
assigning variables, weighting 
and then computing some risk 
4 / 13% 11 / 15% 15 / 14% Data does improve risk 
management, but 
judgment of 
management should be a 
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factor. score so that we can neatly and 
easily compartmentalize risks.  
While it's a helpful exercise to 
separate major risks from less 
material ones, it also simplifies 
the subjectivity and time bound 
nature of assessing risks and 
discounts management 
discretion, experience and 
judgment. (RM) 
Qualitative as 
management should use 
data with caution to 
complement experience. 
Process & 
Tools 
Quantitative practices, 
however, the related 
processes, e.g., complex 
governance, complex 
models, do not allow for 
effective risk 
management. 
Current risk management is at a 
crossroads.  Historically, it may 
have relied more heavily on 
quantification for risk 
management, but it has not 
proven to be effective as a 
"forward looking" mechanism.  
The maturation of qualitative 
based methodologies such as the 
risk and control self assessments 
and scenario analysis are 
reaching the point to be on the 
stage with quantitative 
methodologies.  However, the 
banks need to strengthen their 
data management practices to 
ensure both quantitative and 
qualitative tools function 
effectively. (REG) 
5 / 16% 7 / 9% 12 / 11% 
Risk management is 
becoming more driven 
from models/numbers. 
Qualitative 
Qualitative as some risk 
are inherently difficult to 
quantify. 
It's more qualitative.  There 
should be a balance between the 
two.  In some cases, there is a 
lack of talent or expanding 
emphasis on the quantitative 
side.  We risk having blind spots 
by just solely going on senior 
management discretion.  It's 
what you "don't see" or what 
you're not 'willing to see' that 
creates issues/events. (RM) 
3 / 9% 7 / 9% 10 / 9% 
Risk management is 
becoming more 
qualitatively driven. 
Risk Type  
Risk management needs 
to balance strengths of 
both. 
Qualitatively driven, with the 
exception of credit risk 
management which tends to be 
quantitative.  Due to the 
maturity of certain risk 
management practices (e.g. 
credit, liquidity, and interest rate 
risk)  in most institutions, they 
are more easily quantified, are 
ingrained and garner significant 
attention.  Other risks, such as 
compliance and reputation risk, 
are extremely difficult to 
quantify.  Most measurements of 
these nebulous risks tend to be 
performance indicators and not 
0 / 0% 3 / 4% 3 / 3% 
Mixture as some risk are 
more quantifiable than 
others. 
88 
 
risk indicators, backwards-
looking and not forward-
looking.  This leads management 
to be more reactive rather than 
proactive. (REG) 
 
Question: Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as more “quantitatively driven” 
(i.e., increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of risk modeling renders more and more 
risk types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively driven” (i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by 
numbers is turned to with caution; risk measurements are trend indicators which may complement or be 
overwritten by senior managerial discretion, experience and judgment)?  Please be as specific as possible.   
 
Quantitative themed comments were the most common among both respondent groups. 
They indicated that risk management is becoming more driven by models and numbers with 
capabilities to set quantifiable limits and measure against them.  According to one REG, “They 
are more quantitatively driven, which is primarily due to 1) the large size and complexity of 
large institutions, which requires more quantitatively driven approaches, and 2) regulators have 
pushed banks that way, especially through exercises like CCAR.  Regulators have all but ignored 
or severely undervalued the qualitatively driven de-risking and risk management that has take 
place post-crisis.  For example, some banks have significantly de-risked via improved AQ, 
changed underwriting practices and strategies, and running-off problem assets, but regulators 
give them little credit and instead focus on the bank's CCAR models.”  Another REG stated, 
“Risk management is more quantitatively driven as institutions attempt to model for every 
situation.”  The RMs shared these perspectives as one stated, “Risk management practices are 
more quantitative today than they were prior to the crisis.  Additional work is required to ensure 
that the models are more robust, the data used in decision making process are high quality.  The 
key to sustainability is process excellence.” Another RM shared, “Yes, current risk management 
practices are more quantitatively driven in my space.  It's all about scorecard management and 
how we are tracking that.” 
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Mixture - themed comments were the next most common. As noted, a higher number of 
REGs responses aligned to this theme than RMs with the difference between REGs indication of 
quantitative and mixture counts from our content analysis resulting in 24 and 23 respectively.  
One REG stated, “The current risk management environment is a mixture of quantity and quality 
driven methodologies with history established and models to project into the future a range of 
performance scenarios and financial outputs.”  Another REG offered similar perspectives which 
also seemed to capture challenges organizations face today by stating, “Many firms are trying to 
hold on to quantitatively driven systems given the time and effort placed into creating complex 
models.  However, the importance of qualitative factors is being realized and a shift is taking 
place. I believe both are almost equally considered in today's companies.” An RM shared a 
similar perspective stating, “I believe it is a combination of both. I think we've got better 
numbers for the models, but that the past performance bias of the models may not be as good a 
predictor of future performance due to the large number of changes that have been implemented. 
I believe we need a more effective way to weight the changes in the business, for example 
practices that have been stopped or businesses that have been sold as a moderator to the capital 
models.” 
Judgment - themed comments were the third most common.  For both RMs and REGs 
who initially appeared to indicate quantitative, qualitative or mixture, our content analysis 
identified such an explicit indication of the importance of judgment regardless of said indication, 
this category was thus created.  As an example, one RM stated, “The shift is toward quantitative 
but the current mix is still typically 60 / 40 qualitative / quantitative. Dependence on experience, 
judgment and reflection will not diminish, but will be fortified with better quantification of risk 
factors.”  One REG shared a similar perspective indicating, “I believe, current risk management 
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practices are being driven by both quantitative and qualitative factors.  The regulatory and 
legislative environment seems to be largely driving a change toward a more quantitative 
approach.  For example, Basel legislation seems to be pushing the banks toward developing 
sophisticated risk rating programs and risk modeling systems, to calculate the bank's risk based 
capital calculation. However, the bank's still seem to maintain a sense of expert judgment and 
discretion, in their risk management programs and modeling assumptions.  In my opinion, the 
bankers seem to realize the importance of providing this judgmental overlay, to the quantitative 
modeling approach.” 
Process & tools - themed comments were the fourth most common.  Our content analysis 
for both RMs and REGs indicated some of the comments that appeared initially as quantitative 
or mixture themes were in fact driving at deeper concerns with processes and tools that needed to 
be reassessed, as without these, the data was meaningless.    According to one RM, “I would 
describe my experience as more quantitatively driven at the present.  We are in an environment 
of over measuring and reporting.  In fact the amount of data and reporting has become so dense 
that in fact the metrics/reporting themselves can be a barrier to effective risk management.”  A 
similar sentiment was offered by a REG who stated, “They are more quantitatively driven which 
in most cases can be a problem because the banker does not understand the data and what it is 
really telling them.  Garbage in - garbage out. ”  This perspective appears to be in line with 
Martin et al.’s (2007) study which suggest process tool challenges can be seen in circumstances 
where risk management practices were not able to be supported by the risk applications and 
infrastructure. 
Qualitative - themed comments were fifth as both RMs and REGs indicated some risks 
are inherently difficult to quantify.  One RM state, “It's more qualitative.  There should be a 
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balance between the two.  In some cases, there is a lack of talent or expanding emphasis on the 
quantitative side.  We risk having blind spots by just solely going on senior management 
discretion.  It's what you "don't see" or what you're not 'willing to see' that creates issues/events.”  
A REG shared this view stating, “It is mostly qualitatively driven.  Quantitative measures vary 
significantly by risk discipline, product line, etc.  However I still believe decisions to concentrate 
on certain asset classes or activities is largely strategic outcomes based on organizational 
perceptions of what they are good at.  I have yet to visit a bank where statisticians are occupying 
the executive suites.” 
Risk type - themed comments were only identified with REGs.  Similarly to judgment 
and process & tools, our content analysis indicated the responses were driving at the impact that 
the type of risk may have.  As one REG shared, “Qualitatively driven, with the exception of 
credit risk management which tends to be quantitative.  Due to the maturity of certain risk 
management practices (e.g. credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk) in most institutions, they are 
more easily quantified, are ingrained and garner significant attention.  Other risks, such as 
compliance and reputation risk, are extremely difficult to quantify.  Most measurements of these 
nebulous risks tend to be performance indicators and not risk indicators, backwards-looking and 
not forward-looking.  This leads management to be more reactive rather than proactive.”  
Another REGs comment indicated impacts of risk type by stating, “I think it is a mixture of both.  
Some things such as credit risk are more easily quantifiable than other things such as strategic or 
operational risk.”  While this theme was only identified with REGs, it is consistent with 
Lundqvist’s (2014) study’s suggested pillar of “specific risk identification and risk assessment 
activities which is integral to implementing enterprise risk management systems/practices.” 
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IV.10 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of RMS 
In our final open-ended question, we asked respondents to share their suggestions to 
improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices.  Table 21 summarizes the 
respondents’ responses to the open-ended question: “What changes would you suggest to 
improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices?”   
Our coding and subsequent content analysis identified eight major categories of 
suggestions: improve risk function (e.g., risk management that functions and emanates 
consistently at Enterprise level down to current business activity level), risk culture (e.g., culture 
of risk management and accountability supported by the board and senior leadership), 
preemptive techniques (e.g., develop more dynamic, forward looking, and preemptive risk 
management tools and techniques that blends quantitative and qualitative), aligned to strategy  
(e.g., performance/compensation aligned with organization risk tolerance, objectives), regulatory 
oversight (e.g., strengthen regulations and regulatory oversight), repercussions (e.g., implement 
stronger repercussion for individual and organization, e.g., civil, criminal penalties, capital 
penalties), industry standards (e.g., risk management standards tailored at an industry level), and 
independent oversight (e.g., stronger independent assessment of risk management, e.g., outside 
organization/3rd line of defense). 
Table 21 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices 
– Categories 
  
Category 
  
Coded Response 
  
Representative Response 
Number of Responses / Percentage 
of Total 
RMs REGs Total 
Improve Risk 
Function 
Enhance the risk 
monitoring and 
challenge function 
with the right people 
involved in process. 
Human resources responsible 
for risk management must be 
treated like critical employees 
instead of a necessary evil.  They 
should be qualified and 
empowered to do their jobs 
effectively.  They should also see 
themselves in senior 
6 / 21% 21 / 27% 27 / 26% 
Improve risk 
management metrics 
and reporting. 
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Risk management 
that functions and 
emanates consistently 
at Enterprise level 
down to current 
business activity 
level. 
management - both in terms of 
promotion opportunities and in 
terms of support from senior 
management. (REG) 
Experienced, 
sufficiently 
compensated risk 
management 
personnel. 
Risk Culture 
Culture of risk 
management and 
accountability 
supported by the 
board and senior 
leadership. 
The mandate of senior 
management, and examples of 
senior management support of 
the enterprise and in-business-
unit risk groups would improve 
the perception of the risk 
management process across the 
firm.  The perception of a risk 
(and audit) group much be 
culturally changed to that of a 
partner to the business, not an 
adversary. (RM) 
5 / 18% 16 / 21% 21 / 20% 
Performance/Compen
sation aligned with 
organization risk 
tolerance, objectives. 
Preemptive 
Techniques 
Develop more 
dynamic, forward 
looking, and 
preemptive risk 
management tools 
and techniques that 
blends quantitative 
and qualitative. 
Needs to be established to 
handle short-term and long-term 
issues/situations facing the 
institution.  Must be dynamic to 
adjust to unforeseen events in 
the market place and be able to 
identify and measure existing 
risks. (REG) 
7 / 25% 12 / 15% 19 / 18% 
Stronger risk analysis 
and use of lessons 
learned. 
Improve risk 
management metrics 
and reporting. 
Aligned to 
Strategy 
Performance/Compen
sation aligned with 
organization risk 
tolerance, objectives. 
Compensation tied to risk 
management across all 
disciplines / Rewards for 
elevating high risk processes or 
self identified audit issues / 
Acknowledgement and training / 
Communication (RM) 
4 / 14% 14 / 19% 18 / 17% 
Culture of risk 
management and 
accountability 
supported by the 
board and senior 
leadership. 
Regulatory 
Oversight 
Strengthen 
regulations and 
regulatory oversight. 
Maintain current high level, 
macro oversight by banks and 
regulators.  However, insure 
that regulators have the capacity 
(staff and experienced/trained 
examiners sufficient to conduct 
targeted reviews.  Ensure 
continuous monitoring is in 
2 / 7% 6 / 8% 8 / 8% 
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place at all large (>$10B). 
(REG) 
Repercussions 
Implement stronger 
repercussion for 
individual and 
organization, e.g., 
civil, criminal 
penalties, capital 
penalties. 
Financial accountability at the 
most senior levels (i.e. CEOs 
and board members), as well as 
business line heads.   (REG) 
0 / 0% 5 / 6% 5 / 5% 
Industry 
Standards  
Risk management 
standards tailored at 
an industry level. 
I would recommend more 
consistency in how risk 
management is managed in the 
industry.  Focus would be to 
ensure all financial institutions 
are managing to the same high 
standards. (RM) 
3 / 11% 1 / 1% 4 / 3% 
Independent 
Oversight 
Stronger independent 
assessment of risk 
management, e.g., 
outside 
organization/3rd line 
of defense. 
I think a periodic, independent 
assessment of risk management 
systems and practices is needed 
in an organization on a regular 
basis.  This can be from the third 
line od defense, but an outside 
firm's view is the best.   They see 
risk management across an 
industry and can provide 
valuable help in identifying 
emerging trends. (REG) 
1 / 4% 2 / 3% 3 / 3% 
 
Question: What changes would you suggest to improve the effectiveness of risk management 
systems/practices?  Please be as specific as possible. 
Lessard et al. (2009) suggest that risk management should be embedded and integrated in 
the company's cultural and organizational fabric such that it is barely noticeable as a distinct 
management function at either the strategic or tactical level.  Also, Lundqvist’s (2014) study 
suggests “holistic organization of risk management” as a pillar that is integral to the 
implementation of enterprise risk management systems/practices.  In line with these 
perspectives, the most common suggestion category overall was improve risk function. They 
indicated that risk management functions that emanate at the enterprise level down to business 
activities are key as are risk management monitoring and challenge functions with the right 
skilled resources. According to one REG, “Human resources responsible for risk management 
must be treated like critical employees instead of a necessary evil.  They should be qualified and 
95 
 
empowered to do their jobs effectively.  They should also see themselves in senior management - 
both in terms of promotion opportunities and in terms of support from senior management.” One 
RM offered, “Staff operational and compliance risk management functions as needed to provide 
the depth of coverage required to proactively monitor and assist in managing risk.”   
Risk culture-themed comments was the second most common category overall.  These 
responses reflected earlier comments of the importance of a strong risk culture and compensation 
practices.  One RM suggested the following, “The mandate of senior management, and examples 
of senior management support of the enterprise and in-business-unit risk groups would improve 
the perception of the risk management process across the firm.  The perception of a risk (and 
audit) group much be culturally changed to that of a partner to the business, not an adversary.” 
One REG shared a similar view stating, “It has to start at the top of the organization.  The board 
and senior management need to fully understand and support its enterprise risk management 
framework.  Risk management needs to be integrated in all levels of the organization.  To 
improve systems and practices, we need to ensure that we are providing appropriate education 
and training to develop the proper talent needed to sustain sound progress towards developing 
risk management into a business as usual function.” 
While preemptive techniques was overall the third most common suggestion, this was the 
top suggestion overall for RMs.  Both RMs and REGs indicated however the need to develop 
more dynamic, forward looking, risk management tools and techniques that blends quantitative 
and qualitative methods.  This is consistent with Mikes (2014) study which suggests design 
parameter of risk tools which we adapted to the Execution phase.  This theme of preemptive 
techniques may provide practitioners context to consider relative to the Execution phase.  One 
RM stated, “Better tools that can be scaled to measure and quantify effectively.  Balance of 
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adherence vs risk taking.  We tend to over-do one at the expense of the other depending on the 
financial climate and performance of the company.  Good leadership with vision and willingness 
to have transparency.”  This view was shared by one REG who stated, “Focus on preemptive risk 
management processes. Too often risk management policies and practices are developed after an 
incident has occurred and are prepared to correct prior existing issues, while attempting to stop 
future occurrences.” 
Although aligned to strategy was overall the fourth most common suggestion, this ranked 
third overall for REGs.  Both respondent categories indicated a need to improve alignment 
between risk culture and risk accountability to strategy.   One RM suggested, “Compensation 
tied to risk management across all disciplines / Rewards for elevating high risk processes or self 
identified audit issues / Acknowledgement and training / Communication.”  A REG shared this 
perspective indicating, “More stringent compensation, hiring and governance requirements.  The 
Chief Risk Officer should be as important to the Company as the CEO and as independent.  
Compensation and should be a direct reflection of performance over the long term.  A hindrance 
to compensation management is the ability for talented individuals to job hop without regard for 
their previous employer.” 
 The overall fifth most common suggestion was regulatory oversight, however, this 
ranked sixth overall for RMs.  Both suggested the strengthening of regulations and regulatory 
oversight.  As one REG stated, “Maintain current high level, macro oversight by banks and 
regulators.  However, insure that regulators have the capacity (staff and experienced/trained 
examiners sufficient to conduct targeted reviews.  Ensure continuous monitoring is in place at all 
large (>$10B).”  One RM offered this suggestion, “There needs to be appropriate pressure by 
regulators on firms to improve effectiveness and keep focus on risk management.  However, 
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prescriptive approaches are less beneficial that conceptual frameworks left to the banks/insurers 
to interpret and apply themselves as they see appropriate to the unique aspects of their 
organizations.  Regulators genuinely need to eliminate the "too big to fail" perception in the 
market place by reinstating Glass Steagall and reducing the size of banks and increasing the 
number of larger banks.  Too much focus on the largest financial institutions at the expense of 
smaller financial institutions.” 
Repercussions was the overall sixth most common suggestion, however, this ranked last 
overall for RMs and all responses to this category were from REGs.  Perhaps this should not be 
surprising given the nature of this category relative to bankers and regulators.  One REG offered, 
“Accountability for risk takers, if not from within (upper management / Board / shareholders), 
then the financial institution regulatory agencies should step up their game by making full use of 
remedies already at their disposal (suspensions and/or removals/permanent industry bars).” 
Another REG suggested, “Let individual firms bear the consequences of the failed risk 
management, e.g. eliminate "too big to fail",” while another stated, “Financial accountability at 
the most senior levels (i.e. CEOs and board members), as well as business line heads.” 
The overall seventh most common suggestion was industry standards.  They suggested 
the development of more industry centric risk management to drive consistency, more industry 
collaboration, and more global coordination.  One REG stated, “Risk mgmt and regulatory 
supervision should be more coordinated across the global while still taking into consideration the 
different cultures and beliefs.”  This sentiment was reflected in one RMs comment stating, “A lot 
of progress has been made on risk management, but reducing variability within and across 
institutions will be required for risk management to be effective within the industry.” 
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The final suggestion was independent oversight where they suggested stronger 
independent assessment of risk management systems/practices.  As offered by one REG, “I think 
a periodic, independent assessment of risk management systems and practices is needed in an 
organization on a regular basis.  This can be from the third line of defense, but an outside firm's 
view is the best.   They see risk management across an industry and can provide valuable help in 
identifying emerging trends.”  This was echoed by one RM stating, “Independence needs to be 
there; stronger then third line.” 
IV.11 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of RMS:  Analyzed Through Descriptive 
Profiles 
We sought to further analyze the suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS as 
reflected in Table 21 by analyzing the suggested improvements by the respondent groups 
descriptive profiles captured in Table 2 to determine if there were differences in the ranking of 
the suggested improvements by analysis through gender, education, and age of our respondent 
groups of RM and REG.  Tables’ 22, 23, and 24 summarize the suggested improvements by 
gender, education, and age respectively.  
Table 22 summarizes the suggested improvements by gender of the respondent groups.  
The gender total count differs from the education, age, and summary of suggested improvements 
Tables of 28 RMs and 77 REGs.  The gender total count is 27 RMs and 76 REGs as two 
respondents did not provide their gender, however, we were still able to code these two 
respondent’s responses through our content analysis and hence include the category of their 
coded response as part of the gender total count.  These two are reflected in the table as “blank.”   
99 
 
Table 22 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices 
– Analyzed Through Descriptive Profiles – Gender 
 
Respondent 
Group 
  Category * 
Gender ** Count IRF RC Pre AtS RO Rep IS IO 
RM 
Male 21 2 3 7 3 2 0 3 1 
Female 6 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Blank 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sub-total 28 6 5 7 4 2 0 3 1 
 
       
   
REG 
Male 60 17 10 10 13 5 3 1 1 
Female 16 3 6 2 1 1 2 0 1 
Blank 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sub-total 77 21 16 12 14 6 5 1 2 
Overall Total Count *** 27 21 19 18 8 5 4 3 
 
* The Category acronyms correspond to the Categories identified in Table 24 resulting from our content 
analysis, subsequent coding, and category identification as follows: IRF = Improve Risk Function; RC = Risk 
Culture; Pre = Preemptive Techniques; AtS = Aligned to Strategy; RO = Regulatory Oversight; Rep = 
Repercussions; IS = Industry Standards; IO = Independent Oversight. 
**Two respondents (1 RM and 1 REG) did not provide their gender, however, we were still able to code 
these two respondent’s responses through our content analysis and hence include the category of their coded 
response as part of the gender total count.  These two are reflected in the table as “blank.” 
***The overall total count reflects the summation of the sub-totals for RMs and REGs for each Category.  
This conforms to the total count figures presented in Table 21. 
 
While the overall total count conforms to the totals in suggested improvements to RMS 
Table 21, which we expected, we do note several differences in rankings of suggestions for 
improvement of RMS by gender.  First, for RMs, the most frequent category was preemptive 
techniques; yet, females had no responses that were coded as this.  For females, the top category 
was improve risk function which aligns to the top overall category when combining both 
respondent groups.  It is difficult to surmise what may be the root cause driver of the difference 
in males versus females relative to preemptive techniques, however, relative to its top ranking to 
the RM respondent group would seem to suggest this is due to their intimacy with risk 
management in day to day activities as bankers and hence their desires for the development of 
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more dynamic, forward looking, and preemptive risk management tools and techniques that 
blends quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Second, for REGs, the most frequent category was improve risk function and it was the 
top category for males.  However, for females, it was second, behind risk culture.  Perhaps one 
driver may be the females desire to be overall more protective.  Yet, as with RMs and their 
overall top choice of preemptive techniques, not surprisingly, the top choice for our supervisory 
regulators of improve risk function may be driven in part by their sense of the importance of 
oversight and governance capabilities in financial institutions. 
Table 23 summarizes the suggested improvements by education of the respondent groups. 
We collapsed education into two groups; four year college or less and more than four year 
college.  Unlike gender, all respondents provided their education profile thus there is no blank 
label and consistent with the suggested improvements Table 21 and gender Table 22, the 
respondent group counts are 28 and 77 for RMs and REGs respectively.  
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Table 23 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices 
– Analyzed Through Descriptive Profiles – Education 
 
Respondent 
Group 
  Category * 
Education ** Count IRF RC Pre AtS RO Rep IS IO 
RM 
Four year 
college or less 
7 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 
More than four 
year college 
21 5 2 6 2 2 0 3 1 
Sub-total 28 6 5 7 4 2 0 3 1 
 
       
   
REG 
Four year 
college or less 
28 10 6 6 5 1 0 0 0 
More than four 
year college 
49 11 10 6 9 5 5 1 2 
Sub-total 77 21 16 12 14 6 5 1 2 
Overall Total Count *** 27 21 19 18 8 5 4 3 
 
* The Category acronyms correspond to the Categories identified in Table 24 resulting from our content 
analysis, subsequent coding, and category identification as follows: IRF = Improve Risk Function; RC = Risk 
Culture; Pre = Preemptive Techniques; AtS = Aligned to Strategy; RO = Regulatory Oversight; Rep = 
Repercussions; IS = Industry Standards; IO = Independent Oversight. 
** We collapsed education into two groups; four year college or less and more than four year college. 
***The overall total count reflects the summation of the sub-totals for RMs and REGs for each Category.  
This conforms to the total count figures presented in Table 21. 
 
The sub-totals and the overall total count numbers do not change compared to the 
suggested improvements Table 21, and gender Table 22.  For RMs, the most frequent category of 
preemptive techniques was generally suggested by those with more than a four year degree; this 
may provide those individuals with additional insights and perspectives and may serve as the 
difference between individuals with similar overall years of experience.  This may also reflect 
additional learned perspectives resulting in more explicit suggestions such as industry specific 
risk management standards and independent oversight beyond the traditional third line of 
defense, versus perhaps the more general notion of “culture,” which was the top category for 
RMs with four year college or less.  Similarly for REGs, the distinctions appear to be in 
categories of repercussions, industry standards and independent oversight, which may reflect 
additional learned perspectives resulting from additional formal education. 
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Table 24 summarizes the suggested improvements by age of the respondent groups. We 
collapsed age into three groups; less than mid (i.e., 34 or less), mid (i.e., 35 – 44), and more than 
mid (i.e., 45 or more).  Unlike gender, all respondents provided their age profile thus there is no 
blank label and consistent with the suggested improvements Table 21, gender Table 22, and 
education Table 23, the respondent group counts are 28 and 77 for RMs and REGs respectively.  
 
Table 24 Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management Systems/Practices 
– Analyzed Through Descriptive Profiles – Age 
 
Respondent 
Group 
  Category * 
Age ** Count IRF RC Pre AtS RO Rep IS IO 
RM 
Less than Mid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mid 9 3 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 
More than Mid 19 3 3 6 3 2 0 2 0 
Sub-total 28 6 5 7 4 2 0 3 1 
 
       
   
REG 
Less than Mid 4 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Mid 15 2 3 3 4 2 1 0 0 
More than Mid 58 18 11 9 9 4 4 1 2 
Sub-total 77 21 16 12 14 6 5 1 2 
Overall Total Count *** 27 21 19 18 8 5 4 3 
 
* The Category acronyms correspond to the Categories identified in Table 24 resulting from our content 
analysis, subsequent coding, and category identification as follows: IRF = Improve Risk Function; RC = Risk 
Culture; Pre = Preemptive Techniques; AtS = Aligned to Strategy; RO = Regulatory Oversight; Rep = 
Repercussions; IS = Industry Standards; IO = Independent Oversight. 
** We collapsed age into three groups; less than mid (i.e., 34 or less), mid (i.e., 35 – 44), and more than mid 
(i.e., 45 or more). 
***The overall total count reflects the summation of the sub-totals for RMs and REGs for each Category.  This 
conforms to the total count figures presented in Table 21. 
 
The sub-totals and the overall total count numbers do not change compared to the 
suggested improvements Table 21, gender Table 22, and education Table 23.  For RMs, the most 
frequent category of preemptive techniques was generally suggested by those in the more than 
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mid group; this may be indicative of the experiences of these individuals with existing risk 
management techniques utilized within their institutions thus prompting this response.  For 
REGs, the most frequent category if improve risk function may be a reflection of these seasoned 
supervisory regulators to improve risk function to enhance oversight and governance capabilities 
in financial institutions. 
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V CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
V.1 Conclusions 
Despite the past history of financial crisis’ including the most recent Great Recession and 
the resultant calls to improve risk management, there is still good reason to worry about the role 
and profile of risk management as financial institutions continue to be distressed by negative 
events.  Yet, current assessment still finds that empirical work on ERM is limited (Eckles et al., 
2014) and in most cases, our review of risk management literature has found that the focus of the 
articles was not explicitly to seek barriers to effective risk management. 
This research contributes to the literature in a number of ways.  Our exploration of 
barriers to effective risk management connects with previous work of Kleffner et al. (2003), and 
Beasley et al. (2005) that calls for additional research including barriers to effective risk 
management.  The proposed RGF utilizes an RMS with three phases of Readiness, Execution, 
and Administration adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011) connects with his call for leveraging these 
factors and phases of RMS in different empirical ways relative to risk management.  We refined 
our RMS by drawing from Mikes et al.’s (2014) study which suggests three ERM design 
parameters and three contingency variables classifying different types of risk events and 
Lundqvist’s (2014) research which suggests four pillars as integral to the implementation of an 
ERM.  This connects with their calls for leveraging these design parameters and contingency 
variables, and furthering analysis of the four pillars.  Schiller et al. (2014) suggests that 
organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and risk knowledge 
generation with current ERM frameworks.  Hence, our final contribution is our proposed RGF 
that draws from van Asselt et al.’s (2011) three risk principles which connects with her efforts to 
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synthesize risk governance and incorporate these principles to serve as the underlying guiding 
risk principles of our proposed RGF.   
As a result, our research on barriers to effective risk management through the lens of the 
proposed RGF, which incorporates the RMS enhanced as noted, provides rich perspectives on 
barriers to effective risk management and suggestions to improve effectiveness of risk 
management which may help practitioners and academia alike consider ways to analyze and 
improve risk management.   
In comparing RMs and REGs, the findings indicate that our respondents strongly viewed 
that barriers to effective risk management can manifest in the phases of Readiness, Execution 
and Administration.  The respondents also strongly viewed the importance of the three risk 
principles to effective risk governance and risk management.  Both RMs and REGs have similar 
views of the selected barriers to effective risk management ranking accountability, i.e., a lack of 
accountability, poorly defined job roles/responsibilities, and the level of employee involvement 
in risk management systems/practices, as the top item with only the Independent Samples T-Test 
for oversight indicating a statistically significant difference.  Some studies suggest that the focus 
on auditability by interested stakeholders may cause organizations to overlook perhaps weaker 
indicators that may actually point towards risks (Power, 2004; Huber et al., 2013; Tekathen et al., 
2013).  Our results however do not seem to support that auditability focus is a strong barrier to 
effective risk management.  Of the selected nine possible barriers to effective risk management, 
auditability ranked ninth overall and for REGs, and tied for eighth overall for RMs. 
Both RMs and REGs believe compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective 
risk management and indicated the greatest barrier may arise from compensation practices that 
are misaligned to strategy. They indicated personnel “should be compensated for behaving 
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consistently with the strategy, i.e., performing what is expected and not inspected.”  This 
misalignment could also be with an organizations risk tolerance levels as one REG noted the 
importance of “aligning to risk management strategies.”  In addition, excessive risk taking and 
lack of compensation related controls round out the top three.  While both respondent groups 
indicated that barriers may manifest in the Execution phase, the percentage of REGs who viewed 
this was higher than RMs and both indicated Administration as the second most impacted phase 
which appears reasonable with the notion of properly administering compensation practices to 
ensure alignment to strategy.  
The notion of “insurance” creating barriers to effective risk management reflected some 
differences between RMs and REGs where RMs generally did not believe barriers would 
manifest and REGs generally indicated it may.  However, it is interesting that REGs “Yes” 
response was 49 percent and “No” response was 47 percent which seems to indicate questions 
exists on the notion of “insurance” and the “moral hazard” it may present.  For some RMs and 
REGs, regulatory oversight themed comments indicated a perceive benefit to risk management 
resulting from the “higher price is paid through high capital requirements” thus causing 
organizations to “become more active in challenging business decisions.”  However, there was 
agreement on the phase where barriers may manifest; for those respondents who indicated 
phases, the highest percent for both RMs and REGS was for the Execution phase. 
On how complete RMS must be to be “effective,” both respondent groups overall 
indicated “<100 percent complete.”  The top category of themes for both “100 percent complete” 
and “<100 percent complete” was dynamic risk management.  The general notion for both 
appeared to be that regardless of the percent complete, “the bar on RMS should be dynamic and 
evolve with the environment.”  There were clear indications of the importance of risk culture 
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with RMS but its meaning differed, e.g., the “<100 percent complete” responses indicated the 
risk culture as important to enable RMS when less than 100 percent, yet, for “100 percent 
complete” was cited with, “Leaving a framework incomplete sends the message that risk 
management is not a priority.” The second top category for “100 percent complete” and “<100 
percent complete” was key risk controls and risk management maturity level respectively.  For 
“100 percent complete” key controls included yearly simulations and trail testing of key controls 
and for “<100 percent complete” respondents indicated strong risk managers can offset 
incomplete RMS. 
The state of the financial/economic environment is viewed as important in shaping 
general perceptions of the effectiveness of risk management and that these perceptions may 
generate barriers to effective risk management.  Both RMs and REGs viewed the level of 
importance as overall high.  If barriers were to manifest they would generally do so in the 
Execution phase.  Administration was the next most cited phase where barriers may manifest.  
Risk focus was the top category as respondents indicated that periods of stability may reduce the 
focus on or priority of risk management.  Concerns were also expressed that strong risk culture 
needs to be maintained in both up and down cycles.  Similarly, both respondent groups indicated 
that perceived stability may drive more risk taking and complacency.  Interestingly both 
respondent groups indicated regulatory oversight may manifest barriers by “driving the focus of 
risk management” or that there is a “lag between financial entrepreneurialism and regulation.”  
In an effort to identify barriers to effective risk management leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009, our analysis revealed 13 major categories.  The top three are risk culture, 
underestimating risk, and siloed risk management.  Organization culture was identified in a study 
of Malaysian public companies of independent non-executive directors as impacting, or being 
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barriers to, their effectiveness in performing their roles (Annuar, 2012).  In line with this, risk 
culture was the top theme overall among RMs and REGs. They indicated that risk culture and 
accountability were missing in most organizations as one RM stated: “Lack of need for effective 
risk management - it is not embedded cultural in most organisations, and certainly not within 
organisations that have a strong focus on Investment banking, so are more prone to risk taking.  
Historically, I have not found effective risk management practices and culture to be embedded 
appropriately within these types of banks and financial services, so it is not surprising that 
ineffective practices were in place prior to the regulators mandates for RRP requirements.”   
Underestimating risk responses from both respondent groups indicate insufficient stress testing 
and consideration of tail events, a lack of imagination, and lack of understand of the types of 
risks present.  Both respondents indicated siloed risk management as the third category citing a 
lack of integration from an enterprise level down to a LOB unit level.  They indicated this 
included inadequate resources devoted to risk management functions. 
Mikes’ (2011) study characterized two types of calculative risk cultures of “quantitative 
enthusiasm” and “quantitative scepticism” and our results seem generally consistent in that our 
content analysis of respondents’ responses identified a mixture category indicating both 
quantitative and qualitative even though mixture was not offered in the survey question.  
However, our results do not appear to align with the notion of “scepticism” with quantitative 
information but rather a need to balance the “strengths” of quantitative and qualitative methods.  
Nonetheless, both RMs and REGs indicated that current RMS are seemingly more quantitatively 
driven.  REGs however also identified with mixture along with quantitative at 37 percent and 43 
percent respectively.  Quantitative based themes indicated large size and complexity of 
institutions require more quantitative driven approaches which have been amplified by 
109 
 
regulations such as capital adequacy reviews.  The mixture based themes do not necessarily cast 
quantitative method in a negative light but rather impress the growing importance of qualitative 
methods such as scenario analysis and risk control self assessments and that simply some risk are 
just inherently difficult to quantify.   
The final perspectives obtained from the respondent group were suggestions to improve 
the effectiveness of RMS.  REGs suggested as their top choice, which was the top choice overall, 
to improve the risk function.  This includes enhancing the function with experienced, sufficiently 
compensated personnel; improving monitoring and challenge functionality by ensuring the right 
people are involved in the process; and improving risk metrics and reporting. While improve risk 
function was the top category overall, for RMs, it was second and the top category was 
preemptive techniques.  RMs suggests the development of more dynamic, forward looking and 
preemptive risk management tools and techniques that blend quantitative and qualitative 
methods; stronger risk analysis and use of lessons learned; and also improving metrics and 
reporting.  Risk culture was overall second and both respondent groups indicated the importance 
of a strong risk culture emanating down from the board and senior leadership with heavy 
emphasis on accountability; and ensuring performance/compensation practices are aligned to 
organization risk tolerances, objectives and strategy.     
Our study adds perspectives from those institutions risk management practices recently 
required to create RPs and certain agency’s regulators, thus providing rich insights, and practical 
perspectives to risk management professionals and academia alike. In most cases, our review of 
risk management literature has found that the focus of the articles was not explicitly to seek 
barriers to effective risk management.  Our study provides such focus and additional 
perspectives.  Also, we do not necessarily portray our proposed RGF as an enterprise-wide risk 
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management system or as a framework for just financial institutions, but more so a model that 
may be drawn upon by practitioners in varying industries and at all levels of an organization’s 
risk management practices.  
V.2 Implications 
Our research indicates that empirical work on risk management is limited and can be 
classified along three main lines of research – describing the ERM practice, analyzing the 
determinants of ERM adoption, and assessing the valuation effect of ERM (Eckles et al., 2014). 
While these paradigms may offer continuing research opportunities, we suggest a different 
mission for risk management in research and practice.  Our agenda would move us away from 
perhaps why RMS is or is not adopted to one of why does it not function as fully as intended.   
Given the emphasis on RMS and the seemingly continued focus on it and the challenges 
it has faced, the extant research often seems peripheral to the core importance of RMS: to 
mitigate risks.  RMS adoption, including its most popular form of ERM, and whether its 
organically developed or whether you are getting the necessary valuation from RMS, does not 
seem as controversial any more versus the time where most financial institutions were throwing 
around the acronym of “ERM” as the savior against risk.  It seems since, and perhaps evidenced 
by literature and more importantly, real life negative events, that RMS, including ERM, has 
continued to miss the mark of its intended purpose: to mitigate risk.  Our mission seeks to pursue 
research of RMS in empirical ways that go beyond the traditional paradigms to new, more 
realistic and practical views. 
 At the core of our mission are four perspectives.  We share these perspectives to help 
move away from these current paradigms that seems to, in part, drive RMS research and to help 
practitioners leverage this study’s findings in their fight against barriers to effective risk 
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management.  First, the notion of controls and procedures are important points to include as part 
of any RMS, but its focus should not be at the expense of the RMS’s intended purpose of 
mitigating risks.  This may drive the perception that RMS is simply a part of a “tools culture” 
driven by concerns for audit and control thus undermining its ability to improve risk 
management (Huber et al., 2013a).  Hence, we can see the evolved accounting or internal 
controls based RMS serving as organizational compliance mechanisms or “rationalization 
machines” which have been implicated as the reason for some company’s failure, as risk 
management was relegated to a compliance function (Ghoshal, 1987; Beasley et al., 2010; Mikes 
et al., 2014; Burchell et al., 1980; Kaplan et al., 2012).   
One way to achieve a more sound foundation of RMS to transcend these perceptions and 
truly drive a “risk focus” versus “controls focus” is to ground RMS in Risk principles.  The 
concept of risk management and governance pertains to the various ways in which many actors, 
individuals, and institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, 
complexity, and/or ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011).  Risk principles may serve as guidance 
for practitioners as they need to understand how different individuals and groups within 
organizations define risk, potential biases in risk assessment, and challenges in implementing 
risk management initiatives as many risks cannot be calculated on the basis of probability and 
effects alone (Bromiley et al., 2014; van Asselt et al., 2011).   
 Second in our mission is normative research on barriers to effective risk management.  
Our review of risk management literature generally did not find articles focusing explicitly on 
barriers to effective RMS.  Our study provides practical perspectives that may be explored to 
provide realistic benefit and value in understanding risk management both practically and 
academically.  From our selected barriers to effective risk management question, lack of 
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accountability and weaknesses in risk management personnel resonated most with both our 
respondent groups (see Table 7).  Risk culture was prevalent through our respondents’ responses 
and was the top category identified of barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (see 
Table 18). The top three suggestions to improve the effectiveness of RMS are improving the risk 
function, risk culture, and preemptive techniques (see Table 21).   
Normative implications may be beneficial and such studies could investigate, for 
example, are there particular risk categories (e.g., operational, credit risk) that preemptive 
techniques may be better suited for, or what prevents organizations from incorporating more 
forwarding looking risk management tools and techniques.  Similarly, we can seek perspective of 
our study’s identified “mixture” category when we sought respondent’s perspectives on whether 
the current RMS’s are more quantitatively or qualitatively driven. Rather than seeking 
perspectives of “calculative risk cultures” (Mikes, 2011) and whether organizations are 
“quantitative enthusiast or skeptics,” perhaps perform studies on organizations to identify “RMS 
enthusiast” and the type of “risk culture” that is present that shapes their success or failure.  
Studies of factors impeding “accountability” as cited by both our respondent groups as the top 
barrier of effective RMS from the selected barriers question would seem warranted and perhaps 
timely with recent negative events including the London Whale and from past issues such as 
underwriting issues stemming in part from the notion of “robo signing.”  Research on 
inconsistent “risk focus” could ask how organizations may improve it such that it is consistently 
maintained in both up and down financial cycles; is it due to management biases or some other 
theoretical concept that may be root cause drivers of, for example, complacency during up 
cycles.  This may in turn provide organizations practical perspectives to consider correcting such 
impediments to consistent execution of “risk focus.” 
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Continued leveraging of the RGF is the third mission perspective.  Schiller et al., (2014) 
suggests that organizations risk management is limited due to a lack of the concept of risk and 
risk knowledge generation with current ERM frameworks.  Further, some suggest that the 
current ERM model is too strongly influenced by accounting and auditing standards of control, 
with an emphasis on detailed controls supported with robust documentation evidencing 
effectiveness of the controls (Power, 2009; Talwar, 2011; Jordan et al., 2013).  Our RGF seems 
warranted as it foundationally rest on Risk principles versus emphasizing standards of internal 
controls which may enhance the understanding of risks and the ways in which actors and 
institutions, public and private, deal with risks surrounded by uncertainty, complexity, and/or 
ambiguity (van Asselt et al., 2011) that appear to be lacking with current organizational risk 
management (Schiller et al., 2014).   
On-going investigation of RMS at financial institutions through the RGF may continue to 
refine and further enrich the practical insights gained from our study. Table 17 lists the 
previously discussed category of barriers by phase as determined by our content analysis for the 
questions pertaining to compensation practices, the banking environment providing a type of 
“insurance,” and the state of financial/economic environment.  Further research into these 
barriers may enhance views and perspectives into current RMS to identify more practical 
solutions by phase to mitigate these barriers.  Similarly, scrutiny from academia may identify 
factors correlating to organization learning, adaptive leadership, or decision making theories that 
provide additional insights into these theories and/or other paradigms. 
Finally, we would probably all agree that RMS will continue to be a focus area for 
practitioners for the foreseeable future.  With that said we believe our study identifies practical 
focus areas for practitioners to consider breaking down barriers to effective risk management and 
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improving RMS.  We suggest that while the study’s major findings and implications are not 
necessarily definitive answers to the challenges of RMS, we are confident in suggesting that the 
perspectives obtained from these RMs and REGs should be strongly considered and leveraged 
where appropriate regardless of industry.   
V.2.1 Major Suggestions/Implications 
The major suggestions and implications to improving RMS are reflected in Table 25.  
This table reflects the top overall categories from the questions: nine selected barriers to effective 
risk management, compensation practices, barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, suggestions to improve risk management, and state of the financial/economic environment. 
Table 25 Major Suggestions to Improve the Effectiveness of Risk Management 
Systems/Practices 
 
 
Category * Suggestions/Implications Study Question 
Accountability 
 Organizations should be more 
aggressive enforcing accountability. 
 More explicit processes, procedures 
and governing policies. 
Nine selected barriers to effective 
risk management (Table 7). 
Misalignment 
to Strategy 
 Should apply to all areas of the 
organization. 
 Should include control and assurance 
functions, i.e., Risk Management 
Function and Internal Audit. 
Compensation practices (Table 9). 
Risk Culture 
 Risk Management Function should 
perform periodic assessment of risk 
culture at Enterprise and business unit 
level. 
 Internal Audit should perform periodic 
assessment of the Risk Management 
Function relative to risk culture and at 
the business unit level relative to risk 
culture. 
 These assessments should be 
fundamentally and deliberately 
enhanced to first align with van Asselt 
et al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of 
understanding how the enterprise 
and/or business units tackle risks that 
they may not be certain with, are 
complex or ambiguous, before jumping 
straight to the notion of, “what are the 
controls and processes we have in 
Barriers leading up to the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009 (Table 18). 
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place?” 
Improve Risk 
Function 
 Implement more dynamic, forward 
looking, and preemptive risk 
management tools and techniques that 
blend quantitative and qualitative 
methods. 
 Risk Management Function and 
personnel should be of high stature in 
the organization and very 
knowledgeable of business area. 
 Risk Management Function needs to be 
respected (e.g., due to high knowledge 
of the business area) and perhaps, on 
certain levels, feared. 
Suggestions to improve 
effectiveness of RMS (Table 21). 
Risk Focus 
 Require continuous monitoring of 
Enterprise and business area risk focus 
by first, second, and third lines of 
defense. 
 These assessments should be 
fundamentally and deliberately 
enhanced to first align with van Asselt 
et al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of 
understanding how the enterprise 
and/or business units tackle risks that 
they may not be certain with, are 
complex or ambiguous, before jumping 
straight to the notion of, “what are the 
controls and processes we have in 
place?” 
 Board/senior management and risk 
culture must explicitly stress the 
importance of RMS in both up and 
down cycles; this should be supported 
by many of the aforementioned 
suggestions/implications. 
State of the financial/economic 
environment (Table 16). 
 
* Top overall categories from the questions of nine selected barriers to effective risk management, 
compensation practices, barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, suggestions to improve 
risk management, and state of the financial/economic environment. 
 
Accountability – was the top category from the nine selected barriers to effective risk 
management question (Table 7).  Organizations, simply put, need to be more aggressive on this 
point.  As one REG indicated, “You can have all the systems and/or processes in the world…but 
it matters not when the body creating risk is not held accountable.”  It must be hardwired at the 
board and senior management team level and the notion of a “lack of accountability” should be 
116 
 
eliminated.  Incorporating the use of explicit procedures, controls and governing policies and 
standards can drive the importance of and enforcement of accountability and it should be done so 
at all levels and areas of an organization.   
Misalignment to strategy – was the top category from the compensation practices 
question (Table 9).  However, this perspective is critical on many levels as our respondents’ 
responses suggest, thus it should not be limited to the notion of compensation alone.  Many 
financial institutions have a strategy and may have elements such as a risk appetite statement to 
serve as guidance for the entire organization.  Ensuring that all organizations actions and 
activities are not in contravention of these types of guiding statements needs to be critically 
assessed.  While areas such as compensation practices in revenue generating areas may be an 
obvious area of focus to ensuring alignment to strategy and should not be ignored, critical 
assessment should include ensuring proper alignment of the Risk Management Function program 
and the scope and activities of the Internal Audit function to such guiding statements, thus 
ensuring the rigor and direction of these control/assurance functions. 
Risk culture – was the top category for the barriers leading up to the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 question (Table 18), but was also a prevalent category in other questions.  A strong 
risk culture, including risk management, cannot be viewed, as noted by one RM, “as an 
impediment by the business or an expensive overhead cost.”  Much the same with 
Accountability, and really any of these categories, it must start from the top of the organization 
and be driven throughout the organization to all levels.  As the notion of risk “culture” denotes a 
conceptual/intangible perspective, one way to put some substance to risk culture may be to 
formalize explicit assessments of risk culture by second and third lines of defense in the form of 
the Risk Management Function creating “risk culture” requirements that businesses must adhere 
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to and are periodically assessed against by the Risk Management Function.  This could be further 
supported by periodic assessments by Internal Audit’s review of the Risk Management Function, 
i.e., how well they drive adherence to risk culture at the business unit, and enterprise levels.  
These assessments should be fundamentally and deliberately enhanced to first align with van 
Asselt et al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of understanding how the enterprise and/or business 
units tackle risks that they may not be certain with, are complex, or ambiguous.  The Risk 
Management Function should have a critical eye toward business units or enterprise functions 
that tend to jump straight to the notion of, “what are the controls and processes we have in 
place,” i.e., a “controls focus” versus ensuring their understanding of the risk presented, i.e., a 
desired “risk focus.” 
Improve risk function – was the top category for the suggestions to improve the 
effectiveness of RMS question (Table 21).  Several of the respondents indicated the need to have 
risk management processes and techniques emanating from the enterprise level consistently 
down to the business unit level.  Also, one REG suggested that the Risk Management Function, 
“Should be qualified and empowered to do their jobs effectively.  They should also see 
themselves in senior management - both in terms of promotion opportunities and in terms of 
support from senior management.”  While we did not disagree with the importance of the stature 
of the Risk Management Function, we suggest, and view the following as equally if not more 
important than stature, that the Risk Management Function needs to be respected for its 
knowledgeable personnel; perhaps on a certain level, even feared, due to their practical 
knowledge of the businesses they support in a second line capacity. 
Risk focus – was the top category for the question of the state of the financial/economic 
environment (Table 16).  Organizations need to focus on putting a priority on RMS in both up 
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and down cycles. This is important as one RM indicated, “All the attention is placed on bad 
times because there is proof of poor risk taking.  In good times, when too much risk is being 
taken, there is no proof and therefore less ability to challenge that behavior.  It’s about sustaining 
reasonable behavior during both parts of the cycle.”  One suggestion is to deploy similar tactics 
noted for risk culture whereby periodic mandatory risk assessments are performed relative to 
maintaining risk focus by the first, second, and third lines of defense.  As one REG indicated, 
“The systems were not in fact good when the economy was favorable but the shape of the 
economy played a big part in everyone believing that risk management was good because there 
was a lack of testing of the adequacy of systems.”  However, as noted for risk culture, these 
assessments should be fundamentally and deliberately enhanced to first align with van Asselt et 
al.’s (2011) Risk principles focus of understanding how the enterprise and/or business units 
tackle risks that they may not be certain with, are complex, or ambiguous.  The Risk 
Management Function should have a critical eye toward business units or enterprise functions 
that tend to jump straight to the notion of, “what are the controls and processes we have in 
place,” i.e., a “controls focus” versus ensuring their understanding of the risk presented, i.e., a 
desired “risk focus.” 
This study provides many more practical consideration points for practitioners to 
consider towards breaking down barriers to effective risk management.  History of the financial 
crisis’ experienced over the years paints a dire picture of the supposed positives of RMS; 
however, we view our study as one that provides rich perspectives of barriers to effective risk 
management that is not readily apparent in extant literature, that we believe will have positive 
implications for both academia and practitioners alike.   
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V.3 Limitations 
Risk management as a technical discipline has been in existence for over 50 years and it 
seems the role and its profile will continue to have strong bearing in practice and in academia.  
Though this study has proposed a RGF, it is an exploratory initial effort.  As with all research, 
there are limitations associated with this study.  This study builds from Cho et al.’s (2014) study 
on perceptions of the effectiveness of RPs.  Hence, first, the study targeted only the 130 financial 
institutions subject to the Section 165 (d) RP formation requirements and only two groups, Risk 
Managers and Regulators.  Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assume that expanding the 
targeted population and the respondent groups to non-financial industries and non regulated 
groups may build upon this study’s data and further enrich perspectives on barriers to effective 
risk management.  Second, this analysis required coding of responses, and identification of 
categories and themes, and required professional judgment, still however, the intercoder 
reliability seems to evidence sound analysis.  Lastly, the RGF has been developed from existing 
literature and the researcher’s perspectives as a regulator.   
V.4 Future Research 
Future research leveraging this RGF may identify opportunities for enhancement based 
on feedback from industry practitioners and academia.  A study focusing more explicitly on 
facets of the RGF may identify opportunities for enhancement and provide additional insights 
into the practical applications, for example, of the three risk principles.  A second area of 
research is continued exploration of the insights obtained from this study.  Risk culture was such 
a prevalent theme and perhaps it should not be a surprise, but one obvious question is what are 
barriers to effective risk culture?  The notion of adaptive leadership and the possible benefits 
toward driving an organization to embrace risk culture may provide insights to risk management 
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challenges as well.  Third, research into the impacts of modeling and their use to an 
organizations risk management processes may be insightful with the growing regulatory 
requirements calling for the use of models; does this change the dynamics of the risk functions? 
The necessary make-up of resources in the risk function?  One respondent indicated that he/she 
has yet to go into a bank and see a “quant” sitting in the CEO’s desk, but what about CRO? Or 
COO?  Fourth, continuing exploration using the RGF in other regulated industries such as 
healthcare may provide further rich context on barriers to effective risk management. 
V.5 DISCLAIMER 
 
This study does not represent the views of any particular financial institution, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the 12 Federal Reserve District Banks. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Tables  
Table 26. Critical Success Factors and Definitions, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes et al. 
(2014)*. 
Variable name  Definition and properties 
Business type Type of the business that the organization is involved in, including its final product 
or service, and the relative level of technology that is implemented in the 
organization. 
Communication  Communication of risk issues, communication systems which are used in the 
organization, and its hardware infrastructure and software capabilities design. It 
also includes data analysis systems and non-official and emotional communications 
within the organization. 
Consultants  Utilization of management consultancy services in organization. 
Documentation  Documentation system which is used in the organization and its hardware 
infrastructure and software capabilities design. It also includes the data accuracy 
level in the organization. 
Education Competence, awareness, training, and education of the organization’s personnel, 
including risk management staff about RMS, its processes, tools, and applications. 
Environment  External environment in which the organization is performing. It encompasses the 
effects of market, suppliers, competitors, socio-political systems and also the 
organization’s partnership and joint venture strategies. 
(2) External risks. 
General management 
skills 
General management skills including problem-solving, negotiating, 
communication, and influencing the organization. 
Leadership Leadership characteristics of risk and top managers. This factor is excluded from 
general management skills due to its importance and attention that it has gained 
from risk management researchers and practitioners. 
Organizational culture Staff morale and commitment. Flexibility, adaption to change, and respect to 
external management consultants. 
Organizational structure Organization’s design, allocation of authorities, and responsibilities. 
Performance reporting Risk performance measurement, monitoring, and feedback for both short- and long-
term performance measurements. 
Process design Detailed and clear process design for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; 
frequency of risk meetings; and risk tools design and availability of documented 
process ownerships for the organization’s internal processes. 
(1) Processes for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; Frequency of risk 
meetings; Risk tools. 
(2) Preventable risks; Strategy execution risks; External risks. 
Project management 
skills 
Maturity of the organization’s project management capabilities. 
Resources  Availability of all kinds of resources and infrastructure including human resources, 
organizational validity, and technical validity. Cost and time are also included in 
this category. 
Accountability  Job roles/responsibilities and also level of employee involvement in RMS clearly 
defined. 
Reward and recognition 
system 
Availability of reward and recognition system schemes in organizations. 
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Strategy  Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward 
risk management in the organization. 
(2) Strategy execution risks. 
Team-building  Existence of developed teams and teamwork spirit within the organization. 
Top management  Level of top management support of RMS practices. 
* Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2). 
 
Table 27. Critical Success Factors (CSF) - Readiness, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes et al. 
(2014)*. 
Readiness CSF* Defined as: Factors that have influence on the inclination and readiness of a 
corporation for implementing RMS. 
Environment  External environment in which the organization is performing. It encompasses the 
effects of market, suppliers, competitors, socio-political systems and also the 
organization’s partnership and joint venture strategies. 
Organizational culture Staff morale and commitment. Flexibility, adaption to change, and respect to external 
management consultants. 
Resources  Availability of all kinds of resources and infrastructure including human resources, 
organizational validity, and technical validity. Cost and time are also included in this 
category. 
Strategy  Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward 
risk management in the organization. 
(2) Strategy execution risks. 
*For this study we mainly selected those CSFs that were graded as more significant.  We also selected "Strategy" 
for all three phases as it was graded more significant in all three. 
Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2). 
 
Table 28. Critical Success Factors (CSF) - Execution, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes et al. 
(2014)*. 
Execution CSF* Defined as: Factors that are important during the design and 
implementation of RMS in a corporation and can significantly affect the success 
of RMS design and implementation. 
Performance reporting Risk performance measurement, monitoring, and feedback for both short- and long-
term performance measurements. 
Process design Detailed and clear process design for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; 
frequency of risk meetings; and risk tools design and availability of documented 
process ownerships for the organization’s internal processes. 
(1) Processes for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks; Frequency of risk 
meetings; Risk tools. 
(2) Preventable risks; Strategy execution risks; External risks. 
Accountability  Job roles/responsibilities and also level of employee involvement in RMS clearly 
defined. 
Strategy  Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward 
risk management in the organization. 
(2) Strategy execution risks. 
*For this study we mainly selected those CSFs that were graded as more significant.  We also selected "Strategy" 
for all three phases as it was graded more significant in all three. 
Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2). 
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Table 29. Critical Success Factors (CSF) - Administration, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), and Mikes 
et al. (2014)*. 
Administration CSF* Defined as: Factors that are crucially important to successfully run, maintain, 
update, and administrate RMS after design and implementation. 
Communication  Communication of risk issues, communication systems which are used in the 
organization, and its hardware infrastructure and software capabilities design. It also 
includes data analysis systems and nonofficial and emotional communications within 
the organization. 
Organizational 
structure 
Organization’s design, allocation of authorities, and responsibilities. 
Strategy  Well-defined and clearly understood vision, mission, and long-term strategy toward 
risk management in the organization. 
(2) Strategy execution risks. 
Top management  Level of top management support of RMS practices. 
*For this study we mainly selected those CSFs that were graded as more significant.  We also selected "Strategy" 
for all three phases as it was graded more significant in all three. 
Denotes Design parameters (1), and Contingency variables (2). 
 
Table 30. RMS design parameters and contingent variables, adapted from Mikes et al. (2014). 
Design Parameters 
Processes for identifying, 
assessing, and 
prioritizing risks 
- Risk identification can take place face-to-face or through self-assessments. 
- Risk discussions can be confined to senior line managers and staff or can be 
decentralized by engaging front-line, support, and administrative staff as well. 
Frequency of risk 
meetings 
Frequency of risk identification and assessment processes must match the velocity of 
risk evolution. 
Risk tools - Use multidimensional visualizations, such as risk maps, to quantify risks along 
likelihood, impact, and controllability dimensions. 
- Choice of risk tools, ranging from qualitative descriptions and scenarios to the 
measurement of expected and unexpected loss, will be conditioned by (1) the 
availability of data and knowledge about a particular risk (loss) and (2) how relevant 
and reliable the available risk tools are in the eyes of risk experts and everyone else 
using the tools. 
Contingency variables, classifying risk types 
Preventable risks Arise from routine operational breakdowns or from employees’ unauthorized, illegal, 
unethical, incorrect, or inappropriate actions. Companies gain nothing by tolerating 
such risks; they are inherently undesirable. Depending on the firm’s tolerance for 
failure and on the existence of cost-effective controls, management should strive to 
reduce the incidence of preventable risks to zero. 
Strategy execution risks Organizations may take on risks to generate superior returns; while mitigation efforts 
may occur, some residual strategy risks will always remain. 
External risks Arise from events that the company cannot influence. Some of these risks are closely 
entwined with the firm’s strategic choices and are therefore related to strategy 
execution risk. For example, mergers and acquisitions and geographical and market 
expansion entail the partly controllable risks of strategy execution, but they also 
introduce external uncontrollable uncertainties—new political, regulatory, and 
competitive environments. 
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Table 31. Four Pillars of RMS Implementation, adapted from Lundqvist (2014). 
General internal environment 
and objective setting 
The first two components are not directly associated with risk management;  
These can be viewed as ‘‘prerequisites’’ of ERM implementation. These 
components are necessary to have well-functioning and well implemented ERM 
but are neither connected directly to risk management activities nor specific to 
ERM. Therefore, firms with no effort toward holistic risk management, or risk 
management at all for that matter, can have implemented these two prerequisite 
factors robustly. 
General control activities and 
information and 
communication 
Holistic organization of risk 
management 
The third component distinguishes between firms that are actively managing 
different risks of the firm and those that are not, but this component provides no 
information on the organization of these risk management activities. 
Specific risk identification and 
risk assessment activities 
The fourth component contains the dimensions that are characteristic of an 
enterprise-wide risk management implementation, for example, formal written 
statement of risk appetite, correlating and determining portfolio effects of 
combined risks, having a senior manager assigned the responsibility of 
overseeing risk. 
 
 
Table 32 Guiding Risk Principles of the Proposed Risk Governance Framework, adapted from van Asselt 
et al. (2011). 
Principle* Defining details 
Communication and 
Inclusion (CI) 
- CI is used in the two-way sense of the term. Effective mutual CI is one of the key 
challenges in risk governance. 
- Positively framed, CI is at the core of any successful risk management activity. 
Negatively framed, a lack of CI destructs risk management. 
- CI in the context of RMS refers to exchanges between policy-makers, experts, 
stakeholders and the general public, and among themselves. 
- Aim of CI is to provide a better basis, also in terms of trust and social support, for 
responsible governing of uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous risks. 
- CI may serve the sharing of information about the risks and possible ways of 
handling them. 
- CI may support building and sustaining trust among various actors through which 
particular arrangements or risk management measures become acceptable.  
- CI may result in actually involving people in risk-related decisions, through which 
they gain ownership. 
- CI does not mean that everyone is communicating with everyone during the whole 
process. Social learning is required also to figure out which type of CI with whom is 
important in which phase or stage of the RMS. 
- Critical issues for CI include: Who is included? What is included? What are the 
scope and mandate of the process? 
- CI  can take different forms: roundtables, open forums, negotiated rule making 
exercises, mediation, or mixed advisory committees, including scientists and 
stakeholder. 
- CI is needed to explore various sources of information and to identify various 
perspectives. 
- CI is a means to agree on principles and rules that should be respected in the 
processes and structures of collective decision-making. 
- CI supports the co-production of risk knowledge, the coordination of risk 
evaluation, and the design of risk management. 
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Integration - Refers to the need to collect and synthesize all relevant knowledge and experience 
from various disciplines and various sources including uncertainty information and 
articulations of risk perceptions and values. 
- Emphasizes that also values and issues such as reversibility, persistence, ubiquity, 
tolerability, equity, catastrophic potential, controllability, and voluntariness should be 
integrated in risk assessment and evaluation. 
- Reflects the importance of such multi-dimensional evaluations. Risk management is 
not usually about a single risk; it requires risk(s)-benefit(s) evaluations and risk-risk 
trade-offs. 
- Refers to the process itself. Risk management advances a holistic 
approach to framing, appraising, characterizing, evaluating, and managing risks. This 
implies that a strict separation between risk assessment and risk management is 
counterproductive. 
- Calls attention to the need to consider the interconnections, both content-wise and in 
terms of process, between the various risk-related activities. 
 - Risk governance cannot be routinized. It is important that the actors and institutions 
involved reflect on what they are doing to manage risk and continue to emphasize 
that the risks considered are uncertain, complex, and/or ambiguous, as the temptation 
to treat them as simple and to apply familiar routines remains huge. 
- A collective reflection about balancing pros and cons is needed. 
- Emphasizes that there are important difficult issues (uncertainty, complexity, 
ambiguity, and balancing act) that need repeated consideration of all actors 
throughout the process. Otherwise, the process risks to (re)introduce the familiar 
frames and routines developed for simple risks. 
*These three principles should not be considered as separate steps or stages, but as principles that should be 
considered at every step or phase in the risk management system. 
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Readiness Execution Administration
General internal environment 
and objective setting
Integration
General control activities and information and communication
Reflection
Table 33. Proposed Risk Governance Framework, adapted from Yaraghi et al. (2011), Lundqvist 
(2014), Mikes et al. (2014), and van Asselt et al. (2011).
Holistic organization of risk management
Specific risk identification and risk assessment activities
Risk Management System
Communication and Inclusion
Guiding Risk Principles
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Appendix B: Survey questionnaire 
 
SAMPLING PLAN 
 
We will sample from a Federal Reserve email distribution list which will produce a list of regulators and bankers, 
and LinkedIn members.  We will also leverage/apply snow ball effect technique generated from the above sources.  
We also plan to reissue the link to the web-based questionnaire 3 additional times (total of 4 distributions) to provide 
ample opportunities for the respondents to participate. 
 
For the lists obtained from the Federal Reserve email distribution, this will include personnel with the title of 
“Examiner” and “Analyst” from all twelve Federal Reserve District Banks, which are as follows: 
 Richmond 
 New York 
 Boston 
 Atlanta 
 Kansas City 
 St Louis 
 Minneapolis 
 San Francisco 
 Dallas 
 Chicago 
 Philadelphia 
 Cleveland 
 
The list obtained from the Federal Reserve email distribution will also include those Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) regulators, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulators, and Federal 
Reserve System (Board) personnel with responsibility for the supervision and regulation of the 130 financial 
institutions.  The list obtained from LinkedIn will be comprised of only individuals from the 130 institutions with 
job responsibilities generally associated with risk management responsibilities.  Each respondent will be also be 
invited to forward the invitation to their known colleagues who are bankers or regulators with responsibilities related 
to risk management oversight.  A systematic random sample will be selected from the developed e-mail lists. We 
believe the sample population and sample size will be approximately 600.  We anticipate we will have responses in 
the range of 100 to 200 respondents.  The respondents will be offered a summary of the study results as an incentive 
for completing the survey. 
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EMAIL INVITATION 
 
Hello: 
 
You are invited to complete our survey about how professionals like yourself feel about general risk management 
practices and its impact on organizations and NOT just what has happened in the last 5-10 years, e.g., factors leading 
to the passing of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
  
The questions pertain to your PERSONAL views and beliefs and do NOT ask any questions about your employer.    
  
The survey has 20 questions and should take you approximately 30 minutes to complete. Your participation in this 
study is completely voluntary. Your responses and all data from this survey will be reported only in the aggregate 
and no personal information will be shared. All information will be coded and will be, and remain 
CONFIDENTIAL. If you have questions at any time about the survey or its procedures, you may contact Edward 
Cho at the email address specified below. 
  
If you are interested in a summary of the study’s results we would be happy to send them to you as a token of our 
appreciation.  At the end of the survey you’ll have an opportunity to identify this interest. 
  
Thank you very much for your time and candidness. Please start with the survey now by clicking on the "Take the 
Survey" text below.  
  
Sincerely, 
Ed Cho 
Doctoral Candidate, Georgia State University. 
echo14@student.gsu.edu 
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SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Q1. For which type of organization are you currently employed? 
1. Financial institution including bank or insurance company (GO TO Q2) 
2. Government regulatory agency (GO TO Q2) 
3. Other (TERMINATE) 
 
Q2. Please review the statements below related to “Readiness” factors relative to risk management 
systems/practices and select the answer that best reflects your personal views.  “Readiness” factors are 
defined as factors that have influence on the inclination and readiness of an organization for implementing 
risk management systems/practices. 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
    
 Strongly 
Agree 
Q2.1 Poorly defined strategy hinders firms’ 
risk management systems/practices. 
 
(Strategy is defined as the organizations 
vision, mission, and long-term 
objectives.) 
       
Q2.2 Poor organization culture hinders firms’ 
risk management systems/practices.  
 
(Organization culture is defined to 
include staff morale and commitment, 
and flexibility to change.) 
       
Q2.3 Lack of appropriate resources hinder 
firms’ risk management 
systems/practices. 
 
(Resources is defined to include 
infrastructure including human 
resources, and technical resources (cost 
and time are included in this category).) 
       
Q2.4 External environment in which the 
organization is operating hinder firms’ 
risk management systems/practices.  
 
(Environment is defined to include the 
effects of market, suppliers, competitors, 
socio-political systems, and the 
organization’s partnership and joint 
venture strategies.) 
       
 
Q3. Please review the statements below related to “Execution” factors relative to risk management 
systems/practices and select the answer that best reflects your personal views.  “Execution” factors are 
defined as factors that are important during the design and implementation of risk management 
systems/practices in an organization and can significantly affect the success of risk management 
systems/practices. 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
    
Strongly 
Agree 
Q3.1 Poorly understood strategy hinder 
firms’ risk management 
systems/practices. 
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(Strategy is defined as the organizations 
vision, mission, and long-term 
objectives.) 
Q3.2 Poor process design hinder firms’ risk 
management systems/practices. 
 
(Process design is defined to include 
processes for identifying, assessing, and 
prioritizing risks; frequency of risk 
meetings; and risk tools design; and 
availability of documented process 
ownerships for the organization’s 
internal processes.)  
       
Q3.3 Lack of accountability hinder firms’ risk 
management systems/practices. 
 
(Accountability is defined to include 
defined job roles/responsibilities, and the 
level of employee involvement in risk 
management systems/practices.)  
       
Q3.4 Inadequate risk performance reporting 
hinder firms’ risk management 
systems/practices. 
 
(Performance reporting is defined to 
include risk measurement, monitoring, 
and feedback reporting.) 
       
 
Q4. Please review the statements below related to “Administration” factors relative to risk management 
systems/practices and select the answer that best reflects your personal views.  “Administration” factors are 
defined as factors that are important to successfully run, maintain, update, and administrate risk 
management systems/practices after design and implementation. 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
Q4.1 Poorly communicated strategy hinders 
firms’ risk management 
systems/practices. 
 
(Strategy is defined as the organizations 
vision, mission, and long-term 
objectives.) 
       
Q4.2 Inadequate organization structure hinders 
firms’ risk management systems/practices. 
 
(Organization structure includes the 
design, allocation of authorities, and 
responsibilities.)  
       
Q4.3 Inadequate levels of top management 
support of risk management 
systems/practices hinder firms’ risk 
management systems/practices. 
 
(Support is defined to include driving 
accountability and ownership of risk 
       
136 
 
management systems/practices.) 
Q4.4 Inadequate communication of risk issues 
hinder firms’ risk management 
systems/practices. 
 
(Communication is defined to include 
processes to identify, assess and 
prioritize risks, including software/data 
analysis tools used to facilitate the 
communication.)  
       
 
Q5. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements about Risk Governance and 
Risk Management.  
  Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
Q5.1 Communication is key to effective risk 
governance and risk management. 
 
(I.e., communication exchanges 
between policy makers, stakeholders, 
and experts.) 
       
Q5.2 Inclusion is key to effective risk 
governance and risk management. 
 
(E.g. involving people in risk-related 
decisions through which they gain 
ownership.) 
       
Q5.3 Integration is key to effective risk 
governance and risk management. 
 
(I.e., synthesis of risk perceptions and 
values; risk management is not usually 
about a single risk, it requires risks-
benefits evaluations and risk-risk trade-
offs.) 
       
Q5.4 Reflection is key to effective risk 
governance and risk management. 
 
(I.e., risk governance cannot be 
routinized. Actors must reflect on what 
they are doing to manage risk and 
continue to emphasize that the risks are 
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous, as 
the temptation to treat them as simple 
and to apply familiar routines remains 
huge.) 
       
 
Q6. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement about risk management 
systems/practices.  
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
     
Strongly 
Agree 
Q6.1 In general, if you want to manage risk, 
you have to quantify it. 
       
Q6.2 In general, current risk management 
systems/practices support the 
integration of learned or acquired risk 
knowledge.  
       
Q6.3 Organization compensation practices 
that are misaligned with risk 
management impact risk taking. 
       
Q6.4 The current unique banking 
environment promotes more risk taking 
by institutions due to the concept of 
“too big to fail.”  I.e., taking risks is 
made easier with the understanding that 
the institution will be “bailed out.” 
       
Q6.5 Risk management systems/practices are 
important to overall institution 
performance. 
       
 
Q7. For each of the following statements, please indicate the degree to which you feel each is a barrier to 
effective risk management. The scale is 1 to 7 where 1 means "Very Low Significance as a Barrier" and 7 
means "Very High Significance as a Barrier." 
  Very Low 
Significance 
as a Barrier 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
Very High 
Significance 
as a Barrier 
7 
Q7.1 Risk management systems/practices are 
more focused on auditability and 
documentation evidence. 
       
Q7.2 Lack of a well-defined and clearly 
understood vision, mission, and long-
term strategy toward risk management 
in the organization. 
       
Q7.3 Lack of accountability, poorly defined 
job roles/responsibilities, and the level 
of employee involvement in risk 
management systems/practices.  
       
Q7.4 Lack of qualified personnel to execute 
risk management practices. 
       
Q7.5 Disparity of local risk management 
processes and enterprise level risk 
management processes. 
       
Q7.6 Lack of lower levels of management 
involvement in risk assessments. 
       
Q7.7 Inadequate level of documentation, i.e., 
lack of clearly documented risk issues 
or concerns. 
       
Q7.8 Inadequate oversight by the board and 
senior leadership. 
       
Q7.9 Organization challenges in 
accommodating socio-political 
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factors/pressures. 
 
Q8. Do you believe that an organization’s compensation practices may manifest barriers to effective risk 
management?  If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and 
“Administration,” does it manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these phase versus 
another?  Please be as specific as possible.   
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q9. Do you believe that the current unique banking environment provides a type of “insurance” for some 
organizations with the concept that “too big to fail” may indicate the organization would be “bailed out?”  
If so, relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” does 
this notion of “insurance” manifest barriers to effective risk management more in one of these phases 
versus another?  Please be as specific as possible.   
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q10. Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration” factors, for 
risk management systems/practices to be considered “effective,” please select the answer that best reflects 
your personal views: 
1. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be complete and in place for risk 
management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
2. All phases of Readiness, Execution, and Administration factors must be in place, but do not have to be 
100% complete, for risk management systems/practices to be “effective.” 
 
Q11. Please provide any additional perspectives to your choice for the percentage complete question above. 
Please be as specific as possible. 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q12. How important is the state of the financial/economic environment in shaping general perceptions of the 
effectiveness of risk management?  (i.e., if we are coming out of a financial crisis then general perceptions 
of risk management may be different than if there is a long period of stability.). Please be as specific as 
possible.   
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q13. Relative to the previously discussed phases of “Readiness,” “Execution,” and “Administration,” do you 
believe that the state of the financial/economic environment may manifest barriers to effective risk 
management?  (E.g., in periods of long stability, management may begin to focus less on Execution factors 
thus creating potential barriers to effective risk management.) Please be as specific as possible.   
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
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 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q14. Benefits cited by bankers and regulators that were preparing Resolution Plans included improved 
understanding of the bank and improved risk management.  However, risk management practices were in 
place prior to the requirement for Resolution Plans.  What do you believe were barriers to effective risk 
management at firms leading up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009? Please be as specific as possible. 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q15.  Would you describe current risk management systems/practices as more “quantitatively driven” (i.e., 
increasing availability of data and the rising sophistication of risk modeling renders more and more risk 
types as manageable by numbers), or “qualitatively driven” (i.e., risk modeling and managing risks by 
numbers is turned to with caution; risk measurements are trend indicators which may complement or be 
overwritten by senior managerial discretion, experience and judgment)?  Please be as specific as possible. 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q16. What changes would you suggest to improve the effectiveness of risk management systems/practices?  
Please be as specific as possible. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q17. Please indicate your age: 
1. Less than 25 years old 
2. 25-34 
3. 35-44 
4. 45-54 
5. 55 or older 
 
Q18. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? 
1. Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling) 
2. High school incomplete (Grades 9-11 or Grade 12 with NO diploma) 
3. High school graduate (Grade 12 with diploma or GED certificate) 
4. Some college, no degree (includes community college) 
5. Two year associate degree from a college or university 
6. Four year college or university degree/Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB) 
7. Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no postgraduate degree 
8. Postgraduate or professional degree, including master’s, doctorate, medical or law degree (e.g., MA, 
MS, PhD, MD, JD) 
 
Q19. What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
Q20. If you’d like to receive a summary of this study’s findings, please enter your email address. 
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 _____________________ 
 
 
This concludes our survey.  We thank you for your time and opinions. 
 
